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ABSTRACT
The overall objective of the study was to determine the
financial characteristics of companies involved in merger
activity. More specifically, the study aims to determine:
(a) whether acquired companies possessed
financial characteristics similar to previous
failed companies (the 'failing-company'
hypothesis);
(b) whether acquiring companies possessed
financial characteristics similar to previous
failed companies and
(c) the impact of acquisition on the
post-acquisition performance of acquiring
companies, and particularly to consider whether
their performance differs according to the
financial characteristics of the companies they
acquired.
A new "bankruptcy prediction" model, contemporary with
the acquisition data, was derived, tested for robustness, and
applied to samples of acquired and acquiring companies. An
indirect test of the 'failing-company' hypothesis was carried
out by comparison with the results obtained on application of
the model to control groups of non-acquired and non-acquiring
companies.
The test indicated that a higher proportion of acquired
companies possessed financial characteristics similar to
failed companies than the control group of non-acquired
companies. This evidence tends to support the
'failing-company' hypothesis as a motive for mergers for
acquired companies. Conversely, there was no such evidence
in support of the hypothesis for acquiring companies.
ii
The approach adopted also allowed the dichotomy of
acquired companies (failing vs. non-failing) which made it
possible to test for differential post-acquisition
performance of the acquiring companies.
In order to evaluate the post-acquisition performance of
acquiring companies, three different measurement criteria
were adopted. They were:
(a) accounting-based profitability and gearing
ratios
(b) industry-standardardised profitability
measure (Meeks (1977)) and
(c) performance analysis-scores (PAS-score)
(Taffler (1983)).
The results indicated that the acquiring companies
generally incurred a decline in their post-acquisition
profitability measures, while they increased their gearing
ratios. Generally, the group acquiring potentially failing
companies exhibited 'superior' post-acquisition performance
compared with the group acquiring "non-failing" companies.
These findings support the managerial motives for
mergers since there appears to be little evidence that
mergers are undertaken to increase profitability as implied
in neoclassical motives. They also suggest the possible need
for a review of public policy towards mergers; perhaps
mergers ought to be encouraged only if they prevent impending
bankruptcy by the acquisition of failing companies.
:iii
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Study Overview: 
Corporate takeovers and mergers are now a common
feature of modern business life. They form a major avenue
for the growth maximizing firm. The size and intensity of
takeover activity in recent time have triggered off varied
speculations about the motives of acquisitions. Equally,
several new defensive strategies have been adopted to ward
off unwanted takeover bids.
The broad goals of this study are to investigate the
financial characteristics of the companies involved in
takeover activity. The first focus is on determining
whether the acquired companies were in danger of failure
prior to their acquisition, in other words whether merger
route was adopted to avoid bankruptcy . The second focus
is determining the post-acquisition performance of the
acquiring companies.
21.2 Previous Knowledge: 
As the rate of takeover activity continues to rise,
several attempts have been made to discover the
motivations, financial characteristics and impact of this
form of business activity. The bulk of these studies have
,	 •
taken one of two major approaches: (1) to determine the
impact of acquisition on the financial performance of the
acquiring companies and (ii) the prediction of takeover
targets.
The outcome of the studies to determine the impact of
acquisition on the performance of the acquiring companies
is not unambiguous. Some studies indicate that on average
profitability of the acquiring companies declined after
the merger (Singh (1971), Meeks (1977)), whilst Cosh,
Hughes and Singh (1980) showed that in their sample,
acquiring company profitability either increased, or
remained the same following the merger.
There are theoretical justifications for these
findings. In recent years, many theories for explaining
merger motives have been discussed in both finance and
economics literature. There is a measure of agreement
between the authors that motives for merger can be broadly
defined by two theories, 'managerial' and 'neoclassical'.
The discussion of these theories and their relevance to
the post-acquisition performance of the acquiring
companies is undertaken in Chapter 3.
3The second approach adopted by previous empirical
studies on merger has involved the application of the
statistical technique of discriminant analysis to develop
a combination of accounting ratios to predict take-over
targets (Singh (1971), Stevens (1973)). This approach has
had a measure of success. However, while it may be
possible to predict takeover targets, it does not follow
that the predicted 'targets' are likely to be acquired.
Most previous empirical studies of financial ratios
have investigated the behaviour of the ratios of companies
during years preceding economic events like corporate
bankruptcy, and default on long-term debt (Beaver
(1966,1968), Altman (1968), Edmister (1972) and Taffler
(1982)). All these studies support empirically the
contention of proponents of ratio analysis (e.g. Foulke
(1968)), that certain ratios are capable of predicting
business failure. However, only two studies have
investigated empirically the failing-company doctrine for
companies involved in merger activities. There are two
versions of the doctrine; the first for the acquired and
the second for the acquiring company. The first version
of the doctrine views acquisition as a way to avoid
bankruptcy for the acquired firm (Dawey (1961)). The
second version views acquisition as a 'defensive' strategy
for the acquiring company against bankruptcy (Weston and
Mansinghka (1971)).
4Stevens and Shrieves (1979) used data from U.S.A.
companies and Altman's (1968) bankruptcy prediction model
to test the first version of the failing company
doctrine. The other study was by Taffler and Soper (1983)
using data from U.K. companies and Taffler's (1982)
model. These studies are discussed in Chapter 4.
The present study is markedly different from the two
previous studies. Stevens and Shrieves used U.S.A. data
and the outcome of the study cannot be generalized to
include U.K. corporate organisations due to institutional
and financial accounting reporting differences. Moreover,
they used a model which might have been potentially
defective. The defective nature of Altman's (1968) model
is discussed in Chapter 4. In the case of Taffler and
Soper, they used U.K. companies and their sample included
all acquisitions of quoted companies in the London Stock
Exchange during their study period. This implies that
their conclusions relate to both large and small quoted
companies during the period. One cannot conclude from the
findings of their study that severe financial crises among
'large' quoted companies in the U.K. are resolved through
the merger process. This gap in knowledge about large
firms is important, because it is this category of firms
that are likely to solicit for mergers as they seldom go
bankrupt. This study aims to fill that gap.
5Other studies, for example, Singh (1971) and Meeks
(1977) have sought to test the impact of acquisition on
the performance of the acquiring companies. These studies
have employed both market and accounting based measures of
performance. None of these studies to the knowledge of
the present author has split the acquiring companies into
two sets according to the financial characteristics of the
acquired companies. The grouping of the acquiring
companies into two sets according to the financial
characteristics of the acquired companies enables the
comparative performance of the sets to be made. This
approach would enable a statement to be made as to whether
the post-acquisition performance cf the acquiring
companies is a function of the financial characteristics
of the companies they acquired.
1.3 Objectives of the Study: 
The overall objective of the study is to determine the
financial characteristics of companies involved in merger
activity. More specifically, the study aims to
1. determine whether acquired firms were
in danger of bankruptcy prior to
acquisition
2. determine whether acquiring companies
were in danger of bankruptcy prior to
acquisition
3. determine the impact of acquisition on
acquiring companies; and particularly to
consider whether their performance
differs according to whether or not the
companies they acquired appeared to be in
danger of bankruptcy.
61.4 Significance of the Study: 
It has been suggested that most mergers are merely a
civilized alternative to bankruptcy or voluntary
liquidation that transfers assets from failing to rising
firms (Dawey, (1961)). This suggests a hypothesis that
acquisition is a route to avoid bankruptcy l . In order to
test the hypothesis, it is therefore necessary to determine
whether acquired firms would have gone bankrupt. Based on
the outcome of hypothesis testing, one might argue whether
bankruptcy or acquisition seems 'better' for the benefits
of shareholders, management, workers in particular and
society in general.
The empirical approach adopted in this study was to
derive a bankruptcy prediction model from a group of
failed and non-failed companies. The model was applied to
a group of acquired and non-acquired companies to
determine whether the proportion of firms posessing
failing characteristics is higher in the group of acquired
firms. The outcome of the empirical approach adopted in
this study could provide support for the failing company
doctrine for the acquired company. If the bankruptcy
prediction model can accurately predict failing companies,
1. Bankruptcy for the purpose of the present
study is defined as one of the following: (a)
winding-up by Order of the Court; (b) entry
into creditor's volunlary liquidation or (c)
the appointment of a receiver.
it can provide an 'early-warning' signal to both
management l
 and shareholders of an impending danger so
that, merger solicitation or other remedial actions can be
initiated.
If, acquisition is an alternative to bankruptcy for
the acquired firms, it raises additional issue for the
acquiring firms. The issue relates to the motive behind
the acquisition, given that the acquired companies were
potentially failing companies, It has, however, been
hypothesized by Weston and Mansinghka (1971) that
acquiring companies were potentially 'sick' companies who
sought to increase their size, thereby insulating
themselves from becoming possible acquisition targets.
This suggests a failing company hypothesis for the
acquiring companies. The empirical approach of this study
could also provide evidence for the failing company
hypothesis for the acquiring companies.
1. Under the Insolvency Act 1985, directors
can be sued for 'wrongly trading'. Under the
Provision, no evidence of dishonest intent need
be proved, i.e. incompetence or irresponsible
conduct may suffice.
81.5 Post-Acquisition Performance: 
Previous studies by Singh (1971), Utton (1974) and
Meeks (1977) show that acquisitions do not improve
profitability of the acquirer, and in most cases, they
suffer a severe decline in profitability subsequent to
acquisition. However, these studies treat acquisitions as
a homogeneous set. It is hypothesised in the present
study, that such an approach might mask differential
effects resulting from the nature (failing or not) of the
firms being acquired. To investigate this possibility, it
is first necessary to split the acquiring companies into
two groups - those acquiring others with failure
characteristics and those acquiring others with
non-failure characteristics - and to measure the
post-acquisition performance of each group separately.
There are several possible outcomes for the new group
post-combination performance. First, it could be that by
acquiring a potentially failing company, the profitability
of the acquirer is 'diluted' to a level that a decline in
profitability becomes apparent. Alternatively,
acquisition of a failing company might allow the purchase
of useful assets and companies relatively cheaply; if
these can be put to good use by the acquirer, an improved
performance might be expected. Acquisition of a profitable
company may conversely lead to a relaxation of effort on
the part of the management, which in turn may affect the
overall group profitability. This study seeks to provide
evidence as to the possible outcome.
91.6 Hypotheses: 
In order to achieve the objectives of the study, the
following testable hypotheses were formulated:
1. Ho:	 There is no significant difference between
the proportion of firms possessing failing
characteristics in the sets of acquired and non-
acquired firms:
2. Ho:	 There is no significant difference between the
proportion of firms possessing failing characteris-
tics in the sets of acquiring and non-acquiring
firms:
3. Ho:	 There is no difference between the post-acquisition
and pre-acquisition performance of the acquiring
companies
4. Ho:	 There is no difference between the performance of
the two groups of acquiring companies based on the
financial characteristics of the acquired
companies.
1.7 Methodology: 
This study adopts empirical research methodology to
achieve its stated objectives. An alternative methodology
which might have been adopted was an 'opinion' approach
with or without the use of questionnaires. With the
opinion methodology, the outcome of the study would be
based on the opinions (sentiments, emotions, etc) of
persons, or groups involved in the actual merger
execution. The subjective nature of the opinion
methodology renders it less appropriate for the overall
objective of this study.
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The strategy
 adopted was to derive a reliable
bankruptcy prediction model based on financial ratios,
following a similar approach to studies by Altman (1968),
Taffler (1982) and man y
 others. After testing the model
for robustness, it was applied to samples of acquired and
non-acquired, acquiring and non-acquiring companies to
test hypotheses (1) and (2). This also allowed the
dichotomy of acquired companies (failing vs. non-failing)
which was required for testing the fourth hypothesis.
The performance measurements used were mainly
accounting based including profitability and gearing
ratios, the Meeks (1977) industry-standardised
profitability measure and Taffler (1983) PAS-score, which
seeks to measure relative strength by ranking company
'Z-scores'.
1.8 Research Tools: 
The primary analytical technique used to test the
failing-company hypothesis was multivariate discriminant
analysis (MDA). Using the DISCRIMINANT procedure provided
in the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS-X),
and based on the values of the variables (financial
ratios) investigated, MDA creates discriminant profiles of
known failed and non-failed in the sample of companies
analyzed.
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Using the SPSS-x FACTOR procedure, factor analysis
was employed to lessen the problem of multicollinearityl
which is coincident with the use of MDA and financial
ratios as variables. The application of factor analysis
reduced the number of variables from which the
discriminant function was constructed.
The derived discriminant function was successful in
distinguishing between failed and non-failed companies.
Several validation tests were carried out to establish the
robustness of the model and to establish whether the
derived model was sample-specific. The validated model
was used in testing the failing company hypothesis both
for the acquired and acquiring companies.
1.9 Data Collection: 
Financial statements of companies used in the
analysis were obtained from the Extel Cards, Annual
Published Statements by the Companies and from the
Department of Trade. The Companies were at various
relevant periods quoted on the London Stock Exchange.
The set of companies used in the derivation of the
bankruptcy prediction model were known to have either
failed or survived during the period under review. The
1. Multicollinearity is discussed in Chapter 6
Section 6.3.4
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set of companies involved in mergers were listed by the
"Times 1000" under the heading 'Largest Acquisitions and
Mergers'. The remaining set of companies were not
involved in any significant merger activity during the
period under review. These companies were used to form
control groups.
1.10 Organisation of the Dissertation: 
The dissertation is organised into two parts. The
first part of the dissertation reviews the literature on
which the study is based. The second part presents the
empirical results of the study.
In Chapter 2, the current level of merger activity is
examined and the reasons often advocated for takeover
activity are reviewed. Special attention is drawn to the
financial characteristics of the acquired companies which
lend credence to the view of acquisition as a route to
avoid bankruptcy.
In chapter 3, the acquisition motives from the
acquiring companies' point of view are discussed. Both
the theoretical and empirical views are presented to
generate expectation of the outcome of this study.
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The acquisition alternative argument raised in
Chapter 2 is developed further in Chapter 4. Both the
theoretical and empirical framework are discussed.
Prior research has suggested the usefulness of
financial ratios in the prediction of firm failure. This
literature is reviewed in Chapter 5.
The second part presents the empirical results of the
study. The methodology and detailed research hypotheses
of the study are presented in Chapter 6.
In Chapter 7, the bankruptcy prediction model is
derived from groups of failed and non-failed companies.
In Chapter 8 results of the study relating to the failed
company hypothesis are presented.
In Chapter 9 includes the analysis and results
relating to the post-acquisition performance of the
acquiring companies. The concluding Chapter 10 includes
discussion of the study's results, its findings,
limitations, implications and areas for further research.
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CHAPTER 2
A REVIEW OF MERGER ACTIVITY
2.1 Introduction: 
This chapter centres on a discussion of mergers and
the reasons often advocated for their popularity. Special
attention is drawn to the financial characteristics of the
companies acquired during mergers.
2.2. Merger Spate 
The recent merger spate is a feature not just
confined to the United Kingdom but is found in many
advanced industralized nations, for example, the United
States of America. The timing of this intensive takeover
activity has varied slightly between the economies of the
developed countries. However, the main peak of the
takeover activity can be identified with the early 1970's
(see Table 2.1. relating to the United Kingdom).
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TABLE 2.1
MERGER ACTIVITY: INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL COMPANIES 1969-19841
Year	 No of Acquisitions
and Mergers
No
Acquiring
No
Acquired
Value
(a)
1969 686 846 1,068.9
1970 629 793 1,122.5
1971 687 884 911.1
1972 928 1,210 2,531.6
1973 929 1,205 1,304.3
1974 427 504 508.4
1975 276 315 290.8
1976 315 353 427.2
1977 427 481 ' 824.0
1978 484 567 1,140.0
1979 447 534 1,656.0
1980 404 469 1,475.0
1981 389 452 1,144.0
1982 399 463 2,206.0
1983 391 447 2,343.0
1984 508 568 5,474.0
Source: HMSO: "Acquisitions & Mergers of Industrial and
Commercial Companies" Business Monitor, MQ 7 (various
editions).
Note: 1. Mergers within the Financial Sector are recorded in
a separate series from the figures given above. Details of
Financial Mergers are contained in the Bank of England's
Financial Company Series.
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In the U.K., merger activity in the years 1959-1972
was probably more intensive than in any other period in
industrial history, perhaps the most active since the
191 9-1 930 merger boom. However, the trend has shown
substantial cyclical fluctuation, particularly in
1970-1985. If peak years are to be identified amongst
industrial and commercial companies since 1969, the years
1969-1973 stand out clearly. By contrast 1975, was a
depressed year but there has been some recovery since then
(see also Table 2.1).
2.3 Merger Activity Among Largest Quoted Companies: 
This study examined merger activities involving the
largest quoted companies on the Stock Exchange for the
period 1979 to 1983. The sample chosen represents an
important part of takeovers among quoted companies. 	 A
criticism of this study is that it examines only a small
proportion of overall takeover activity. However, this
applies equally to most previous studies, for example,
Franks et al (1977). However, the importance of the
sample should be judged in terms of value of the acquired
companies rather than the number of takeovers examined.
For example, in 1982/83 financial year the total number of
acquired companies was 463 and the reported expenditure
was £2,200m. However, acquisitions with value over £2r11
were 114 which represents 24% of the total population.
This 24% accounted for 92.66% of the total value of
acquisition for the period (see Table 2.2)
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2.4 Distinction Between Takeover and Merger: 
Many authors, for example, Meeks and Whittington
(1975), have tended to use the terms 'merger', and
'takeover' or 'acquisition' in a completely
interchangeable fashion. However, it is important, though
not always easy, to draw a distinction between them.
'Merger' is said to occur where a new company is formed to
acquire the assets of two or more firms, and where the
terms of the amalgamation are more or less equal. It is
possible to classify the dominant firm in a merger either
on the basis of the composition of the new board of
directors, or on the book values or market values of the
merging firms.
'Takeover', however, represents the acquisition of
the assets of one company by another without the formation
of a new company. This distinction is purely legal, and
the choice between these two forms of business combination
is affected by financial and administrative considerations
rather than by broader economic justification (Moon
(1968), Singh (1971)).
19
It is worthy of mention that takeovers are by far the
more numerically dominant of the two classifications. The
most thorough examination of the quoted manufacturing
sector in the United Kingdom available so far shows that
of the 1,599 companies which were absorbed through merger
in the period 1948-1972, only 77 (or 4.8%) did so because
of merger, (Hughes, (1977)). Therefore, in general, the
terms 'takeover' or 'acquisition' are preferred,
and these terms are used in an interchangeable mannerl.
Similarly, in the present study, the terms are used in an
interchangeable fashion.
2.5. Takeover As a Paradox?: 
An initial problem to be resolved is why takeovers
occur in the first instance. Hindley (1973) asserted that
the sale of a business takes place only when the buyer has
higher expectations of its future profitability than the
seller. The higher expectation of future profitability by
the buyer may be a reason for a high bid premium.
1. There is also an accounting distinction
between the two forms of business combination -
'merger' and 'consolidation' accounting. This
distinction is not pursued in the present
study. The accounting guidelines are provided
by SSAP 23 'Accounting for Mergers and
Acquisitions'.
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There are a number of possible reasons for the
premium. First, if the merger creates new business
opportunities that increase the earning power of the
assets, part of the discounted present value of those
gains may have to be paid over to the shareholders of the
acquired company. For example, if the benefits of the
merger can be obtained by many potential acquirers, while
there is only one acquiree, competitive bidding may
increase the bid premium enough so that a large proportion
of the value of the benefits of the merger is paid to the
acquired company's shareholders as a part of the bid
price.
Franks etal (1985) suggested that where there are no
other bidders for a company, it is possible that a
successful bid can be pitched more closely to prevailing
stock market prices, and the corresponding bid premium
will be smaller. They also asserted that if the bid
premium were zero, many shareholders would still believe
there were merger benefits and would hope for a better
future bid from either the current bidder or another.
21
The bid premium has been described as an enticement
given by the acquirer to the seller to ensure the
consummation of the merger. (Graham (1966)). Weston
(1966) quoted Graham to suggest that:
” ...as a broad empirical matter, an acquiring
company must pay a 20% premium to the company
it seeks to acquire. The 20% premium must be
more than the existing price of the acquired
company's stock if it is to provide an
inducement for the acquired company's
stockholders to approve the sale" ..p 136.
Empirical studies by McCarthy (1963), Walker (1963),
Walker and Kirkpatrick (1963), Weston and Brigham (1966)
and Gort (1966) have shown that bid premiums range from
15% to 46% to acquired company shareholders.
However, Grossman and Hart (1980) suggested that some
shareholders may refuse to sell their shares even when a
bid premium is offered because they wish to remain as
minority shareholders in the merged company. The purpose
of refusing to sell their shares is to enjoy any
additional gains that may accrue to them as a result of
the merger benefits. If a sufficient number of individual
shareholders believe that the value of the merger benefits
exceeds the bid premium and behave accordingly, the bid
will fail at that price.
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Grossman and Hart call this a 'free-rider' problem because
some shareholders hope to gain on the backs of other
shareholders. This situation arises where delegation of
power is made to few individuals. A fundamental problem
with this delegation is that no individual has a large
enough incentive to devote resources to ensuring that the
representatives are acting in the interest of the
represented. Grossman and Hart refuted the suggestion
that in a company the free-rider problem can be avoided by
use of the takeover bid mechanism%
However, there may be a situation where each
shareholder is so small that his decision will not affect
the outcome of the takeover. In such a situation,
Grossman and Hart argue that if a shareholder thinks that
the takeover will succeed and that the raider will improve
the firm, he will not sell his shares, but will instead
retain them, because he anticipates a profit from their
price appreciation.
1. See Williamson (1964) for a discussion of
the separation of ownership and control in the
corporation. See also Marris (1964) and Manne
(1965) for a discussion of the role of takeover
bids in ensuring that a director serves the
interests of shareholders.
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Grossman and Hart's study is a polemic against
conventional wisdom in economics and as such merits some
digression from the main theme of this chapter. Suppose
V* is the maximum potential value of the acquired firm, V,
its current value, P, the bid price, N, the number of
shares, and NA, the number of shares purchased by the
acquirer. The situation where the bid price falls between
the actual and maximum valuation of the firm can be
represented as:
(1)	 V*	 V
> p >
N	 N
In this case, the acquiring firm would hope to gain
(V* - P) .	 NA,
N
i.e. the difference between the actual potential value of
the firm and the price they pay for the shares. However,
existing shareholders would refuse to sell their shares in
the hope of making a gain of
V* - V	 per share
N	 N
rather than P - V/N if they sell. Therefore, although a
bid is made it is unsuccessful. The bid will succeed when
(2)	 P >	 V* >	 V
N	 N
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But in this situation, there is no incentive to make a bid
which exceeds the maximum potential valuation of the
prospective victim. Hence it is concluded that a takeover
will never take place.
The empirical evidence generally does not support this
piece of economic argument. There are four main reasons
advanced for this: the existence of a mechanism to bypass
the free-rider problem; the ability for 'covert' purchases
of shares to be made; different perception between the
acquirer and the acquiror and the dilution of property
rights.
In the U.K., for example, there is an institutional
mechanism for bypassing the "free-rider" problem. If
company ABC acquires 30% or more of the voting rights of
Company XYZ, or if ABC in any period of twelve months adds
more than 2% to an existing holding of between 30% to 50%
in XYZ, then Rule 34 of the Takeover Code obliges Company
ABC to make a bid for the remainder of the equity of XYZ.
The price will not be less than the highest price ABC paid
for any XYZ shares in the previous twelve months. If the
bid results in ABC acquiring 90% or more of the shares of
XYZ that are not already owned, ABC may force the
remaining XYZ shareholders to accept the bid using the
procedure laid down in Section 209 of the 1948 Companies
Act (and amended by S. 428 and 430 of the 1985 Act).
Under a scheme of arrangement, the 90% requirement could
be reduced to 75%. A scheme of arrangement is a system
whereby the share capital of one company is cancelled and
replaced by new shares issued by the other (Davies,(1976)).
Secondly, where shares are publicly quoted on the
Stock Exchange, they may also be purchased in a piecemeal
covert fashion l without any prior consultation between the
directors or shareholders of the companies involved.
Given these situations, there may not be any incentive for
the minority shareholder to "free-ride".
The Grossman and Hart argument assumes that both the
acquiring and the target companies hold the same
perception about the value of V*. If however, the
management of the bidder is of the view that they are more
efficient than the target's management and the target's
shareholders do not have information on the managers of
the bidder2 , then the acquirer's value of V* will exceed
the potential maximum value held by either the victim's
1. Sections 198-220 of the Companies Act
(1985) enforce a disclosure. The Act's
disclosure provisions make it mandatory for a
shareholder to inform a company when a holding
exceeds 5 per cent. There is also a provision
which deals with concert parties, i.e. where a
number of investors agree to act together they
must report their stakes as a whole.
2. This position may not hold if the bidder is
a "well-known" company.
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management or shareholders. A bid in the range:
(3)
	
V*A	 V*D
> p
 >
N	 N
where A = bidder/acquirer
D	 = target/acquired
is both feasible and would be successful. Similarly, the
acquirer may not be a profit maximizer and thus willing to
pay a higher price than V*/N for all the shares.
It could also be that the existing shareholders of
the target company, rather than aiming to maximize their
benefits, seek to minimize their maximum loss. Suppose a
bid is made such that the first inequality relationship
holds (1) above. Then if shareholders refuse to accept in
the hope of a higher bid, and the bid fails, then a loss
of share value P - V/N is experienced.
Finally, if there is a possibility of "dilution" of
shares then the Grossman and Hart problem can be
overcome. If dilution of equity is entrenched into the
Company's Articles of Association, this will enable the
acquirer to exclude minority shareholders from the gains
in profit. After a successful acquisition, the acquirer
has voting control and can vote to liquidate or merge the
corporation with a parent wholly owned by the acquirer.
By undervaluing the price of the assets transferred, the
company is obtained at a discount. The dilution of
property rights of minority shareholders will, together
with the arguments presented earlier, undermine the
strength of the Grossman and Hart's paradox.
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2.6 Explanations of Recent Takeover Activity: 
The lack of empirical support for Grossman and Hart's
analysis leads one to consider some of the explanations
for takeover. Evidence suggests that stock market prices
are critical in determining the rate of takeover
activity . Gort (1969) quoted two studies that tend to
support the relation between indexes of stock prices and
merger rates. One was carried out by Nelson (1953) who
found on the basis of quarterly data for 1895-1904, a
strong correlation between an index of industrial stock
prices and number of takeovers. The other study by Weston
(1953) obtained this same result for the inter-war period
using annual data. Thus the association between stock
market prices and takeover activities appears to have been
established, although a satisfactory explanation for the
relation has not been given.
One hypothesis that has been put forward by Hughes et
al (1980) is the promoters' profits in modern takeover
activity. They argued that managers might obtain large
financial gains through takeover activities, even though
28
there were no economic gains to be generated from the
takeovers. Mueller (1969) had earlier stated:
... while 'synergistic' effects and managerial
insights are often said to be present in
various merger situations, their existence in
sufficient strength to warrant the high
premiums paid for other firms, often appears
implausible when the merger is between firms in
seemingly unrelated or loosely related
industries. This is especially true when, as
frequently happens, the acquired firm is left
to operate as An autonomous division of the
larger unit, operated by the same management
team that controlled it before the
merger". .p.643.
The economic gains to be generated from the mergers could
take place, for example, through the speculation on the
part of managers of both acquiring and acquired firms in
the shares of the acquired before the merger is
announced. Since most mergers take place through the
payment of a large premium to the shareholders of the
acquired company, any individuals who purchased on a high
margin the shares in the acquired firms prior to the
mergers' announcement would stand to make large gains.
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The situations of promoters or insiders raises a
possibility of a conflict of interest between inside
managers and outside shareholders regarding merger
activityl.
Another explanation for takeover activity is Gort's
(1969) "economic disturbance theory of mergers". He
argued that discrepancies in valuation for income
producing assets arise from differences in expectations
about future income streams and the risks associated with
expected income. When such discrepancies are
characterized by a higher value being placed on the assets
of a firm by non-owners than by owners, acquisitions
become possible. It is likely that at any given point in
time there will be differences in individual expectations
about the future profit stream of a firm and thus about
1. Mueller (1977) reviewed the evidence of
conflict of interest in the United States.
Similarly, the recent investigation of
Insider Dealings by the Securities Exchange
Commission involving Mr. I. Boesky in USA and
the case of Mr. G. Collier of Morgan Grenfell
are relevant.
30
the present value of a firm's shares. Shareholders'
differences in opinion will be a function of the quality
and quantity of the information held, different
evaluations of this information and the varying degrees of
optimism and pessimism about the firm's futurel.
Under Gores economic disturbance theory of mergers,
one can expect mergers to take place during periods of
either rapidly rising or rapidly falling share prices. In
a period of rising share prices, mergers will take place
wherever outsiders gather information about the firm's
prospects that the present holders do not obtain, if this
information leads them to upgrade their evaluation of the
firm's prospects on the basis of the information they
already hold. Again, these changes must be coupled with a
lack of change of optimism on the part of present
holders. In a falling stock market the reverse process
must take place. The present shareholders must gather
information that outsiders do not have, leading them to
1. Beaver (1981) described the information
asymmetry in terms of more informed and less 
informed investors. In this setting, the more
informed investors may be either holders or
non-holders of the security and may be either
potential sellers or buyers. In other words,
at some prices (a bid price) an investor is
willing to buy shares and at some price (an ask
price) is willing to sell shares.
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expect a rapid decline in the company's share prices than
outsiders expect. Or, the shareholders may be more
pessimistic about the future prospects of the firm than
outsiders are, again leading them to sell the firm. In
either case, there is an asymmetry of expectations leading
to merger, in other words, insiders become relatively
pessimistic, while outsiders become relatively optimistic.
Information asymmetry is not confined to investors.
Although, investors play a significant part in mergers,
the key role is played by management. Therefore, for
acquisition to take place, managers of the acquiring
company must be more optimistic about the acquired firm's
\
future than other parties of the acquired company,
assuming rational behaviour.
The interpretation of Gort's theory suggests that
increases in merger activity could be associated with both
rapid upswings and downswings in stockmarket prices. Thus
neither the high nor the low share prices can effectively
explain the intensity of merger activity. This conclusion
leads one to consider other merger hypotheses that have
been put forward.
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Merger activity has been seen by some, (Dewey (1961),
Marris (1964) and Manne (1965)) as the vindication of
neoclassical economics in which the threat of takeover
provides a control mechanism on managers separated from
effective shareholder control% 	 Neoclassical theories
may be consistent with the observed correlation between
share prices and takeovers if inefficiencies become
conspicuous in a rising stock market. However, this view
of takeovers as being 'super-efficient' in controlling
managerial discretion is inconsistent with the
Grossman/Hart evidence.
However, the neoclassical view of takeovers may not
be sufficient to explain the spate in takeover
activities. It could be argued at a micro-economic level
that takeovers provide a springboard for the growth
maximising firm. Such a firm may have a higher
1. The threat of takeover plays an important
role in Marris's theory of the firm. This
threat will act as a further check on firm
managers in their pursuit of their own goals.
If they are cautious managers, they will be
constrained from being too timid in their
pursuit of profit, lest the price of their
share fall to a low enough level to tempt some
more aggressive management team to take over
their firm and put their assets to better use.
If the managers are vigorous pursuers of
growth, they will be restrained from a too
active pursuit of expansion at the expense of
their stockholders' interests, out of fear that
the price of their share will be driven down
far enough to attract other firm to acquire it.
Hindley (1969), p.431 views mergers as "..
the only external constraint upon managerial
exploitation of the owners".
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expectation about the potential future value of the target
firm than its original managers and shareholders. Whether
this view supports the managerial hypothesis of takeovers
will be examined in the next chapter. But the cause of
the spate in takeover activity which generates excitement
among the promoters and innocent 'bystanders' remains a
controversial issue. However, a feature of takeover
activity that is of particular interest to this study is
the financial characteristics of firms associated with the
event. This aspect is examined in the next section.
2.7. The Characteristics of Firms Associated with Mergers: 
A first approach to evaluating either the motivations
for, or the consequences of, mergers is to distinguish
firms that merged from firms that did not merge. Hughes
etal (1980) have advanced reasons why such an approach is
necessary. They argued that such comparisons bear
directly on a range of issues that are important from the
point of view of both economic theory and policy. A major
issue is the nature of the selection mechanism generated
by the normal workings of competitive markets and its
implications for the behaviour of economic agents (Winter
(1971), Hahn (1973)). In the real world, takeover assumes
a crucial role because of the operation of large
management-controlled firms that are characteriszed by the
divorce of ownership from control, Manne (1965), Hindley
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(1969), Singh (1971), (1975)). The large companies
conduct their business in imperfect product markets and
seldom go bankrupt, as takeover is their main cause of
deathl . Thus, there is the need to know the kind of
companies that are taken over.
A possible reason why the analysis of financial
characteristics of the companies involved in merger
activity is important is the view held by neoclassical
economists 2 , for example Meade (1968). They hypothesize
that the selection process represented by the takeover
mechanism selects the 'efficient', i.e., the
profit-maximimising firms, for survival and 'punishes' the
inefficient ones by forcing their disappearance through
acquisition.
However, the assumption of profit maximisation has
been criticized by several economists. It has been argued
(Marris (1964)) that because of divorce of ownership from
control of modern enterprises, the 'paid' managers
1. Hughes op.cit.
Singh (1971) also discussed how takeover
provides a market mechanism through which the
managers of the large oligopolistic companies
could in practice be effectively disciplined.
2. The 'neo-classical' and 'managerial'
motives of merger are discussed in Chapter 3.
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will be less interested in maximising the profits (or
stock-market valuation) of the firm, than they will be in
maximising its rate of growth. This is because managerial
remuneration as well as other 'perquisites' are related
more to the size of the firm than to its profitability.
Other writers, (the behavioural school: Cyert and March
(1963), Machlup (1967)) have argued that there is no fixed
'objective' of the firm, neither profit nor growth
maximisation but a i satisficing' position to account for
the complex internal structure of the firm. The internal
structure of the firm is referred to as being complex
because an organisation comprises of many social
groupings, such as top executives, middle and low-level
managers, shareholders and others, whose interests differ
and may not be defined in profit or growth maximisation
terms.
In spite of the criticisms of profit maximisation,
other economists (Alchian (1950), Friedman (1953)) have
argued that the facts about separation of ownership and
control, or the relation to the social relationships
within it, are irrelevant from an economic point of view.
According to them, the external environment of the firm,
mainly in the form of forces of competition, leave it
little room for manoeurve. As Friedman explained:
"The process of "natural selection" thus helps
to validate the maximisation of returns
hypothesis - or rather, given natural
selection, the acceptance of the hypothesis can
be based largely on the judgement that it
summarises appropriately the conditions for
survival" p. 28.
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However, Winter (1964) suggested that the economic
natural selection does not imply the survival of
profit-maximising firms, and the disappearance of the
non-maximisers in the strictest sense.	 'or example, in
certain states of the world involving oligopolistic
competition, 'barriers' to entry, cost advantages to large
scale, it is the firms that seek a balanced rather than
optimum solutions that are more likely to 'survive' than
the profit-maximisers.
Conversely, managerial economists such as Galbraith
(1967), and Mueller (1969) have argued that because of
imperfections in the stock market, the takeover process is
more likely to favour the survival of large firms or those
that pursue fast growth, rather than those that are
efficient in the neoclassical sense. A comparison of the
financial characteristics of firms involved in merger
activity could produce evidence to resolve or clarify the
debate. It may indicate on one hand, the extent the
takeover process does select the 'efficient' firms for
survival and 'punish' the inefficient ones by forcing them
out of existence through acquisitions. On the other hand,
it could indicate whether the more efficient firms tend to
acquire the less efficient ones.
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Some authors have taken empirical approaches to
compare the financial characteristics of acquired and
non-acquired companies. Some of these studies are
reviewed in the next section with a view to determining
the financial characteristics of acquired companies.
2.8 Empirical Studies: 
Singh (1971) studied the financial characteristics of
185 acquired firms in the United Kingdom over the period
1955 to 1960.	 The purpose of the study was to
differentiate between acquired and nonacquired firms,
using financial ratios as measurement variables. The
detailed statistical analysis of the data was related to
takeovers in five industries: food, electrical
engineering, non-electrical engineering, drink, and
clothing and footwear. Using both univariate and
multivariate statistical analyses, Singh found that
acquired firms tended to have low profitability, low
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growth and low valuation ratios l when compared against
non-acquired firms. Singh suggested that the major
variable influencing takeover incidence was
profitability.	 Singh's results are shown in Table 2.3.
1.	 Valuation ratio is defined as the ratio of the
stock market value of a firm's equity to the book
value of its net assets.
Singh argued that the valuation ratio reflects the
past performance of the firm only to the extent that
the market judges its future prospects by its past
record. He invoked Marris (1964) to argue that for
firms of the same size, the higher the valuation
ratio of the firm, the smaller the chance that it
will be acquired. The hypothesis is based on the
notion that the numerator of the valuation ratio
(i.e. the stock-market value of the firm's equity
shares) represents the price that a 'raider' would
have to pay for the acquired firm. However, the bid
premium tends to make the acquisition price higher.
Misclassified
Pre-Tax Profitability	 (X1)	 39.1
Growth	 (X9)	 44.8
Valuation Ratio (X10)
	
44.8
Liquidity
	 (X5)	 49.4
Gearing	 (X6)	 49.4
All Variables
	 35.0
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Table 2.3
SINGH'S ERROR PREDICTION RATES OF THE CLASSIFICATORY VARIABLES: 
Source: Singh (1971) p.113
The percentage of misclassication indicates the extent the
acquired firms could be differentiated from the non-acquired
firms based on those variables. When Singh tested the
variables collectively, he obtained 35% misclassication. This
figure appears to represent a slight improvement over the error
of misclassification expected by chance (50%). However, it
does indicate that there may be a degree of overlap between the
characteristics of acquired and non-acquired firms, or perhaps
that Singh chose the wrong variables.
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Singh's study is very comprehensive and was the first
U.K. study to introduce multivariate discriminant analysis
in the prediction of takeover events. His application of
discriminant analysis resulted in an accuracy rate of 65%
on the original sample, i.e. predicting takeover targets.
This result is an over-estimation of the accuracy rate
because the discriminant function was applied to the very
data from which it was computed. Singh took cognizance of
the methodological pitfall in his study when he stated:
"although this figure represents definite
improvement over the error of misclassification
expected on random allocation (50%), it does
indicate a rather large degree of overlap between
the characteristics of taken-over and non-taken-over
firms.... Furthermore, it should be noted that the
errors for misclassification given above are in fact
an under-estimate in an important sense. This is
because they are based in each case on the
application of the linear discrimination function to
the very set of data from which it was estimated.
If these functions were used to classify other sets
of data (e.g. of a different time-period), the
errors of misclassification would tend to be even
higher". p113.
Later studies, where improvement has been made to the
methodology have shown the sample-specific nature of such
previous studies.1
1. Further consideration of this topic is
given in chapter 6 on Methodology. For a
fuller discussion, See Frank, et al "Bias in
Multiple Discriminant Analysis," Journal of
Marketing Research, August (1965)
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If Singh's model is slightly less accurate than he
claimed, then there may be a reason to believe that
acquired companies cannot be differentiated from
non-acquired companies based on their financial
characteristics.
Singh's sample companies were drawn from the period
1955- 1960. It is however, to be expected that the
general economic situation has altered. The economic
indicators affect, to some extent, the financial variables
used in deriving the model. Similarly, the financial
accounting reporting framework has changed with the
introduction of the Statements of Standard Accounting
Practice (SSAPS) in the early 1970s.
Tzannos and Samuels (1972) carried out an
investigation into 36 randomly selected mergers that took
place from the beginning of July 1967 to the end of March
1968. A control group consisting of 32 companies was
constructed on a random basis. As with Singh's study, the
authors used a discriminant analysis approach.
The variables used consisted of the following:
(1) trend in capital gearing
(2) volatility in capital gearing,
(3) level of capital gearing;
(4) trend in ratio of profit to capital employed
(5) volatility of profit to capital employed
(6) liquidity percentage
(7) acid test ratio
(8) price earnings ratio
(9) price cash flow ratio
(10) trend in dividends per share and volatility of
dividends per share.
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The authors concluded that the characteristics
possessed by the acquired firms which differentiated them
from the non-acquired were as follows: a higher absolute
level of capital gearing, a higher rate of increase in
capital gearing, a slower increase in profits, a lower
price earnings ratio, a slower rate of increase in
dividends and a greater variation over time in the rate of
dividends. Tzannos and Samuels also found that the
characteristics of the companies that were active in
taking over other companies were an above average downward
trend in capital gearing, a lower absolute level of
capital gearing, a higher than average increase in profits
to capital employed and a higher than average increase in
the trend of dividends.
The study by Tzoannos and Samuels tends to confirm
some of the findings of other studies which sought to
discriminate between acquired and non-acquired companies
using financial ratios as variables.
Unlike Singh's study, which covered a period of well
over five years, Tzoannos and Samuel's study covered only
a nine-month period. As a result, not very much could be
read into the conclusions of the study. It could be that
the characteristics of the companies involved in the
merger process during that 'single-period' were atypical
of other periods.
	 Like Singh, the discriminant function
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of Tzoannos and Samuels study was applied to the very
sample on which the model was developed. This tends to
bias the results upwards as admitted by the authors
(p.12).
A summary of other U.K. studies which have sought to
differentiate the financial characteristics of companies
involved in merger activities has been made by Levine and
Aaronovitch (1981). The summary is reproduced as Appendix
A at the end of this chapter.
2.9. Studies Outside the United Kingdom: 
Similar studies to those in Appendix A have been
conducted outside the United Kingdom, especially in the
United States. However, before describing some of these
studies, it is worth pointing out that the business
conditions, corporate financial characteristics and the
institutional framework differ somewhat between the U.K.
and the U.S.A. Despite these differences, the results of
some of these studies can be of significant value.
Taussig and Hayes (1968) investigated cash takeovers
in the U.S. with the objective of identifying any common
financial characteristics. Their sample consisted of a
random selection of fifty cash takeovers between January
1956 and December 1966, from several sources including the
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'Standard and Poor's Called Bond Record', 'The Wall Street
Journal' and "records of various investment banking
houses". The financial characteristics of this sample
were then compared against a randomly chosen control group
consisting of fifty non-acquired firms, paired with each
subject company by three-digit standard industrial
classification (SIC) number and gross sales. The authors
concluded that acquired firms had high liquidity, poor
earnings and a declining dividend record.
The conclusions of the authors may not be applicable
to other forms of takeover because many takeovers are not
for cash. Cash takeovers represent only a tiny form of
financing acquisition and may be very susceptible to the
economic climate. In a rising stock market, for example,
acquirers may prefer to finance their acquisitions through
share exchanges. If this condition prevails, the number
of cash takeovers within that period will be considerably
reduced. Further, in a cash-squeezed economy with rising
interest rates, financing acquisitions by cash may not be
an ideal method for management.
However, notwithstanding the limitations of the
study, the conclusions of the study cannot be dismissed.
The conclusions seem to confirm similar studies involving
all forms of takeovers that acquired firms possess
declining rate of profits and declining dividend records.
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In a more comprehensive study, Stevens (1973) used
discriminant analysis and factor analysis in an attempt to
discriminate between acquired and non-acquired companies.
His sample consisted of 80 firms with 40 firms in each
group, chosen from the 1966 Moody's List of Companies.
Financial ratios were calculated for each of the firms and
the ratios as a group measured financial qualities such as
profitability, liquidity, activity and leverage. Multiple
discriminant analysis (MDA) was employed using the ratio
data to develop a linear model that best discriminated the
acquired group from the non-acquired group.
The MDA model was employed to classify each firm in
the original sample, the results of the classification are
reproduced in Table 2.4 and the discriminant function in
Table 2.5.
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Table 2. 4
RESULTS OF STEVEN'S STUDY 
CLASSIFICATION OF ACQUIRED AND NON-ACQUIRED FIRMS USING MDA MODEL 
Actual	 Predicted Group
Group	 Acquired	 Non-acquired
Acquired
	
34	 6
Non-Acquired	 18	 22
Source: D. L. Stevens "Financial Characteristics of Merged
Firms: A Multivariate Analysis" Journal of Financial and
Quantitative Analysis: March, 1973 p.156.
Table 2.5
STEVEN'S DISCRIMINANT FUNCTION: 
Variable Ratio Discriminant
Coefficient
Scaled
Vector
Rank
X1 EBIT/Sales 0.108 8.085 2
X2 NWC/Total Assets i -0.033 -4.800 4
X3 Sales/Total Assets 0.987 5.196 3
X4 LT liabilities/TA 0.111 12.953 1
1. Net Working Capital/Total Assets
Source: D.L. Stevens (1973) "Financial Characteristics of
Merged Firms" p154.
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Each firm was classified based upon the probability of
group membership, given its discriminant score. When the
discriminant model was applied to the model-derivation
sample, the total classification accuracy was 70% (58/80)
which was statistically significant at the 0.001 level,
compared with a chance classification of (40/80) correct.
Stevens reported that the classification accuracy was
not similar between the groups since acquired firms were
classified with 85% accuracy (34/40 correct) and the
non-acquired sample was more evenly split (22/40
correct). Thus, 18 of the non-acquired firms had
financial profiles more similar to those of the acquired
firms. He asserted that the result was not surprising
when one considers the nature of the non-acquired sample
in which a non-acquired firm may still be attractive for
acquisition.
In an improvement to earlier studies using
discriminant analysis, notably Singh (1971) and Tzoannos
and Samuels (1972), Stevens made attempts to validate his
model by classifying firms not used in deriving the
model. A split sample validation technique was employed
with half of the original sample used to develop a model
and the remaining firms used for classification. This
resulted in minimal shrinkage, as overall classification
accuracy was 67.5%, perhaps lending support to the
stability of the original model.
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A second attempt at validation was made by determining
if the variables in the discriminant model and their
coefficients remained stable over other time periods. To
carry out this validation, the same ratios were calculated
for two new samples, with 20 acquired firms in each, taken
from the acquisition years 1967 and 1968.
	 The result
obtained from the validation sample led Stevens to assert
that the 1966 model had enough stability over the
three-year period to classify accurately these new
samples. He then concluded that his findings implied that
financial characteristics alone provide a means by which
acquired firms can be separated from others.
Stevens made a robust attempt to discriminate between
acquired and non-acquired companies. He applied the
factor analysis technique in an attempt to reduce the
financial data that entered the discriminant function.
His model was successful in classifying acquired companies
but less successful in classifying non-acquired
companies. The latter outcome is to be expected, since
there are many non-acquired companies possessing financial
characteristics similar to acquired companies, but which
for one reason or the other have not seen predators.
Stevens, by validating his model using the
split-sample technique has avoided the methodological
pitfalls of earlier studies. Because his 'test' sample
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companies were drawn from a single period (one year),
there is the need to pool companies over a number of years
to determine if the outcome will be different from that of
Steven's study. The test companies in the present study
were pooled over a period of five years.
In a recent study, Palepu (1986) argued that it is
difficult to predict takeover targets using accounting
information. He cited earlier studies l which indicate
that accounting based models have impressive ability to
predict acquisition targets six to twelve months before
the announcement of takeovers.
Falepu's criticisms of earlier studies are based on
three methodological problems. First, the use of
non-random, equal-share samples in the model estimation,
without modification to the estimators, leads to
inconsistent and biased estimates of the model
1. These studies include Simkowitz and Monroe
(1971), Castagna and Matolcsy (1976), Belkaoui
(1978) and Dietrich and Sorensen (1984). The
studies report prediction accuracies ranging from
70% to 90%.
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parameters. This results in overstating the model's
ability to predict targets. Second, the use of
equal-share samples in prediction tests leads to error
rate estimates that fail to represent the model's
predictive ability in the population. Third, the use of
arbitrary cutoff probabilities in prediction tests without
specifying a decision context, the relevant state-payoff
matrix, and the relevant state-payout matrix, and the
prior state probabilities makes the reported prediction
accuracies difficult to interpret. Palepu pointed out
that the appropriate cutoff probability to be employed in
the prediction tests, should be determined by the decision
context in which the model's predictions are to be used.
Palepu's study was an attempt to rectify the
methodological pitfalls of earlier takeover prediction
studies. His 'improved' model was more successful in
classifying acquired companies than non-acquired ones.
The outcome of his study is similar to that of Stevens
(referred to earlier) which was not very successful in
classifying non-acquired companies. However, the
contribution of Palepu's study, especially in pointing out
the methodological flaws of previous studies, should be
recognized. The study by Palepu has opened a new line of
argument as to whether or not accounting based models are
capable of predicting takeover targets.
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In an attempt to shed more light on the controversy,
Castagna and Matolcsy (1986), derived accounting based
models from Australian Companies, involved in takeover
activities. The study was based on a sample of 82
'industrial' listed firms which were acquired in the
period of 1970 to 1980, and for which financial data were
available for at least five years prior to acquisition. A
discriminant model using financial ratios as variables was
derived. The predictive performance of the model is
reproduced in Tables 2.6 and 2.7. Generally, the results .
indicate a high misclassification rate for acquired firms
relative to that of surviving (non-acquired) firms. For
example, the results in Table 2.8 indicate that the model
(using a ten variable set with equal prior-probabilities)
classified 75.76% of the surviving firms correctly, but
only 42.42% of the acquired firms were correctly
classified one year prior to acquisition. Similarly, the
results in Table 2.7 (using a five variable set)
classified 78.80% of the surviving firms correctly, but
only 42.4% of the acquired firms. Based on the results of
their study,
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Castagna and Matolcsy concluded:
"..the results of this study question the usefulness of
published accounting numbers for identifying takeover targets
and suggest that the claims to the contrary made by some
investment service firms and sections of the professional
finance community cannot by supported"..p.13
Table 2.5..
CASTAGNA AND MATOLCSY'S STUDY 
CLASSIFICATION ACCURACY OF DISCRIMINANT MODEL 
(using ten variable set with equal priors) 
ACQUIRED AND NONACQUIRED COD2ANIES 
	
Actual Group
	 Percentage
	
idembership	 Total
Predicted Group Membership
1st
	 2nd	 3rd
	 4th	 5th
(Years Prior to Acquisition)
Acquired
	
100%	 42.42	 45.45	 54.55	 48.48	 39.39
Surviving	 100%
	 75.76
	
72.73	 72.73
	
66.67	 66.67
Average Correct
Classification %
	 59.09
	
59.09	 53.03
	
57.58	 46.97
Table 2.7..
CASTAGNA AND MATOLCSY'S STUDY 
CLASSIFICATION ACCURACY OF DISCRIMINANT 110Da,
(using five variable set with equal priors) 
ACQUIRED AND NONACQUIRED CailDAN_E- S 
	Actual Group
	 Percentage
	
Membership
	 Total
Predicted Group Eembership
1st	 2nd
	 3rd	 4th	 5th
(Years Prior to Acquisition)
Acquired	 100%
	 42.42	 45.45	 48.48
	 48.48
	 39.39
Surviving	 100%
	 78.79	 69.70	 69.70	 63.64	 66. 7
Average Correct
Classification %
	 60.61
	 57.58	 59.09
	 56.06	 53.03
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Castagna and Matolcsy further remarked that given the
robustness of the statistical analysis employed in their
study, it was unlikely that alternative forms of analysis
and/or extensions to the data set would significantly
improve the results. However, they suggested that a
fruitful line of enquiry would be to analyze the
characteristics of targets with a view to testing
hypotheses on the factors that make firms attractive as
acquisition targets.
2.10. Summary 
The review of empirical studies on firms associated
with mergers presents mixed results. The earlier studies
indicated the possibility of predicting acquisition
targets using accounting based models. However,
subsequent studies with 'refined' methodology appear to
produce a somewhat negative result.
	
Both the earlier and
the later studies have successfully 'classified' acquired
and non-acquired companies. But disagreement comes in
'predicting' acquisitions. Although some of the earlier
accounting based models claimed to have succeeded in
predicting takeover, what they have actually done is
classifying acquired and non-acquired companies.
There is strong reason to uphold the above line of
argument given that the stock market does not seem to
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predict acquisition targets with a high degree of accuracy
even three months prior to the announcement of takeover
bids, (Dodd and Ruback (1977), Asquith (1983)). Based on
the evidence of the market-based studies, Jensen and
Ruback (1983 p.29) argued that "it is difficult, if not
impossible, for the market to predict future targets".
Furthermore, they argued that the takeover announcements
convey a substantial amount of new information as
evidenced by the dramatic increase in the target firm's
share prices. If takeovers can be anticipated from
publicly available accounting data, such price reaction is
unlikely to occur at the announcement time. Accordingly,
it seems unlikely that any takeover prediction model based
on publicly available accounting information will be able
to predict takeover targets with a high degree of accuracy
. as has been reported by earlier accounting based studies.
Moreover, it has been recognized that there is a
weakness in the methodology adopted by some researchers
arising from non-randomness of the sample and the use of
arbitrary cutoff probabilities. These methodological
loopholes may have the effect of understating the error
rate in predicting takeover targets and overstating the
error rate in predicting non-targets.
However, in spite of the disagreement over
'prediction' that has surrounded these studies, the
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studies have tended to produce a uniform picture of merger
targets. The studies indicate that merger targets were
relatively unprofitable, sluggish, over-liquid firms,
often with a history of static or declining earnings and
dividends. These were the findings of the studies outside
the United Kingdom (Taussig and Hayes (1965)). Similarly,
research based on accounting data in the U.K. has shown
that in general acquired firms have lower profitability,
growth and stock market ratings, compared with a control
group prior to takeover (Singh, (1971), Tzoannos and
Samuels (1972), Kuehn (1975), Firth (1976) and Cosh et al
1980)).
The above findings lend some support to the
hypothesis that some targets may be regarded as
potentially failing firms and that mergers may be an
alternative to bankruptcy. This is one of the arguments
which the present study seeks to address. It would also
appear that attempts to discover the characteristics of
target firms may be a more fruitful line of enquiry than
attempts to directly predict takeover targets. This line
of enquiry is pursued in the chapter four. In the next
chapter the theoretical and empirical motives for merger
are reviewed.
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CHAPTER 3
ACQUISITION MOTIVES: THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK
3.1 Introduction:
In recent years, many theories for explaining mergers
have been discussed and tested in the literature of
finance, law and economics. Hypotheses about the motives
of merger have been broadly defined as 'neoclassical' or
'managerial'. The purpose of this chapter is to review
the theoretical framework of these motives and examine the
empirical findings of some of the studies in an attempt to
discover whether any of these motives leads to shareholder
wealth creation. The focus of shareholder wealth creation
is an enhancement of post-acquisition profitability.
3.2 Neoclassical Motives: 
The 'neoclassical' set of theories suggests that
firms will engage in takeovers if this leads to an
increase in wealth for the shareholders of the acquiring
company. The increase in wealth may arise from the
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following areas: operational or managerial scale
economies, (Bain (1959), Jacoby (1969)); pure financial
rationale (Lintner (1971), Lewellen (1971)) and
differential efficiency, (Copeland and Weston (1983)).
Perhaps a discussion of the reasons behind these economies
is necessary in order to determine whether they are likely
to be realized in practice.
3.2.1 Economies of Scale: 
Merger brings together two or more firms into one.
Consequently, the merged entity increases its size, and as
such the realisation of economies of scale is envisaged.
However, even if merging does cause economies of scale,
the two or three merging firms may still be more
profitable apart than together. This is because it may be
cheaper to achieve those economies through internal
expansion rather than merger. This raises two additional
issues: whether the envisaged economies are achieved in
practice and whether merging is the best way to achieve
them.
Scherer (1970) identified two main types of economy
of scale. These are "plant level" and "firm level"
economies of scale. The former results from increases in
the size of individual plants, and the latter results from
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increases in the overall size of the firm. The plant
level economies of scale may be ignored because merging is
unlikely to increase the size of a firm's individual
plants. It will however, increase the number of plants it
owns. Moreover, even it it did increase plant size (for
example by transferring one firm's business to the other
firm's plant), perhaps internal expansion could cause the
same effects at a lower cost. Internal expansion would
avoid the costs of negotiating the merger (and its
attendant re-organisation) and of disposing of one of the
firms' plants. Consequently, merging is unlikely to
improve profitability by causing economies of scale at
the plant level.
However, merging does undoubtedly increase a firm's
size and hence firm level economies of scale may be
achieved. Consequently attempts should be made to
discover if the various economies of size can actually
occur in practice. Scherer et al (1975) pointed out
several areas of a firm's business where economies of
scale may arise. These areas include finance, selling and
marketing, purchasing and research and development. A
review of these and other areas is necessary to determine
if these economies can be achieved in real life.
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3.2.2. Finance: 
Sawyer (1981) argued that merging can reduce the
proportionate cost of obtaining finance in two main ways.
Firstly, it is argued that lower interest rates are
charged because larger firms are usually perceived as
being less risky than smaller firms. Secondly, it is
argued that the transaction costs involved in raising
finance become proportionately lower as the amount of
finance required increases. Therefore, because larger
firms, typically raise finance in larger blocks, their
financing costs will be lower.
It appears that financing economies differ from all
the other forms of economies because they seem to have
occurred in practice. Kitching (1967) found that managers
of merging firms generally found financial synergy to be
the easiest form of synergy to achieve. It was also said
to have the highest "bay-off". Similarly, Scherer et al
(1975) arrived at the same conclusion. In his study,
firms in all of the fourteen industries examined generally
achieved financial economies from being of multi-plant
size.
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3.2.3. Selling and Marketing: 
There are three areas of economies of scale commonly
said to arise from this part of a firm's business.
Firstly, it is often argued that due to the inherently
uncertain nature of advertising, higher levels of
promotional expenditure will bring proportionally higher
returns than smaller levels (Townsend (1968)). Therefore,
as merging increases firm size, thereby enabling
advertising expenditure to be increased, it may result in
advertising economies being achieved. There is however,
no empirical study to show whether or not this is the case
in practice. However, it may be the case in the few
industries where advertising forms a high proportion of
the firm's sales (Bain, (1959)).
The second likely economy is that the merged firm
will be able to buy larger advertisements which frequently
cost proportionally less than smaller ones (Prais
(1976)). For example, Scherer et al stated that full-page
newspaper advertisements cost less per square inch than
quarter-page or smaller ones. In contrast, Prais noted
that in the early 1970s, television commercials cost more
per viewer at peak hours than at off-peak hours. In
addition, it is not known if larger advertisements are
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cost-effective (even if they do cost proportionally less),
that is, if the cost of larger advertisements is
sufficiently compensated by greater increases in returns.
For example, Scherer et al stated that larger
advertisements have relatively more 'attention getting
power', whereas Prais held the opposite view.
Consequently it is difficult to conclude on the relative
merits of large and small scale advertisement, and hence,
on whether or not mergers will cause advertising economies.
The third economy in this area is said to arise from
spreading the costs of certain fixed selling and marketing
resources over two firms' products instead of one, thereby
decreasing their average costs. Kitching (1967) in his
study of 22 merger-intensive companies, stated that these
were frequently observed and were often substantial.
However, Newbould (1970) found that only five mergers out
of 38 studied achieved sales force and distribution
economies. Kitching used U.S.A. data where the sales and
distribution function may be much more important than in
the U.K.	 Hence, Newbould's results are probably more
relevant for the purpose of the present study. Thus, it
is likely that merging will only cause these economies in
a few cases.
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3.2.4. Administration and Staffing: 
Scherer et al (1975) pointed out two main reasons why
economies of size may arise in a firm's administrative and
staffing functions. The first is that increased
specialization becomes possible. Penrose (1959) summed up
this view when she stated:
"when the scale of production is
sufficient to justify a specialized
production manager, a sales manager, a
financial expert, or a specialist in raw
materials buying, for example, each
function is performed more efficiently
than it could be if all of them were
performed by one person". p.92
Although it has been shown that larger firms do
generally employ more specialists than smaller ones
(Scherer et al (1975)), there is no evidence on whether or
not they benefit from this. It can probably be said that
specialisation will improve efficiency, however, these
gains may be offset by higher salaries. In addition, the
efficiency gains may be quite small. For example, it has
been noted that managers of small firms can perform a
number of different tasks reasonably efficiently, and that
they can obtain specialist help from outside sources.
Consequently, it is hard to tell if these economies l will
generally be achieved in practice.
1. Scherer, F.M et al (1975) The
Economies of Multi-plant Operation: an
International Comparisons Study, Chapter 7.
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The second economy of size arises because certain
administrative and staffing functions use a fixed set of
resources. Hence, their average cost will reduce as size
increases. If these economies are to be realised, total
administrative and managerial staff will have to be
significantly reduced after a merger takes place.
However, in Newbould's (1970) study of 38 merging
companies, he found that executive redundancies were
either zero or negligible in 23 cases. The corresponding
figures for non-executive redundancies was 27 out of 38,
(although there are no recent studies to confirm or refute
the findings). Consequently, the evidence suggests the
realisation of economies might be'scant. It also
questions the notion that acquisition is a vehicle for
eliminating 'bad management'.
.3.2.t, Research and Development: 
Low (1970) argued that merging is supposed to cause R
& D economies as increased size enables increased
specialisation, and/or increased spreading of fixed R & D
resource costs to be achieved. In addition, it can also
be hypothesized that larger firms tend to have a wider
range of products. As a result, they are more likely to
make fruitful use of any discoveries made in the R & D
department. All three R & D prospective economies have
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one thing in common, namely they are impossible to
measure. This is because it is practically impossible to
identify and quantify the results accruing to a firm from
the R & D department. For example, the first and third
economies should increase the benefits from R & D, while
holding costs constant. In contrast, the second economy
reduces the costs of R & D while holding the benefits
achieved constant. Consequently, if the benefits arising
from R & D are difficult to measure, it is also difficult
to determine if these benefits actually exist. However,
Scherer's interview results indicate that in general,
single plant firms are not seriously disadvantaged in
comparison with multi-plant firms in this context.
Similarly, Kitching concluded from his study that mergers
generally receive little synergy from R & D economies.
Nevertheless, both studies found significant R & D
economies in a few cases. If a meaningful interpretation
is to be accorded to these studies, it appears that R & D
economies can only be obtained in a few cases.
3.2.6. Complementary Resources: 
An occasion where merging may improve profitability
is where the merging firms hold complementary resources,
(Brealey and Myers (1981)). This is likely to occur if
one of the merging firms has resources that the other
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needs and when they are combined their overall efficiency
improves. This economy relies on one critical assumption,
namely, that it will be beneficial for the firms to obtain
the required resources by merging, rather than buying or
building them up by themselves. For instance, Brealey and
Myers gave an example, in which a small firm has a unique
product but does not have the production and sales
facilities necessary to develop it properly. If it merges
with a firm with these facilities, then overall
profitability may be higher than if each firm tried to
obtain these resources independently. However, such
occasions are likely to be few and far between. This is
because merging is often an expensive process. It may be
possible for firms to get the resources they require at
less cost through other means.
In addition to the foregoing alleged to be generated
as a result of scale-economies, other 'newer' forms of
neoclassical merger motives l have been put forward
(Lintner (1971)). Some of these motives are discussed
below:
1. Other merger motives include Price Earnings
'Magic' (Lintner (1971), Meade(1969)) and
redeployment of corporate capital (Sherman
(1972), Weston (1970) and Williamson (1970,
1975)).
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3.2.7. Taxes: 
Lintner (1971) argued that tax exemption of corporate
re-organizations, and the use of one company's tax loss
carry-overs by its partner provides a possible incentive
for mergers. Sometimes a firm may have potential tax
shields but not have the profits to take advantage of them.
However, mergers undertaken just, to use tax loss
carry-forwards may be challenged by the Inland Revenuel
and the use of the tax-carry-overs may be denied, or the
conditions to be satisfied render the merger unattractive.
3.2.8. Leverage/Debt Capacity: 
Lewellen (1971) and Lintner (1971) made a case for a
financial leverage-related acquisition motive in the form
of taking advantage of latent debt capacity. They
identified two sources of gain. The first arises from the
fact that borrowing costs decline with the size of firm
1. The main provisions which deal with this form
are found in the T.A. 1970, Sections 258-264, F.A.
1973 Section 28, and Sch.9 F.A. 1985.
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(all things being equal), because of size-scale economies
in credit investigation and security issue costs as well
as "marketability". Lintner asserted that
"large firms can thus refinance debt of small
independent firms at lower economic cost
resulting in a genuine capital gain through
merger" p.107.
The second source of gain arising from lower debt
costs has been referred to by some (Levy and Sarnat
(1970)) as diversification. They argued that the combined
debt capacity
 of the two companies as separate entities
was less than the debt capacity of the firm resulting from
their merger. As Lewellen explained:
"..if we assume that in any given year (or run
of years) there exists for each individual firm
some positive probability of suffering losses
large enough to induce financial failure, the
joint probability of such an event is reduced
by... the combination of other than perfectly
correlated income streams in a merger.. The
diversification can be expected to create a
true economic gain to the shareholders owing to
the fact that the combination of the financial
resources of the two firms making up the merger
reduces lenders' risk while combining each of
the individual shares of the two companies in
investors' portfolio does not" p.801
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However, Higgins (1971) argued that Lewellen's
analysis was incomplete because it examined explicitly the
impact of merger on the firms' creditors. He asserted:
H .. if it can be demonstrated that a merger
benefits the firm's creditors, however one
chooses to measure this benefit, without
simultaneously hurting tne firm's shareholders,
then it seems unnecessary to refer to the much
debated capital structure proposition to
demonstrate that the value of the firm will
increase with the merger" p.543
In a similar disagreement with Lewellen's
'debt-capacity' motive for merger, Levy and Sarnat (1970)
demonstrated that in perfect capital markets the value of
the merged firm will be the same as the combined market
values of the separate firms - because portfolio
diversification by investors will have already exhausted
the diversification benefits available through the
merger. Similarly, others (Alberts (1966), Adler and
Dumas (1975)), have argued persuasively that investors can
obtain the same diversification themselves by purchasing
appropriate amounts of the unmerged companies. Therefore,
merger may not alter the total value of the combining
firms l , and may only achieve that in a perfect market2.
1. Myers (1968) argued that conglomerate
mergers will not alter total values if the
capital market is perfect and complete. In an
incomplete market, such a merger can harm
stockholders by forcing them to hold two
otherwise separate companies in fixed
proportions. Although Myers observation refers
to conglomerate mergers, such implications may
be valid to other forms of mergers.
2. see Beaver (1981) for the effects of
information assymetry in an imperfPct mdrket
setting.
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Higgins and Schall (1975) have also questioned
Lewellen's conclusion and they demonstrated empirically
that, in the absence of transaction costs of bankruptcy,
shareholders of merging firms bear the "cost of the
co-insurance" 1 of debt which arises from the merger. They
argued that for shareholders to benefit from the merger,
the value of the incremental 'benefits' must exceed the
cost of co-insurance.
The foregoing arguments sug gest that the benefit
arising from debt capacity and diversification may be
questionable and it requires an empirical approach to
determine whether these benefits are realized in practice.
3.2.9.	 Replacement of Incompetent Managers: 
Some of the neo-classical economists (Dewey (1961),
Manne (1965)) have seen merger as a method for replacing
inefficient managements.	 This merger motive argues that
the management of acquiring companies search for 'poorly'
managed companies which can be bought at nominal prices.
1. Rubinstein (1973) regards the cost as a
loss of some of the limited liability
advantages of holding shares in separate
companies as opposed to the combined company.
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However, the justification of this merger motive
becomes debatable in view of recent findings. For
example, Mueller (1969) stated inter alia 
H ... as frequently happens, the acquired firm
is left to operate as an autonomous division of
the larger unit, operated by the same
management team that controlled it before the
merger". .p.643.
One can therefore argue that if replacement of
'inefficient management' was a motive, it is implausible
that the same set of management has to remain after the
merger. However, a more recent evidence has indicated
that 52% of a target firm's executives no longer will be
with the acquiring firm three years after a merger or
acquisition (Duns Business Month (1981, pp 86-88)). But
the evidence does not indicate whether the managers left
as a result of personal goals being at odds with the
objectives of the parent companies or removal as a result
of alleged inefficiencies.
3.3 Summary: 
In summary, it appears that the neoclassical
hypothesis that merger improves the wealth of the
acquiring firm tends to be unrealistic. Firstly, the
economies are only likely to occur very rarely in
practice. Secondly, in some of these cases, internal
expansion may have the same effect at a lower cost.
Thirdly, in some of the remaining cases, it is likely that
the efficiency gains may be offset by associaf-ed
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diseconomies. In conclusion, it seems doubtful whether
the detailed prediction from the neoclassical theories of
merger would lead to improvements in merger
profitability. Given this conclusion, it is perhaps
necessary to review the other alternative hypothesis of
merger motive - the 'managerial'.
3.4 Managerial Motives: 
The 'managerial' school of merger motives upholds the
view that management will seek to maximize its on utility
whether or not this is consistent with the maximization of
shareholder wealth. There are three possible outcomes
which result from managerial theories in relation to
merger profitability. The first suggests that mergers
will generally reduce profitability, the second that in
the majority of cases, mergers will have no effect on
profitability at all, and the third that merging will
generally not improve profitability.
The first of these theories is that of Baumol
(1959). He argued that firms will maximize sales not
profits. He also contended that, in the majority of
cases, sales and profitability will be negatively
correlated. Hence, merging (because it increases sales)
is likely to reduce profitability.
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The second is Marris's (1964) theory that firms
maximize a sustainable growth level, at which
profitability is constant. Thus, merging to sustain
growth is likely to have no effect on profitability.
However, when a firm is increasing its growth rate in an
attempt to reach this maximum sustainable level, Marris's
model implies that growth and profitability are likely to
conflict. Therefore, merging in these circumstances is
likely to reduce profitability.
The third theory is Williamson's (1963) theory which
states that, in conditions of imperfect competition,
improvements in efficiency are likely to be offset by
increases in costs due to management slack. Hence,
mergers will probably not improve profitability, even if
efficiency gains are expected to occur. However, this
theory does recognize that in conditions of perfect
competition mergers will only occur if they are expected
to increase profitability. Thus, if this state of perfect
competition continues to exist such that managerial slack
will not arise, in these restricted circumstances merging
may actually improve profitability. A further discussion
of the basis and rationality of the managerial motives for
merger follows.
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3.5. The Basis of the Managerial Theories of Merger 
Profitability: 
The managerial theories of the firm emanate from
Berle and Means (1932) propositions (more recently
restated by Jensen and Meckling (1976) as agency theory).
They noticed that it was increasingly common, in large
corporations, for control to be divorced from ownership.
Consequently, they suggested that managers (who run the
firm) could act in such a way as to further their own
goals, with little interference from the shareholders (who
own the firm). Hence the managerial theorists realised
that there was little reason to believe that firms will
follow profit maximisation policies. Therefore, by
reference to managers own self-interests, they attempted
to establish the corporate policies that managers would
actually adopt. A discussion of Baumol's sales
maximisation theory follows.
3.5.1. Baumol's Sales Maximixation Theory: 
Baumol contended that managers' self-interest will
motivate them to maximise sales subject to some minimum
profit constraint (see below for his reasoning).
Therefore it is likely that mergers will be seen by
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managers as a quick and easy way to satisfy their own
self-interests by increasing sales. Therefore, there is
little reason to hold the view that merging will improve
profitability.
In fact, Baumol contended that although initial sales
increases may increase profitability, in the majority of
cases, the increase in sales will cause a decrease in
profitability. Consequently, it is reasonable to assume
from this that the vast majority of mergers will probably
reduce profitability. Furthermore, it is likely that the
initial sales increases, which increase profitability,
will be achieved internally, while the later sales
increases, which reduce profitability, will be achieved by
acquisition. This is because initial sales increases may
be comparatively easily achieved by increasing
expenditure on advertising and R & D, or through internal
expansion, for example. However, as the firm grows, it
may find it increasingly difficult to increase sales still
further. Hence, they may turn to acquisition as a quicker
and easier way to increase sales. Consequently, not only
is acquisition likely to reduce a firm's profitability, it
will probably also be less profitable than internal
expansion.
The rationality of Baumol's theory is questionable on
two grounds. Firstly, do managers actually maximze s31es
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as opposed to profits, and secondly, does this imply that
acquisition will probably reduce profitability? The first
question is important because if firms actually maximise
profits, then acquisitions will only occur if they do not
adversely affect profitability. Consequently, in this
situation, mergers should not reduce profitability.
However, if managers are more interested in sales, mergers
are more likely to reduce profitability than to improve it
(Baumol).
Baumol argued that the main reason why managers are
motivated to maximize sales is because their salaries are
more closely related to a firm's sales level than to its
profitability. A number of studies have been carried out
in this direction and they indicate that there is a strong
positive relationship between sales and executive
remuneration l . For example, in his study, Cosh (1975)
used a regression analysis technique to determine the
relative importance of the effects of sales and
profitability upon executive remuneration for over 1,000
U.K. companies between 1969 and 1971. Cosh found that,
for larger quoted companies, size 2 alone explained 44% of
the variance in executive
1. See Sawyer, M.C. (1981) for a detailed
review of these studies:"The Economics of
Industries and Firms: Theories, Evidence and
Policy, London, Croom Helm.
2. Sales as a proxy for size.
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remuneration, while size and profitability together
explained only 48%. For the group of smaller quoted
companies, the corresponding figures were 19% and 34%
respectively. He suggested that this difference may be
explained by the probability that smaller firms are more
likely to be owner-controlled. Therefore, in general,
Cosh's study suggests that firm's size has a more
significant effect upon executive remuneration than its
profitability. Consequently, it is likely that a good
proportion of managers will follow sales maximization
policies and hence, there is some support to Baumol's
theory in this respect.
In general, the studies looking at firm's size and
profitability have shown that there is no systematic
relationship between firm size and profitability. For
example, Eatwell (1971), carried out a review of the
empirical evidence available in 1971 and concluded that
there was no consistent relationship between thP mean rat
of profitability by size classes when individual firms arP
considered.
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However, he asserted that if the sample consisted
solely of (positive) income corporations, there was a weak
but significant negative relationship between
profitability and size.
It appears that Eatwell's conclusion is supported by
a more recent study by Whittington (1980). He examined
the relationship between sales and profitability for over
1,000 U.K. companies for the period 1960 to 1974 and
concluded that the average profitability was largely
independent of firm size, but such relationship as there
was tended to be negative.
Consequently, the empirical evidence tends to show
that size does not have a major effect on profitability.
Nevertheless, it is possible that it may have a small
adverse effect on profitability in some cases. This later
evidence does not support the assertion that sales and
profitability are negatively correlated but there is
strong theoretical evidence for this from both
micro-economic theory and product life cycle theory.
3.5.2. Marris's Growth Theory: 
Marris (1964) put forward a theory that managers are
motivated to maximize a sustainable growth level. This
theory is closely related to Baumol's, although the latter
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is essentially a one period model where managers maximize
the sales level in each period. However, Marris's theory
is a dynamic model where managers' long term goal is to
maximize the steady growth rate in sales achieved every
period.
Marris contends that a manager's objective is to
reach a maximum sustainable level of growth. By this it
implies a growth level that can be sustained each year
without adversely affecting either the firm's future
growth potential or its profitability. Marris suggested
that when a firm's growth rate is at the maximum
sustainable level, merging to sustain this growth level
should not affect profitability. However, he argued that
in the few cases where growth is being increased mergers
will probably reduce profitability.
The rationality of Maths's theory is questionable on
two grounds. Firstly, whether managers do actually
maximise growth. Marris gave various reasons why they
should, ranging from psychological, sociological to purely
economic ones. However, the main reason given is that
executive remuneration is more closely related to sales
than to profitability (Cosh (1975)). Secondly, if
managers do maximize growth, what is the likely effect of
such a strategy on profitability? Marris contended that
firms maintain a constant growth rate and at this rate
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profitability is also constant. However, it does seem
plausible that, as the growth rate increases, the costs of
reorganizing and adjusting the firm's business will
increase, hence reducing profitability.
3.5.3. Williamson General Preference Function Theory: 
Williamson (1963) put forward another variation of
managerial theory. Like all managerial theories, it
assumes that managers are primarily concerned with their
own best interests and that they manage the firm
accordingly. However, because, Williamson's theory takes
competitive structure into account, it realises that in
conditions of perfect competition, it will be in managers'
best interests to maximise profits. Hence, mergers
occurring in situations of perfect competition may be
expected to increase profitability.
In the contrasting situation of imperfect
competition, Williamson recognized that managers will be
free to follow their other goals apart from profits. In
this situation, he contended that managers will maximise a
utility function whose prime components are management
slack variables l . Basically, management slack constitutes
the costs to the company incurred by managers to further
1. for a fuller description of management
slack, see Cyert, R.M. and March, J.C.
(1963). Chap. 3.
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their own objectives at the expense of profit
maximisation. In fact, if one is to uphold the
propositions of Baumol and Marris, it is highly likely
that mergers are often a form of management slack.
Consequently, if this is the case, there is no reason to
believe that acquisition improves profitability.
In summary, Williamson's model implies that in the
majority of cases, mergers will not improve
profitability. This is either because acquisition is a
form of management slack, or because any expected
efficiency gains from acquisition will be offset by
increases in management slack. The only situation where
mergers may be expected to increase profitability is when
they are expected to improve efficiency (for example,
where conditions of perfect competition exist) and where
this condition does not cause a reduction in competition
(management slack may not occur).
3.6. Conclusion of Managerial Theories: 
From the review of managerial theory of the firm, i
seems quite likely that managers will maximise their own
self-interests. This could take the form of maximising
sales, growth or a utility function. The three theories
described above suggest that merging may either reduce
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profitability, have no effect upon it, or, in exceptional
circumstances, improve it. In the next section, a brief
review of the empirical studies may indicate the
'achievement' of mergers, in other words, which of the
merger hypothesis comes closest to reality. It will also
provide expectations of the outcome of the present study.
3.7. Empirical Evidence: 
Researchers in accounting and finance have had a
long-standing interest in examining and explaining mergers
and acquisitions. This is reflected in the large volume
of academic and professional literature on the subject,
where two dominant methodologies have emerged -
'market-based' and 'accounting-based' studies. The
analysis of mergers and acquisitions within a market
context generally involves an examination of market
returns of the acquiring firms. For example, the studies
conducted by Mandelker (1974), Langetieg (1978), Firth
(1979) and Dodd (1980), amongst others, provide evidence
on the profitability (increase in share prices) of
takeovers and on the timeliness of a market's response to
public announcements of takeover offers.
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The accounting-based studies of mergers examine the
usefulness of published accounting information in
determining the impact of merger on the acquiring firm.
For example Singh (1971) and Meeks (1977), provide
evidence on the profitability of takeovers. The review of
the empirical studies is grouped according to which merger
motive the study tends to support, i.e. whether mergers
increase or decrease profitability.
3.7.1. Studies which conclude that Mergers Improve 
Profitability: 
Lev and Mandelker (1972)(a U.S. study) studied 69
firms making a single large acquisition during the period
1952-63. Profitability and share prices were computed for
the five years prior to the merger and for the five years
subsequent to the merger. They found that shareholders in
the companies earned higher average returns on their
stocks over the five years following the merger than
before, as compared with a sample of companies matched by
size and industry. They also found that the growth of
acquiring firms over the eleven-year period was larger
than that of the control firms. Growth in assets, sales
and operating income were 205, 199 and 186%, respectively,
while the corresponding growth rates for the control firms
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were 130, 100 and 57% respectively. They argued that
these differences could be attributed to the hi gher growth
rate of acquiring firms in the pre-merger period and to
the substantial change in the merger year.
Mandelker (1974) examined 252 mergers in the United
States. His objective was to determine whether mergers
provide abnormal positive or negative returns to the
shareholders of the target and bidding firms. He also
sOught to test whether news of mergers is reflected in the
share prices. His studies showed that for the acquired 
firms, the shareholders can earn abnormal gains before the
acquisition takes place. This was evidenced in the
findings that the cumulative average residuals (CAR)
showed a positive return seven months before the merger,
in contrast with the earlier months before the seventh
month, where the CAR's were mostly negative. For the
acquiring firms, the study did not detect any abnormal
movements in returns, suggesting that the shareholders
were earning normal returns. From this result, Mandelker
concluded that any gains that were made from the merger
went to the shareholders of the target firms and that the
situation suggests that the target firms may have 'unique
resources' and that the management of the target firms
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were inefficient in detecting these resources. Mandelker
went further to assert that the normal returns achieved by
the acquiring firms suggest that their shareholders did
not lose from mergers and that these normal returns show
that the rate of return "is equal to other investments -
production activities of similar risk". p 329.
In the United Kingdom, Franks, Broyles and Hecht
(1977) used a similar method to Mandelker's. They
estimated the gains to shareholders arising from 71
mergers in the breweries and distillers industry during
the period 1955-72. Again, substantial net gains from
merging were found for a majority of companies. The
acquired obtained gains averaging 26% over a period of 3
months prior to the announcement of the merger, and
acquirers about 2.5% on their own market values.
There are differences between the U.K. and the U.S
results although both applied the same methodology. In
the U.K. study, Franks et al found that most mergers were
not anticipated until less than three months prior to the
announcement date. This is compared with the seven months
obtained in the U.S study. Franks, Broyles and Carleton
(1985) attribute this difference to the use of different
sources and different definitions of critical dates, about
the bid. The U.K. target firms had abnormal losses prior
to the announcement of the acquisition, perhaps indicating
that weaker companies were being acquired.
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The studies reviewed conclude that their findings are
inconsistent with the hypothesis that mergers are not
undertaken to improve the welfare of the acquiring firm's
shareholders, or perhaps lead to real gains in economic
efficiency.	 However, these studies also point out that
mergers do appear to have generated 'higher' gains to the
shareholders of the acquired firms than to the
shareholders of the acquiring firms, and in some cases
experienced no gain at all. Consequently, at a minimum,
the mergers appear to have generated enough efficiency
gains to have benefitted the shareholders of the acquired
firms. But this conclusion raises some important
questions about the motives behind the mergers from the
point of view of the acquiring firms. Perhaps, the
empirical studies reviewed in the next section might
partly answer the question.
3.7.2. Studies Supporting Managerial Hypothesis: 
Singh (1971) investigated the profitability of 77
horizontal mergers which occurred during the period
1954-60. He split the 77 firms into five industry groups
and then measured the average profitability (accounting
ratio) for each individual industry and for all
industries. For each merger, he compared the amalgamated
profitability in the year of the merger and in the
following two years with the weighted average
profitability of the individual firms before the merger.
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Singh's results are summarized in Table 3.1. According to
Singh, the results achieved indicate that
".. both for the individual industries and
for all industries together, there was in
a majority of cases, a decline in the
relative profitability of the acquiring
firms, whether one considers profitability
in the year of takeover or one or two
years after takeover". p.162
One of the limitations of Singh's study is that he
did not test his results for statistical significance.
There is therefore a possibility that the results achieved
are due purely to chance.
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Table 3.1
SINGH'S RELATIVE POST-ACQUISITION TO PRE-ACQUISITION PROFITABILITY
Industry
% of amalgamations with worse profitability]
Year of Year After 2nd Year After
Take-over rake-over Take-over
Non-electrical Engineering 56.2 71.4 54.5
Electrical Engineering 75.0 100.0 100.0
Food 75.0 60.0 40.0
Drink 62.8 50.0 53.3
Clothing and Footwear 100.0 100.0 100.0
TOTAL 56.2 66.0 '57.1
1. These are the firms whose relative profitability
declined compared with the combined relative
profitability of the amalgamating firms before
take-over.
Source:	 Singh, A. (1971) Table 7.3 p. 163.
Utton (1974) adopted a different approach from Singh. "e comparPd
the profitability of a group of 39 "merger-intensive" firms with that
of a group of 39 firms who grew mainly through internal expansion.
This was done both for the period 1961-65, when the merging firms wer
active acquirers, and in the period 1966-70, when the merging firms
undertook few mergers. The measure of profitability used was rate of
return on net assets. The results obtained are reproduced in Table
3.2. They show that in both periods the control group had
significantly higher profitability than the merger intensive group.
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TABLE 3.2.
UTTON'S RELATIVE PROFITABILITY OF MERGER-INTENSIVE
AND INTERNAL GROWTH FIRMS 
Mean Profitability (%)
1961-65	 1966-70
Merger-Intensive Group 	 13.5	 11.5
Internal-growth group	 15.4	 14.1
Diffence	 -1.8**	 -2.6*
* statistically different from 0 at the 1;
level
** statistically different from 0 at the 5%
level.
Source:	 Utton, M. A. (1974) Table. IV.
Meeks (1977) examined the "normalised ul
 profitability
of 213 mergers occurring between 1964 and 1972. Unlike
Singh, Meeks used a much longer time period, comparina
profitability in the year of the merger and the following
seven years, with the weighted-average profitability of
the firms in the three years prior to the merger.
1. A full discussion of the normalised
profitability index is made in ChaptPr 6,
Appendix C.
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The results (reproduced in Table 3.3) show that in six of
the seven post-merger years profitability was lower than the
average pre-merger level, although the reduction was typically
quite small. In addition, the decline was statistically
significant in three of those years. However, there was a
significant increase in profitability in the year of the
merger, but Meeks dismisses this as being due to distortions
in measurement which frequently occur in the year of the
merger. There is also an increase in profitability in the
seventh post-merger year but this is not significant. Meeks
therefore concluded that ".. a mild decline in profitability
did typify those mergers".
Table 3.3.
CHANGES IN MEEKS NORMALISED PROFITABILITY MEASUREMENT 
Year
Change in Profitability 	 % of Firms with
after the merger l	reduced profitability
after the merger
Y 0.200* 0.284
y +	 1 -0.009 0.500
y + 2 -0.005 0.524
y + 3 -0.069* 0.594
y + 4 -0.044 0.646
y + 5 -0.122** 0.594
y + 6 -0.157** 0.545
y + 7 0.021 0.500
Notes: * significantly different from 0 at the 1% level
** significantly different from 0 at the 5% level
1. "normalised" profitability of the amalgamation
less the 3-year average pre-merger "normalised"
profitability of the amalgamation.
Source: Meeks, G. (1977) Table 3H p.39.
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Firth (1979) used the 'market-based' approach. He
examined 224 successful merger bids during the period 1972
to 1974 and determined the abnormal returns accruing to
the shareholders of both the acquired and the acquiring
firms as a result of the merger. He then computed the
overall gain or loss achieved by the shareholders during
the period when the information that the firms were to
merge was being fully impounded into the share prices.
The results show that the shareholders of the
acquired firm benefitted from the merger while the
acquiring firms shareholders suffered. However, when the
average gain of the acquired firms shareholders was added
to the average losses of the shareholders in the acquiring
firms, they practically cancelled each other.
Nevertheless, on average there still appeared to be a
small loss overall (see Table 3.4)
Table 3.4
Firth's Results: 
Gain/Loss from Merger (i..141)
Total
	
Acquired
	
Acquiring
Firms	 Firms
Mean	 -9.1	 655.6	 -664.70
No. of Losses	 119	 2	 179
No. of obser-
vations
	
224	 224	 224
Source: Firth, M. (1979) Table 4. p.324.
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Asquith (1983) analyzed the returns obtained for 587
successful and unsuccessful mergers l in the U.S. during
the period 1962-1976. The results of the study are
summarized in Table 3.5. Asquith divided his sample of
companies into four groups. The first two groups are the
target firms, and the second two, the bidding firms.
Target firms and bidding firms were divided further into
mergers or bids on the basis of success and failure. The
Table shows abnormal returns for each group for five
periods around the date of mergers, calculated in the same
way as Mandelker's results.
The first is the pre-press period, which begins 480
days before the announcement of a merger bid and ends 21
days before. The Table shows that in the pre-press period
the abnormal returns were significantly negative for the
two groups of target firms (suggesting a weak profile) and
were significantly positive for the group of successful
bidding firms. This evidence lends credence to the view
that it is the strong firms that take over the weak.
1. 'successful' means that the merger was
consumated, while 'unsuccessful' implies the
opposite.
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On the press date, the day that news of the merger
bid first appeared in the Wall Street Journal, all four
groups showed positive abnormal returns, but only the two
groups of target firms showed significantly positive
abnormal returns, approximately 6 to 7% more than could be
attributable to general movements in the market.
The next period, the interim period, begins one day
after the press day and finishes two days before the
"outcome date" when the outcome of the merger is reported
in the Wall Street Journal. In the interim period, the
abnormal returns continue to be significantly positive
only for the group of successful target firms, while they
are significantly negative for the two groups of firms
involved in unsuccessful mergers.
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Table 3.5
ASOUITH'S ABNORMAL RETURNS FOR FIRMS ENGAGED IN MERGER BIDS (%) 
No of Pre-Press Press Interim Outcome Post-outcome
Firms period(a) Date(b) Period(c) Date(d) period (e)
211 Successful
Target firms -14.1* +6.2* +8.0* +1.13* n.a.
91 Unsuccessful
Target firms -10.5* +7•0* -8.1* -5.4* -8.7*
196 Successful
bidding firms +14.4* +0.2 -0.5 +0.2 -7.2*
89 Unsuccessful
bidding firms +2.2 +0.5 -6.2* -0.2
(a) The pre-press period is the period from 480 days before the
announcement of a merger bid until 21 days before. The abnormal
returns given are for the entire period.
(b) Press date is the day that news of the merger bid first
appears in the Wall Street Journal 
(c) Interim period is the period from 1 day after the press day
until 2 days before the outcome date. The abnormal returns given
are for the entire period.
(d) Outcome day is the day that the outcome of a merger bid is
reported in the Wall Street Journal.
(e) The post-outcome period is the period frcm 1 day after tkp
outcome date until 240 days after the outcome date. The abnormal
returns given are for the entire period.
* The abnormal return is significantly different from 0 at th 1
level.
On the outcome date, large significant negative abnormal
returns continued for the group of unsuccessful target firms.
Finally, in the post-outcome period, beginning one day after the
outcome date until 240 days after the outcome date, all remaining
groups (except for the successful target fill's) showed
significantly negative abnormal returns.
The groups that are of particular interest to the present
study are the successful target firms and the successful bidding
firms. The outcome of Asquith's study and of two further studies
whose results are presented in Table 3.6 seem to present
consistent evidence that the shareholders of successful bidding
firms (acquirers) do not benefit from mergers.
Table 3.5
POST-OUTCOtiE A3NORI4AL aEa-traNs ACQ=NG COHPANIES 
Study by	 Period	 Event Period
Langetieg	 1929-1969	 Month after
(1978)(U.S.)
	
through 12 months
after the effective
date.
Malatesta	 1969-1974	 Month after through
(1983) (U.S.)
	
12 months after
approval for entire
sample
month after through
12 months after
approval for mergers
occuring after 1970
month after through
12 months after
approval for firms
with equity value
under 300m.
Sample
Size Abnormal Returns
149 -6.59
121 -2.90
75 -13.70
59 -7.70
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Similarly, several studies have been carried out on
the pre-outcome abnormal returns for companies involved in
merger activity (see summary of some of the studies in
Table 3.7). The evidence from these studies suggests that
on average both the bidding l and target companies
experience increases in their share prices during the bid
period. However, the increase experienced by the target
companies is substantially higher than the bidding
companies, suggesting in part that shareholders of the
target companies gain more than those of the bidding
companies.
1. Recent events suggest that the increase in the
share prices of the bidding companies may have been
induced by the action of 'friends' of the bidding
companies. One of the latest controversies in the
Guinness saga surrounds the undeclared use of
Indemnities to encourage institutions to ramp the
Guinness share price during a takeover period. The
use of indemnities first came to light in October,
1985 when the Takeover Panel reprimanded Hill Samuel
for not declaring the indemnities given to acquirers
of the shares of Associated Engineers plc.
The argument against the use of indemnities to
acquire shares is because of the impossibility of
assessing its impact on share prices. In other
words, it is difficult to know what proportion of
the increase in share prices arose from the action
of 'friendly' parties.
Dodd	 1970-77	 20 days pre-
(1980)	 public
U.S.	 announcement
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Table 3.7
PRE-OUTCOME RETURNS FOR COMPANIES ENGAGED IN MERGER ACTIVITIES1
Study	 Period Event Period
by
	
Eckbo	 1953-78	 20 days pre-
	
(1983)	 and 10 days
	
U.S.	 post the public
announcement
Asquith
et al 1963-79	 20 days pre-
(1983)	 and through the
U. S.
	 announcement
day
Malatesta 1969-74
	 public announce -
(1983)
	
ment month
U.S.
Bidding Firms Target Firms
Successful Unsuc. Successful Unsuc.
+0.80 +3.13 +21.78 +22.45
(60) (55) (71) -	 (80)
+1.58 +4.85 +14.08 +25.03
(102) (57) (57) (29)
+3.48 +0.70 +20.5 +10.0
(170) (41) (35) (19)
+0.90 n.a. +16.8 n.a.
(256) (83)
Notes: Sample sizes are given in parentheses
1. A comprehensive U.X. study is in course of completion by
Professors J. R. Franks and R. Harris. (1986)
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In a similar study to those in Table 3.7, but using
U.K. companies, Taffler and Gomar (1985) reported that
shareholders of target companies in abandoned bids make
substantial positive abnormal gains due to the bid of the
order of 33% in the bid month alone. They further stated
that
"..these (abnormal gains) do not decay when the bid
is abandoned". .p32
However, the evidence from their stud y
 appears to be
inconsistent with those of Asquith's study reported in
Table 3.5. Taffler and Gomar pointed out that it appears
that the market in the U.K. revalues unsuccessful targets
more substantially than the U.S. market. They further
argued that, though their result appears to be
inconsistent with the neoclassical theory, "as no transfer
of control has taken place, it is nevertheless consistent
with the view that an information efficiency gain was
generated in the market by the merger bid". The new
information about the target firms presumably leads to
upward revision in their valuations.
The foregoing studies (see also Appendix B at the end
of the Chapter for summary of other post-merger
performance studies) reinforce the argument that
shareholders of the acquired companies benefit from
mergers and conversely, that the shareholders of the
acquiring companies do not benefit from mergers. Thus, if
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a company is potentially in danger of bankruptcy it would
appear to be in the interest of its shareholders to
attempt to find a company willing to acquire the business
rather than terminate trading. (This does assume however,
that the positive abnormal returns would still accrue in
such a situation). It also raises an additional issue of
why the management of acquiring companies should embark on
acquisition if it does not lead to any significant
improvement in the wealth of their own shareholders.
3.8 Summary of the Chapter:'
In this chapter, the neoclassical and managerial
motives of mergers were reviewed. An attempt to reconcile
the empirical findings in order to determine which of the
merger motives was predominant did not lead to a coherent
view of merger activities. However, the bulk of empirical
evidence of post-acquisition performance of the acquiring
companies (using either accounting-based or market based
models) seems to suggest that the shareholders of the
acquiring companies do not benefit significantly from
merger. This outcome in part supports the managerial
motives of mergers.
Conversely, evidence from the studies reviewed also
indicates that shareholders of the acquired companies
benefit from merger despite the 'weak' financial
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characteristics often observed for acquired companies,
(see Chapter 2). The motive of acquiring 'weak' companies
which generates huge benefit to the acquired and leads to
little, if any, gain to the acquirer becomes
questionable. In addition to the managerial motive,
another suggestion that have been put forward is that
acquisition is a way to avoid bankruptcy (the failing
company hypothesis). This issue is considered in the next
chapter.
Main Variables	 Nature of Study Conclusion'
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APPENDIX B.
SUMMARY OF OTHER POST-MERGER PERFORMANCE OF ACQUIRING COMPANIES: 
Study
by
Pericd Sample
Singh 1954-60 77
(1971) (U.K.)
Utton 1961-70 39
(1974)
Hogarty 1953-64 43
(1970) (U.S.)
Lone and
Halpern 1955-67 115
(1970) (U.S.)
Reid 1951-61 478
(1968) (U.S.)
lleeks 19 64-7 1 233
(1977) (U.K.)
Cosh, Hughes
and Singh
(1930 1967-69 233
(U.K.)
Kumar 1960-76 354
(1983) (U.K.)
return on assets
rates of return
on Net Assets
Dividend plus
share price
increase
share prices
share prices;
earnings; assets
and sales
rate of return
on assets
rate of return
on assets
rate of return
on assets
comparison
of pre-merger
and post
comparison
pre-and-post
merger
comparison pre-
and post merger
Acquired company
Capital appreciation
tested for changes
pre-and post-merger
pre- and post-
merger changes
pre-and post-
merger changes
pre-and post-
merger changes
Notes: 1. U. indicates an observed post-merger decline
F. indicates an observed post-merger increase.
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CHAPTER 4
ACQUISITION AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO BANKRUPTCY
4.1 Introduction: 
In Chapter 2, it was shown that acquired companies
are likely to be relatively unprofitable, sluggish, often
with a history of declining profitability. These findings
suggest that acquisition targets may possibly be regarded
as potentially failing firms. In chapter 3, it was
suggested that acquiring companies may have embarked on
acquisition in order to avoid bankruptcy. In this
chapter, the theoretical and empirical framework of merger
as an alternative to bankruptcy (the so-called
'failing-company' doctrine) is developed. However, the
economic justification for such behaviour merits
investigation. In particular what factors or costs might
precipitate such action? As a digression from the main
theme of this chapter, bankruptcy costs are discussed in
the following section.
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4.2 Bankruptcy Costs: 
The size, and significance, of the costs associated
with corporate bankruptcy has remained one of the major
unresolved issues in financial theory. This debate stems
from the work of Modigliani and Miller (1958, 1963) who,
in the development of their capital structure irrelevancy
propositions, excluded the possibility of barikruptcyl.
If, as has been subsequently argued, bankruptcy costs are
significant, then the use of debt may be limited to a
level where the present value of the expected costs of
bankruptcy is equal to the present value of the tax
subsidy gained by the use of additional debt.2
An alternative view suggests that bankruptcy costs are
relatively trivial and cannot influence capital structure
decisions. Haugen and Senbet (1978) have argued that the
costs commonly attributed to bankruptcy are actually costs
of liquidation, which is a capital budgeting problem, and
1. M & M (1958, p.274 fn.18) did however,
recognize the possibility of temporary
insolvency which could involve costly
reorganisation.
2. Some studies have modelled bankruptcy
costs. These studies include Robichek and Myers
(1966), Baxter (1967), Kraus and Litzenberger
(1973), Kim (1978), Bulow and Shoven (1978),
Turnbull (1979) and White (1980).
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therefore independent of the act of transferrring control
to creditors. The true costs of bankruptcy are those
associated with this transfer and must be small relative
to the subsidy on debt. However, Hangen and Senbet's
implied model of bankruptcy cost appears to have ignored
the indirect cost of bankruptcy, which are likely to have
an adverse effect on society at large.
Gordon and Malkiel (1980) stated that an additional
cost to bondholders results from their inability to
enforce their prior claims in bankruptcy proceedings. A
court bias may exist in favour of equityholders.
Moreover, while bankruptcy proceedings are in progress
interest is rarely paid on outstanding debt. These
considerations tend to precipitate early settlement of
claims with the result that subordinate debtholders and
even equity holders receive some recovery, though senior
debtholders are not paid in full. This departure from
"me-first" rules may however be less serious than claimed,
as bond and shareholders could often constitute the same
group. Certainly, the growth of institutional
participation in listed securities in the United Kingdom
implies a less serious consequence to bondholders from the
abrogation of "me-first" rules. This however is only
true, to the extent that the same institution holds equity
and debt in the same bankrupt firm.
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Whether bankruptcy costs are of sufficient magnitude
to be of economic significance is an empirical question.
Attempts to provide empirical evidence have been made by
Baxter (1967), Stanley and Girth (1971), Van Horne (1976),
White (1981) and Ang et al (1982). However, because of
problems in data definition, measurement errors and small
sample sizes, the results of these studies are sparodic
and somewhat inconclusive.
In the United Kingdom, no empirical study of which
this author is aware has been carried out. However,
previous empirical studies (for example, Warner, (1977),
Kim, (1978) and Haugen and Senbet (1978)), have identified
elements of direct and indirect cost as having potential
relevance for the determination of bankruptcy costs.
The direct or measurable costs of bankruptcy include
costs such as legal, accounting and selling expenses, as
well as costs paid to agents who administer the bankruptcy
process. The direct cost may also include shortfall
costs, which arise if assets are sold in the process of
liquidation for less than their economic value to the
firm. These costs are primarily due to imperfections in
secondary markets for physical assets, with the results
that a forced sale may not realise the normal market
prices of the assets of liquidating firms.
107
The indirect costs are the additional costs imposed
upon a firm because of its bankruptcy potential. These
costs may include profits on lost sales, costs of
unfavourable credit terms, higher interest charges on late
borrowings, and costs associated with the attendant
enforcement of repayment priorities. The indirect cost
may include the loss of tax credits which the company
would have received if it had not gone bankrupt, and also
the 'social cost' of employees made redundant.
In summary, the precise direct costs of bankruptcy
may be difficult to determine because of methodological
problems. Similarly, the indirect costs, although not
readily quantifiable in monetary terms can have a greater
impact in the society than the direct costs. A
combination of both the direct and indirect costs may be
of such magnitude that avoiding these costs may be an
appropriate approach for management to adopt. It is
therefore not surprising that merger is an alternative
that has been proposed and for which some empirical
evidence exists. In the following sections, merger as an
alternative to bankruptcy is discussed.
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4.3 The Failing Company Hypothesis for Merger Activity: 
There are two identifiable versions of the failing
firm hypothesis. The first version is that a profitable
firm may wish to acquire a failing firm or a firm in a
less profitable industry. The second version of the
hypothesis is that acquiring firms near bankruptcy or in a
declining industry may wish to use merger as the vehicle
for entering more profitable or growth-oriented
industries. A discussion of the failing firm hypothesis
for the acquired firm follows.
4.3.1 Failing Company Hypothesis: The Acquired Company
In a 1961 paper, (more recentl y
 restated by Scott
(1977)), Dawey claimed that most mergers in the USA,
” ... have virtually nothing to do with either
the creation of market power or the realisation
of scale economies. They are merely a
civilized alternative to bankruptcy or the
voluntary liquidation that transfers assets
from failing to rising firms" p.257.
Marris (1964) explained the merger rationale in terms
of inefficiency in resource usage. His 'formal' theory of
takeovers is expanded within the context of the growth and
investment opportunities of the 'managerial firm'. He
argued that shareholders accept a lower dividend payment
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as long as there are investment opportunities with
'abnormal' profits available to the firm. However, when
management continues the high growth/low dividend payment
policy where these investment opportunities no longer
exist, shareholders revise the market valuation of the
firm and may reduce it to such an extent that the firm
itself becomes an 'attractive' takeover target.
A few years later Manne (1965) generalized the
argument in constructing a theory of "the market for
corporate control". In this market, firms compete for
control of inefficiently managed companies through the
takeover route. Manne argued that a poorly managed firm
would have its share price decrease in the market relative
to other companies in the same industries. Furthermore,
Manne argued that the power of the 'market' will
facilitate the effort to takeover management positions by
compensation. Also by acquiring the inefficient firm, the
acquiring firm could increase the efficiency of the
inefficient firm thereby producing "private as well as
social gains".
Meade (1968) summed up the inefficiency argument for
the acquired firms as follows:
"a company which sacrifices profit either to an
easy life or to unprofitable growth makes
itself liable to a takeover bid" p.387.
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This view is supported by Samuelson (1970), when he stated:
"takeovers, like bankruptcy, represent one of
nature's methods of eliminating deadwood in the
struggle for survival. A more open and more
efficiently responsive corporate society can
result" p. 505.
Thus, in these early studies, mergers were seen as an
economical way of eliminating bad management, reorganizing
corporate structures and improving allocation in the
market.
4.3.2. The Empirical Evidence: 
.
The foregoing discussions provide compelling reasons
to hypothesize that, many perhaps most, merger targets
were 'potentially' failing firms. Boyle (1970) sought to
test the failing company hypothesis for the acquired
firm. He gathered profit rates l
 and changes in profit
rates of 698 (55%) of the 1,276 acquired firms in large
acquisitions over the period 1948-68 in the U.S.A.
Acquired firms were classified as either a horizontal,
vertical or conglomerate category. In the year prior to
acquisition, the median profit rate of acquired firms was
8.8%, 9.2% and 10.2% for horizontal, vertical and
1. Profit rate was defined as profit after
taxes as a percentage of stockholder equity.
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conglomerate categories respectively. Boyle showed that
few acquired firms were suffering losses. He also went
further in his analysis by looking at the trend of growth
in assets and profits. He found that acquired firms in
conglomerate mergers had a higher median rate of increase
in both profit and assets for the five years preceeding
merger than the firms in the non-conglomerate category.
Boyle's study appears to have effectively rejected
the hypothesis of merger as a response to impending
bankruptcy, assuming that failing firms cannot be
profitable. However, most of Boyle's comparisons were
only among the classes of mergers, i.e. vertical versus
horizontal versus conglomerate instead of between acquired
and non-acquired firms. It would have been useful to
compare the performance of the acquired firms with that of
non-acquired firms to ascertain whether they had performed
less well (even though profitably). Furthermore, Boyle
reported no test of statistical significance, hence he had
no assurance that his observations were not the result of
chance. Despite the study's limitations, Boyle's efforts
are commendable for being the first to test empirically
the 'failing-firm' hypothesis.
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Blum (1974) developed a failing-company model (FCM)
to aid the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Justice
Department in assessing the probability of business
failure. Blum's purpose was to quantify this probability
by analyzing the financial data of failed firms.
In the USA, the FCM is an acceptable defence against
the antitrust restrictions on corporate mergers. In
International Show v FTC., (1970), the Supreme Court
recognized that when a failing-company is forced into
liquidation, the potential harm to communities, employees,
creditors and owners associated with the business may
outweigh the potential harm to competition caused by
allowing the failing firm, while still intact, to merge
with a competitor. According to Sinkey (Jr), (1981), one
of the difficulties in applying the FCM is the
determination of the point at which a company is
considered 'failing'. This is because the legal jargon
loosely defines failing as a "grave probability of
failure".
Blum used multivariate discriminant analysis (MDA) of
financial ratios as a means for determining the imminence
of corporate failure. He defined failure as "entrance
into a bankruptcy proceeding or an explicit agreement with
creditors which reduces the debts of the company". Blum's
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sample consisted of 115 industrial firms owing liabilities
of more than one million dollars at the time of failure
during the years 1954-1968 plus 115 non-failed firms.
Blum developed a discriminant function consisting of
financial variables.
In a test of the function using measurements taken no
more than one year prior to failure, the model's overall
predictive accuracy rate was approximately 94%. The
accuracy rate declined to 80% for predictions two years in
ad-Vance of failure and 70% for predictions three years
prior to failure.
Clearly, the type of information proceeding from
Blum's study is useful, not just for pleading or deciding
antitrust cases, but also to creditors, investors and
others who may be affected by the impending failure of a
business enterprisel.
A companion argument could be made, although Blum did
not discuss it, that while the combination of two
competitors may tend to reduce competition below present,
previous, or "ideal" levels, the imminent failure of one
1. Similar arguments may be advanced in
support of the 'public interest' logic by the
Monopolies and Mergers Commission in the United
Kingdom.
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(or both) of the separate companies may threaten an even
greater reduction in competition for the industry as a
whole. It is conceivable, moreover, that a merger of two
firms in an industry could strengthen overall competition
within an industry if neither of the merging firms is an
industry leader, and particularly if one of the merging
firms would otherwise fail.
Conn (1976) later sought to test the failing company
doctrine. He drew his sample from the major mergers in
manufacturing and mining during 1960-1969 as reported by
the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC). Most of his
empirical work was centered on the "pure conglomerate"
category of mergers. Conn advanced reasons for this
choice of merger category.
"First, these mergers represent a significant and
increasing portion of all mergers. For the 1948-69
period, pure conglomerate mergers represented over
17% of all mergers and nearly 25% of all
conglomerate acquisitions...Second, these mergers
are between firms selling widely different products
in separate geographic markets. Thus, neither
substantial cost savings nor market power gains seem
likely to result from consolidation.". p.184
Finally, Conn's third reason was that as a separate group,
the pure conglomerates had not been previously tested for
pre-merger profitability.
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Conn collected financial information on 56 mergers
for the five-year pre-merger period. As a profitability
measure, he used net income after taxes/total assets. He
performed a paired-difference test to compare the
significance of the difference between profit rates for
each merger group. He argued that since the
paired-difference test suppresses the effects of common
events on each observation, it is the appropriate test to
measure firm or industry events affecting profitability
Conn found that acquiring and acquired firms had
similar levels of profitability for each of the pre-merger
years examined. The results are summarized in Tables 4.1
and 4.2.
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Table 4.1
CONN'S MEAN PRE-MERGER PROFIT RATES FOR ACQUIRING AND 
ACQUIRED FIRMS FOR A SAMPLE OF 56 PURE CONaDi .Z.RATE NERGIZS (1960-1969) 
Firm Profit	 One Year Prior	 Five Years
to Merger	 prior to Merger
(t)(%)	 (t-5)(%)
Acquiring Firms (na) 	 0.06612	 0.08314
Acquired Firms	 (nb)	 0.06782	 0.08917
= Mean of Net Income after Taxes/Total Assets
Source: Conn, R.L., "The Failing Firm/Industry Doctrines
in Conglomerate Mergers:" The Journal of
Industrial Economics, March, 1976 p.135.
Table 4.2.
CONN'S PRE4aRGER MEANS OF PAIRED DIFFERENCES 13EIT:TEEN PROFIT RATES OF 
ACQUIRING AND ACQUIRED FIRMS FOR 56 PURE CONGLOMERATE 11.7.,G=S (1960-69) 
Acquiring Versus Acquired Firms 
nat - nbt	 -0.00178
	
t = (0.228)
nat-5 - nbt-5	 -0.00633
	 (0.205)
nat - nat-5	 -0.01692
	 (1.305)
nbt - nbt-5	 -0.01701
	 (1.313)
n = net income after taxes/total assets. Subscripts a and b
refer to acquiring and acquired firms respectively; t and t-5
refer to the years for which calculations are based - one and
five years prior to merger.
Source: Conn, R. L. "The Failing Firm....".
Rows one and two of Table 4.1 give the mean profit for
acquiring (na) and acquired firms (nb). Table 4.2 contains
the means of the paired differences between each accuiring and
acquired firm for both pre-merger years and t-statistics. The
subscripts a and b refer to the acquiring and accuired firms
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Based on his analysis, Conn observed no significant
difference between the premerger profitability of
acquiring and acquired firms in period t or t-5 (t values
were 0.228 and 0.205 respectively). He also found no
significant change in either the acquiring or the acquired
firms' profitability in the five years preceding merger.
Conn pointed out that while the mean profit rates for each
set of the firms deólined during the pre-merger period,
the change was not statistically significant. For the
acquiring firms t	 1.305, and for the acquired . firms t
1.313. He stated that the general inference, that could
be drawn from the data, was that firms were acquiring
others of similar profitability, and neither buyers nor
sellers seem to be significantly declining enterprises.
Conn concluded that "the acquired firms are not
'faltering' and that the financial vitality of acquirers,
and acquirees casts considerable doubt on the failing
firm/industry defences for conglomerate mergers" (p.187).
Conn made a serious attempt in testing the
failing-firm hypothesis. Unlike, the Boyle study, he
carried out statistical test of significance. However,
his study is not without loopholes. His study sample
comprised of 'pure conglomerate mergers' during the period
1960-69. Therefore his conclusions, may not be applicable
to other forms of mergers. Indeed, Conn pointed out that
his sample represented only 17% of all mergers, therefore
any conclusion as to the performance of the remaining 83%
during the period under review is lacking.
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Although Conn sought to test the two versions of
failing company doctrine, he omitted an important element
in his comparison. By failing to test the profit-rate of
other companies not involved in any form of merger during
the period, he might have inadvertently reached his
conclusions. The omission of the 'fate' of other
companies (a control group) is of vital importance. It
could be that during the period of his study, firms
generally were enjoying rapid growth in profitability
rate. Alternatively, the comparison directly between
acquiring and acquired companies may be masking the two
observations of the failing company doctrine, i.e., for
both acquiring and acquired companies. Comparison with a
non-acquiring and non-acquired' control group would
reduce this likelihood.
Conn's use of a single-factor l (profit-rate) as a
surrogate for success is also of doubtful validity. If
the surrogacy is to be accepted, it implies that a firm
failing to earn profit is liable to failure. Although
this may be true to some extent, if lack of profit
continues in the long-term, it is equally true that
companies have gone out of business with positive profit
records.
1. The use of multiple discriminant
analysis (MDA) involving the use of
several ratios indicates that there are
several factors' involved in the
prediction of business failure. This is
one of the advantages of MDA over
univariate statistics. A full discussion
is made in Chapter Six on Methodology.
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4.3.3 Failing Company Hypothesis: The Acquiring Company: 
Weston and Mansinghka (1971) sought to test this
hypothesis, suggesting that conglomerate mergers occur for
'defensive' reasons. That is, that acquiring firms
frequently have below average industry profitability and
merger occurs "to avoid adverse effects on profitability
from developments taking place in the firms traditional
market product areas". p.928
They compared the profitability of a sample of 63
conglomerates with two control groups randomly selected
from among the 'Fortune 500' industrials. Their data
cover the periods 1958-68 and 1960-68. They found that in
1958, the conglomerates, (the 63 firms) had profit rates
significantly below the randomly selected sample of
industrials. After 1968, the peak year of merger
activity, the conglomerates had profit rates roughly equal
to those of the industrials l . Their findings are
summarized in Table 4.3.
1. Holzmann, Copeland and Hayya (1975) also
found that a sample of 21 conglomerates had
lower average profitability than a size matched
sample of non-conglomerates for both the
1951-60 and 1961-70 periods.
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Table 4.3
Results from the Weston and Mansinghka Study:
1958	 1958
Sample Means(%)
	
F	 Sample Means(%)	 F-
Statistics	 Statistics
Test
Group
Control
Group
Test
Group
Control
Group
EBIAT/TA 5.3 9.2 9.83* 10.4 8.5 0.44
EBIT/TA 8.7 16.7 17.13* 15.1 15.6 0.02
NET INCOME/
NET WORTH 7.6 12.6 10.52* 13.3 12.4 0.81
DEBT/NET
WORTH 95 56 8.19* 169 87 10.25*
Notes: *difference between test group and control group is
different from 0 at the 1% significance level.
EBIAT/TA is Earnings before interests and preferred dividends
but after Taxes/Total Assets. EBIT/TA is Earnings before
interest, preferred dividends and Taxes.
The third line of the table shows that the profitability of the
conglomerates grew significantly faster than the control group
during the period of heavy merger activity. However, the fourth
line indicates how the conglomerates financed their growth. In
1958, their leverage ratio was higher than the control group but
that ratio almost doubled by 1968, showing perhaps that the
conglomerates financed their growth by an increase in their leverage
ratios.
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The foregoing results led Weston and Mansinghka to
state:
n ... analysis of the backgrounds and
acquisition histories of the conglomerate firms
suggests that they were diversifying
defensively to avoid (1) sales and profit
instability (2) adverse growth developments (3)
adverse competitive shifts (4) technological
obsolescence and (5) increased uncertainties
associated with their industries"...p 928.
They summarized their findings thus:
u••• hence the foregoing data are consistent
with the proposition that the conglomerate
firms perform the economic function of
preserving the values of ongoing organisations
as well as restoring the earning power of the
entities. In addition the conglomerate firms
avoid the costs of bankruptcy".
The failing-company hypothesis for the acquiring
company received further support by Melicher and Rush
(1974) 1 . They compared the profitability of 61
conglomerate firms they acquired. They found that the
conglomerates acquired firms significantly more profitable
than themselves. They also found that the conglomerates
acquired firms with significantly lower leverage ratios
than themselves, suggesting "a latent debt or leverage
capacity motive" p.145.
1. This conclusion supports generally the
conglomerate-firms-as-a-bundle-of-managerial-effi
ciencies proposed by Jacoby (1969). Lynch
(1971) also concluded on the basis of case
study of 28 conglomerates that they followed a
strategy of acquiring 'successful, profitable
companies' with capable management that can be
retained (pp. 83-85).
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However, in an earlier critique of the Weston and
Mansinghka study, Conn (1973) disagreed with their
conclusion and in his later analysis concluded that, "the
general inference drawn from these data is that firms are
acquiring others of similar profitability, and neither
buyers nor sellers seem to be significantly declining
enterprises" p.186
Weston and Mansinghka's results are inconsistent with
those of Conn. Given the contradictory nature of the
results, the time-period covered, and lack of attention
that has been given to the failing firm doctrine for the
acquiring firm, further examination of the issue is in
order. This line of enquiry forms one of the objectives
of the present study.
Shrieves and Stevens (1979) commenting on Conn's
study asserted: "thus Conn's conclusions like Boyle's,
can support only the contention that bankruptcy avoidance
is not the exclusive rationale for mergers". Such
assertion implies that Shrieves and Stevens accept both
Boyle's and Conn's 'single-factor' measurement as adequate
in testing the failing company doctrine. Unfortunately,
the measurements used by both studies (Boyle (1970) and
Conn (1976)) are inadequate and their conclusions are not
final.
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The foregoing discussions suggest that any empirical
analysis of the failing company doctrine should employ a
robust model or technique which will focus on the extent
to which acquired firms were in danger of failure prior to
merger. An important consideration (which has been
stressed by Shrieves and Stevens) is that upon
consummation of the merger, the failure which may have
befallen the merged firm cannot be observed, unless a
subsequent failure of the merged firm can be attributed to
the acquisition. Thus, while it may be possible to
observe firms experiencing financial problems, and in some
cases their subsequent liquidation, for acquired firms the
process of failure may be terminated by acquisition.
Shrieves and Stevens (1979) took the issue further by
examining the extent to which acquired firms were in
danger of failure prior to acquisition by seeking to
measure the ex ante likelihood of bankruptcy. They used
the Altman (1968) bankruptcy prediction model l . Their
sample comprised of 224 firms with 112 firms in each
group, acquired and non-acquired respectively. The
acquired group was selected randomly from the FTC's Larger
Mergers in Manufacturing and Mining during the period
1948-1971. They applied the model to samples of acquired
and non-acquired firms to assess the incidence of
predicted financial
1. The Altman's Model is reviewed in
Chapter 5.
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distress in the two groups. Their results were utilized
in testing the null hypothesis that "the relative
frequency of firms deemed likely to experience bankruptcy
within one year is the same or lower among acquired firms
as among firms not subsequently acquired". Rejection of
the hypothesis was interpreted as supporting the
bankruptcy cost avoidance merger rationale.
They found that 17 (15.2%) of the firms in the
acquired firm sample were near bankruptcy at the time of
the acquisition. This result was compared with 5 firms
(4.5%) found to be near bankruptcy in the sample of
non-acquired firms, and the difference was significant at
the 1% level. They concluded that their results were
consistent with the bankruptcy avoidance motive and went
further to argue that severe financial crises among large
firms are often resolved through the merger process.
Shrieves and Stevens' study is worthy of commendation
because they applied a robust model in an attempt to test
the failing company doctrine. However, it is ironic that
the weakness of the study arises out of the model. They
relied on the Altman (1968) model for their study. Altman
in turn derived the model from a choice of financial
ratios over a twenty-year period. The time-span in the
derivation of the model may have assumed that average
ratios do not shift over time. Although the issue of
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ratio stability over time is yet to be fully resolved, it
seems unreasonable to assume the stationarity of ratios
over long time-periods given the influence of financial
and economic circumstances.
Taffler and Soper (1983) expressed caution on the
outcome of Shrieves and Steven's study. They stated "it
should also be noted that the surprisingly low percentage
of the non-acquired set with "bankrupt" Z-scores is out of
line with other studies using the same model which must
suggest some methodological problems" (p.6 footnote 5).
The arbitrary use of cut-off probabilities without
specifying a decision context is a weakness inherent in
the Altman model. Prior probabilities are probabilities
of group membership in the population. In the Altman's
study, they may be denoted as bl for the probability of
bankrupts and b 2 . (1-b 1 ) for non-bankrupts. Altman's
inference on the development of the model was based on the
premise that sample group frequencies were equal to the
prior probabilities, that is, b l . n1/n and
b2 . n 2 /n. However, when these conditions do not hold,
the statistical inference made may be seriously misleading
if the prior probabilities are not accounted for in the
analysis (Joy and Tollefson (1975), Eisenbeis (1977) and
Palepu (1986)).
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The appropriate cut-off probability to be employed in the
prediction tests is determined by the decision context in which
the model's predictions are to be used. To derive the 'optimal
cutoff probability', it is necessary to specify the decision
context of interest and the prior state probabilities. The
first condition is not a weakness to Shrieves and Stevens'
study. However, the second condition poses a serious threat to
the conclusions of their study. This is because neither Altman
(bankruptcy) nor Shrieves and Stevens themselves (acquisition)
incorporated the prior state probabilities. The failure to
incorporate the prior state probabilities underestimates the
error rate of the model.
In a study similar to that of Shrieves and Stevens but
using U.K. data, Taffler and Soper (1983) applied the Taffler
(1983) 1
 model to a group of acquired and nonacauired
companies. The main data sample used in their analysis
consisted of 172 industrial (manufacturing and construction)
companies quoted on the London Stock Exchange that were
identified as acquired between the beginning of January 1979
and mid-July 1983. These companies had their accounting data
held on the EXSTAT computer tape of company financial
information.
Taffler and Soper compiled their sampled companies from
three sources. The acquisitions between 1977 and 1980 were
taken from the lists compiled by the Department of Trade and
Industry for Business Monitor No.7. "Acquisitions and Mergers
1. The Taffler's model is reviewed in Chapter 6.
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of Industrial and Commercial Companies" and those for 1981 from the
list of U.K. mergers published in the 'Investors Chronicle'. The
1982 and 1983 acquisitions were taken from the 'Financial Times'
"Bids and Deals" section published each Saturday.
Tables 4.4 and 4.5 describe the characteristics of their main
data set.
TABLE 4.4
ACQUISITIONS IN THE DATA Sti BY YEAR
1977 . 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 19.83
NO of
Acquisitionsl 32 31 23 15 30 23 332
Size of
CS TAT Popu-
lation 803 773 733 698 672 736 7043
% Acquired 4.0 4.0 3.1 2.2 4.5 3.1 4.72
Average % Acquired 3.7
notes:	 1. These are the numbers of quoted industrial companies on
the EXSTAT tapes used with financial year ends between 1:5:76
and 30:4:77 and so on which approximate to the number of live
companies in the respective calender year. Because of this
treatment (the only practical one given the way the tape is
arranged) and the number of company failures, the decline in
the size of the population total does not reconcile with the
number of acquisitions.
2. Annualized basis. There were 18 acquisitions to
mid-July 1983
3. Estimated.
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Table 4.5.
CLASSIFICATION OF ACQUISITIONS 
% of
Type/Year
	 1977	 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 Total
Horizontal l
	11
	
14	 9	 6	 16	 10	 9	 75
Vertical	 7	 6	 6	 3	 2	 5	 4	 31
Conglomerate
	 7	 6	 5	 3	 6	 4	 3	 34
Foreign Owned Co. 2
 7	 7	 3	 3	 6	 6	 2	 32
Total
	 32	 31	 23	 15	 30	 23	 18	 172
notes:	 1. 6 companies in 1981 and 1 each in 1982 and 1983
were acquired by their directors or special companies set
up for this specific purpose and these are treated as
horizontal mergers
2. most of the acquisitions by foreign owned
companies were horizontal and many were by U.K.
trading subsidiaries of the overseas parent.
Source: Taffler and Soper (1983) "Acquisitions...."
The Taffler (1933) model was used to analyze the
data in a similar way to that of Shrieves and Stevens. Table
4.6 shows the results of applying the model together with the
percentage of "at risk" Z-score quoted industrial companies on
the EXSTAT tape, excluding the acquired companies for
comparison purposes.
The results led Taffler and Soper to conclude
"The U.K. evidence then provides evidence
consistent with Shrieves and Stevens overall in
that there does appear to be a significant
difference in the acquisition patterns of at
risk companies for the total pooled sample of
172 acquired companies for the six and half
year period" p.16.
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Table 4.6
A COMPARATIVE PERCENTAGE OF "AT RISK" COMPANIES:
ACQULRED vs NONACQULRED 
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 Total
No of Acquisi-
tions with
"At Risk"
Z-scores 6 4 4 1 9 9 133 24.61,5
% of Total 18.8 12.9 17.4 6.7 30.0 39.1 4 38.94 46.0
% of "At Risk"
Z-scores in
the non-Acquired
population 13.7 10.9 11.8 16.2 20.6 22.5 21.1 16.5
Notes:	 1 . Including 1983 on an annualized basis
2. Derived by weighting the respective percentages
by the number of non-acquired com panies in the
population
3. Annualized basis, there were 7 "at risk"
acquisitions in the 18 acquired cases to mid-July
1983.
4. This is significantly different to the population
percentage at better than = 1
5. This is significantly different to the population
% at better than = 1%.
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They further split the period of the study into
pre-recession and recession years. They observed that
when the economic climate was reasonably sound, there was
no evidence that the percentage of acquired quoted
industrial companies possessing bankruptcy
characteristics differed to that of the population
percentage. However, they point out that this does not
apply during the recession period (in other words there
was evidence that the percentage of acquired companies
possessing bankruptcy characteristics differed from the
population percentage) where the null hypothesis was
rejected at 0.1% level. Apparently, this 'strong
rejection' may have eclipsed the 'no-difference' result in
the pre-recession period and therefore have biased the
non-split-period conclusion.
Taffler and Soper tested companies "quoted on the
London Stock Exchange that could be identified as being
acquired". One can argue that their conclusions relate to
both small and large quoted companies during the period.
The support for this argument is based on the sources of
their sampled companies. The list of acquisition compiled
by the Department of Trade and Industry includes "all
acquisitions". This is also the case with the list of
acquisitions compiled by the "Investors' Chronicle" as
well as the acquisitions taken from the Financial Times
"Bids and Deals" section. As such, one cannot conclude
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from the findings of their study that severe financial
crises among 'large' quoted firms are resolved through the
merger process. This gap in knowledge of large firms is
important and an examination of the issue is in order.
This is because it is the large firms that are likely to
solicit for mergers as they seldom go bankrupt, (Singh
(1971)). This line of enquiry is of particular interest
to the present study.
One of the criticisms of the earlier bankruptcy
models similar to those of Altman and Taffler is the
stability of financial ratios over time. Mensah (1984)
argued that because of changes in economic environment
over time, financial ratios should not be assumed to be
stable over time. Although the issue of ratio stability
is vet to be resolved, it is expected that the average
ratio changes over time. In order to avoid the problem of
ratio stability, the model for the present study was
derived specifically over the same time period as the
companies used in the analysis.
	 In other words, the
companies used for the derivation of the model and, the
acquired companies were drawn from the same time period.
In addition to the shortcomings of the previous
studies, none of the studies has compared the
post-combination performance of the acquiring companies
according to the financial characteristics of the acquired
companies.
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4.4. Summary: 
The failing company hypothesis for merger activity
has been discussed. There appears to be empirical support
of the hypothesis for the acquired firms. The evidence
for the acquiring firms appears subtle. In the next
chapter, a review of financial ratios as a tool for
analysis is made.
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CHAPTER 5
BANKRUPTCY PREDICTION MODEL
A REVIEW AND EVALUATION OF RATIO ANALYSIS
5.1. Introduction: 
This chapter reviews the history of financial ratio
analysis and evaluates many of the contributions to its
development. The review and evaluation seeks to convey an
understanding of the process of development, the state of
the art, and the difficulties encountered by researchers
in the field of financial ratio analysis and business
failure prediction.
5.2. Derivation of Financial Ratios: 
Financial ratios are derived from the financial
• information provided by companies. The term 'financial
information' is used broadly in business practice and
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literature but for the purpose of this study, the term is
specifically defined to mean the information which is a
product of the accounting system, i.e. contained in the
published financial statements. The financial statements
include the balance sheet, the income (profit and loss)
statements and derivatives thereof.
Financial statements may be historic or forecast and
audited or unaudited. Financial information for this
study was that information contained in the histoical,
audited financial statements (balance sheet and income
statements) - the type of statements a prospective
investor, analyst or a lending institution would require
of a company.
One may wonder, however, whether in practice this
financial analysis, in its current form, plays any role or
has any importance in the decision making of intended
users - particularly in this case of predicting business
failure and takeover.
Some studies such as Roper (1948), Lee and Tweedie
(1975) have indicated that individual investors pay little
attention to financial reports. At the same time, there
have been studies that have indicated that considerable
reliance is placed on reports by financial analysts.
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Horngren (1957) suggested that "...although the annual
report is not always the most important source of
information (to security analysts), in terms of usage, it
belongs in the first place among sources", p.599. Then
Dyckman (1969) reinforced the belief that financial
statements are of significant importance to such
analysts.
Even in the case of the current 'efficient' capital
markets debate, the apparent and implied uselessness of
published financial statements in the context of efficient
markets (see Gonedes (1972)) seems to be exaggerated.
In fact, there seems to have been considerable evidence to
confirm that investors, even in that context, use
financial statement information and still consider it
useful in their investment decisions, (Ball and Brown
(1968), Beaver (1968) Brown (1970), May (1971), Kiger
(1972) and Niedhoffer and Regan (1972)). Such studies,
apart from establishing the significant importance of
financial information in market economies have helped in
attempts to serve better the needs and preferences of
users of information.
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5.3. Ratio Analysis: Early Development: 
According to Horrigan (1968), the usage of ratios in
financial statement analysis can be said to have begun
with the advent of the current ratio, which was first used
during the 1890's.
	
Subsequently, financial analysts
began to investigate numerous ratios as a basis for credit
decisons. Horrigan discovered that, as early as 1905,
Cannon, the pioneer in financial analysis, used ten
different ratios in a study of business borrowers.
Nevertheless, it appears that most analysts in the early
days emphasized the comparison of the value of a single
ratio to a preconceived criterion value for that ratio.
The most prominent "absolute criterion" was a 2 to 1 value
for the current ratio.
In a classic study of financial ratios, Wall (1919)
classified 981 firms by nine industry groupings and nine
geographic regions. For each firm, he computed the values
of seven ratios and concluded that the values of these
ratios were significantly influenced by geographic
location and type of business.
By today's standards, Wall's methodology would appear
to lack rigour. His conclusions were drawn without
adequate objective analysis. However, his work is
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significant on many counts. First and foremost, the study
adopted an empirical approach. Secondly, it investigated
a large sample. Thirdly, it promoted the idea that a
large number of ratios are useful in evaluating a firm's
financial condition. Fourthly, it challenged the notion
that a single criterion value is a suitable standard for
ratio comparisons. Finally, it explicitly recognized the
problem of heterogeneity inherent in samples of firms from
different industries and regions.
In a later study, Wall (1928) laid additional
groundwork for studies of the present kind. With Dunning,
he published an index of ratios for use in financial
statement analysis. Each ratio is assigned a weight
indicating its relative importance in the index. One
could argue that the assignment of an index to financial
ratios without a theoretical background represents a
crude, somewhat subjectively derived methodology.
Despite the shortcomings of the early studies, ratio
analysis has flourished as a vital analytical tool to
evaluate the financial condition and performance of a
firm. The analysis involves two types of comparison.
First, the analyst can compare a present ratio with past
and expected future ratios for the same company. For
example, a profitability ratio (earnings/total assets) for
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the present year-end could be compared with the
profitability ratio for the preceding year-end. When
financial ratios are arrayed on a spread-sheet over a
period of years, the analyst can study the composition of
change and determine whether there has been an improvement
or a deterioration in the financial condition and
performance of the firm over time.
The second method of comparison involves comparing
the ratios of one firm with those of similar firms or with
industry averages at the same point in time. Such a
comparison gives insight into the relative financial
condition and performance of the firm.
Although ratios are useful analytical tools, there
are some limitations on their usage. Ratios are derived
from accounting data, and accounting data are subject to
different interpretations and perhaps manipulations. For
example, measurement of profitability is ambiguous,
because there is more than a single meaning of profit.
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There are economic definitions of profit but the
accountants have usually found the pure economic concepts
of profit (income) not susceptible to pragmatic use.
Neither Fisher's definition (1966) 1 nor Hick's (1946
p.172) 2 provides enough guidance for measurement purposes
of the accountants.
In accounting, the amount of profit resulting from
the , measurement process depends on the valuation concepts
used. Thus, one may end up with a different profit figure
depending on whether one used market values (liquidation
or opportunity cost value), or historical cost values or
general purchasing power adjusted value or capitalized
(discounted) values. For example, when the historical
values are used, the income reported includes only that
amount which accountants refer to as "realized income".
1. According to Fisher, income is held to be
the flow of wealth of services in excess of.
that necessary to maintain a constant capital.
2. According to Hicks, income is the amount an
individual can consume during a time period,
and be as well off at the end of that period as
he was at the beginning. The immediate
problem, however, is that no precise meaning of
what constitutes "being-well-off" was given.
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Where current costs are used to evaluate assets and
liabilities the resultant income figure excludes monetary
gains and losses obtained from the mere holding of the
monetary assets during the period whether realized or not
(Edward and Bell (1964
With the use of general purchasing power units of
monetary measurement, the income is recast in terms of
measuring units, which attempt to take into account
explicitly the changing purchasing power of money due to
the rise or fall in the general price-level.
Indeed, one can go on enumerating more bases of
valuation and in each case the result is a different
income figure. Such a multiplicity of bases of valuation
with concomittant numerous income figures leaves the
analyst in an ambiguous position to choose the appropriate
income figure to use in his analysis.
The limitations of ratio analysis are not confined to
measurement problems. Interpretation of the ratios
themselves may be ambiguous. For example, a high stock
turnover ratio could indicate efficient stock control, but
it could also indicate a serious shortage of stocks and
suggest the likelihood of stock-outs.
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The limitations of accounting data and financial
ratios have been recognized. However, in spite of their
defects, they represent in most cases the best available
indication to investors and shareholders on the stock
market of the current and past record of a firm. These
are the data used and discussed in the financial press and
in the financial community generally, to indicate company
performance. In the next section, a discussion of the
empirical studies of financial ratios is made.
5.4 Empirical Studies: 
Major empirical studies into ratio analysis have
taken different patterns and spanned many years. Most of
the studies have taken one of two forms: univariate
analysis and multivariate discriminant analysis. A
discussion of each is made in turn.
5.4.1 Univariate statistical method: 
A univariate approach involves the analysis of ratios
to determine their predictive ability on a one-by-one
basis. This methodology has been applied in the
determination of successful and unsuccessful companies.
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Relevant Studies: 
During the same time period in which pragmatical
empiricism flourished, a quite different movement beganl.
Several reseachers undertook a more 'scientific' approach
to the analysis of ratios. Smith and Winakor (1930)
collected and analyzed data on samples of troubled firms.
Their first study involved 29 firms and a later study
included 183 companies that failed during the period
1923-1931. Smith and Winakor, in both studies computed
means of 21 ratios for the sampled firms and found that
patterns of decline in the values of certain variables
appeared to portend failure. The ratio of working capital
to total assets showed an almost perfectly regular pattern
of significant deterioration beginning in the 10th year
before failure. Cash to total assets began a regular and
steep descent in the sixth year preceding failure. The
current ratio showed a reverse trend in the sixth and
fourth years prior to failure, but thereafter declined
steeply.
1. In the 1930s, Foulke (1937) of Dun
and Bradstreet is reported to have
promoted the adoption of his own chosen
handful of ratios for use in financial
statement analysis. He based his claim
to authority on his extensive personal
experience in analyzing financial
statements. Foulke provided neither a
priori constructions nor quantitative
empirical analyses as bases for his ratio
selections.
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A major weakness of the Smith and Winakor studies is
that they did not compare the ratio trends of unsuccessful
firms to trends for control groups of successful firms and
demonstrate a significant contrast. The studies cover the
decade preceding the Great Depression, a period during
which the means of successful firms' ratios might also
have followed a similar pattern to the unsuccessful ones.
In an analysis similar to Smith and Winakor's but
based on a very small sample of 20 unsuccessful firms,
Fitzpatrick (1931) studied trend's of 13 ratios. In a
follow-up study, Fitzpatrick observed trends of the same
ratios as in his original study. He concluded that the
ratios of net profit to net worth, net worth to debt, and
net worth to fixed assets were the best indicators of
success or failure.
The Smith and Winakor and Fitzpatrick studies all had
their shortcomings. However, the studies are extremely
significant. They represent pioneer efforts in the use of
empirical analysis to identify relationships between
financial ratios and subsequent business success or
failure.
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5.4.2. Recent Studies: 
In a more recent study which may now be regarded as a
landmark in financial ratio research, Beaver (1966)
applied a univariate statistical technique to predict
business failure. He carried out the research by
examining the failure prediction ability of 14 financial
ratios. The study involved 79 pairs of failed and
nonfailed firms matched by industry and asset size. The
failed firms in the sample were those firms which during
1954-1964 had been removed from Moody's Industrial Manual
due to bankruptcy, bond default, overdrawn bank account or
nonpayment of a preferred stock dividend.
Beaver computed 30 financial ratios for each year up
to 5 years prior to failure for each of the failed firms.
For each ratio, he grouped values according to the number
of years before failure and computed the arithmetic mean
for each group. He then compared these means, arranged by
numbers of years preceding failure, to corresponding
values of the means of non-failed firms. Then for each
year, he selected that value (in between means of failed
and nonfailed firms) of each ratio which separated the
ratio scores of failing and nonfailing firms with minimal
error.
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Beaver found that five of the variables used as
predictors of failure showed significantly low rates of
predictive error for each of the five years preceding
failure. These variables are summarised in Table 5.1. and
the misclassification rates in Table 5.2.
Table 5.1
BEAVER (1966) SUMMARISED RATIOS 
SUMMARY OF RATIOS FOUND TO BE SIGNIFICANT PREDICTORS: 
1. Cash flow to total debt
2. Net income to total assets
3. Working Capital to Total Assets
4. Current Ratio
5. No-credit Intervall
Source: Beaver (1966)
1. The no-credit interval is a relatively new
ratio in the finance literature. It is
computed by dividing the "net defensive assets
fund" (quick assets - current liabilities) by
the operating expenditures. For a thorough
discussion of the no-credit interval and other
interval measures, see George H. Sorter and
George Benston, "Appraising the Defensive
Position of the Firm" The Accounting Review.
October, 1960, pp 633-650.
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Table 5.2
BEAVER'S CLASSIFICATION RESULTS 
Years prior
to failure Overall
Misclassification
Type I	 Type II
1 (13%)
10% 22% 5%
2 (21%)
18% 34% 8%
3 (23%)
21% 36% 8%
4 (24%)
24% 47% 3%
5 (22%)
22% 42% 4%
(a) Figures in parentheses represent test
against holdout sample. Figures not in
parentheses are test against same sample
from which dichotomous classification
test was estimated.
(b) Type I Error is misclassifying a
failed firm: Type II Error is
misclassifying a non-failed firm.
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In Table 5.2, misclassication rates on all the
variables were lowest during the first year.
Misclassification rates were, in some cases, slightly
higher in intermediate years than in the 5th year, but in
general they increased as the time interval to failure
increased.
Beaver's study is an application of univariate
statistical analysis to business failure prediction. In
the study, numerous variables were examined; however, each
variable was analyzed apart from all others to determine
its usefulness for the purpose in question. The setback
to such an approach is that it provides no means for
determining the compound descriptive or indicative or
predictive significance of more than one variable.
Another possible problem with the method is that a sample
drawn from a population may not typify that population
with respect to a particular variable, even though the
sample may be typical in many other respects.
Another potential weakness is the sensitivity of a
single ratio (and some groups of ratios) to manipulation
by management. Some traditionally prominent ratios are
quite susceptible to such manipulation, often referred to
as 'window dressing', or what Argenti (1976) described as
'creative accounting'. The current ratio provides an
example. In order to improve or 'dress' the current
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ratio, management may reduce the current liabilities prior
to publishing the financial statements. Management may
also build up cash for this purpose, by reducing stocks or
offering substantial discounts to customers for early
payment of their accounts. If the initial value of the
current ratio is greater than unity and if discounts given
in liquidating current assets are not excessive, the
'reduced' current liabilities results in an increase in
the ratio.
Increasing the number of ratios considered in ratio
analysis tends to defeat window dressing efforts.
However, there are exceptions to this generalization. For
example, suppose an analyst computes stock and debtors
turnover ratios using closing stock and debtors balances
respectively as denominators. Then management may
liquidate stocks, offer discounts to debtors to speed
collection, and use the proceeds to pay off current debt,
thereby increasing the stock turnover and debtors turnover
ratios while also increasing the current ratio. Thus, in
a series of actions that are not necessarily beneficial,
and may well be detrimental, to the real financial and
operating position of his company, a 'skilful window
dresser' may make supposedly representative items
displayed in his 'shop window' appear deceptively
attractive.
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Neter (1966) in a discussion of Beaver's study, noted
an interest in the possible effectiveness of multivariate
analysis of evaluating financial ratios as predictions of
business events. This is because the univariate analysis
treats each ratio as though it were independent of every
other ratio analyzed. And unless multicollinearity is-
taken into account, it may be difficult to draw accurate
conclusions about the relative predictive abilities of
various ratios. Multiple discriminant analysis (MDA)
provides a method of evaluating the usefulness of several
ratios taken as a group for correctly classifying
observations into a priori classes. The procedure takes
multicollinearity into account in computing weights
(coefficients) of variables.
5.5. Multiple Discriminant Analysis (MDA):
The late 1960s witnessed a new interest in financial
ratio analysis. Researchers in business, finance,
accounting and banking started investigating the
usefulness of multivariate analysis as a method for
improving the effectiveness of financial analysis. MDA,
as has been pointed out, is a statistical method used to
classify subjects into one of two or more a priori 
classes, based on an analysis of selected characteristics
believed to be related to class membership. From a
decision making perspective, MDA is a method for choosing
one of a finite number of alternative courses of action.
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From a forecasting perspective, MDA is a method of
predicting whether one or another of a finite number of
mutually exclusive events will occur. In any case, it is
usually convenient to discuss discriminant processes in
terms of "classification", or membership in a class
defined by known or knowable values of a classification
variable.
Following Beaver's (1966) paired sample design,
Altman (1968) selected 33 non-failed firms matched to the
failed firms according to industry classification and
asset size (value of total assets). He then tested a
number of combinations of variables and found a linear
combination of five variables. The following discriminant
function was derived:
Z = .012x1 + .014x2 + .033x3 + .006x4 + .999x5
	
where x l 	 =	 Working capital to Total Assets
	
x2	 =	 Retained Earnings to Total Assets
	
X 3	 =	 Earnings before interest and taxes
to Total Assets
	
x4	 =	 Market value of Equity to Par value
of Debt
	
x 5	=	 Sales to Total Assets.
Altman most successfully classified firms by
categorizing those observed to have a 'Z-score' greater
than 2.675 as nonbankrupts and those with lower scores as
bankrupts. In other words, the Z-value 2.675 is the
'critical score' in the discriminant model.
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In a 'series of tests' on validation samples,
Altman's model correctly classified more than 90% of firms
one year before failure. Using financial data taken two
years before date of failure, the model correctly
classified nearly 80% of the firms in the sample. Success
in classification deteriorated and grew erratic when the
model was tested on data taken more than two years prior
to failure. However, the results were better than results
Beaver (1966) obtained with his best single ratio.
Joy and Tollefson (1975) criticized Altman's
conclusion. They claimed that Altman's classifications
were not predictions of corporate bankruptcy but merely ex
post discriminations. They also contended that Altman's
'holdout° sample should have been drawn from a future
period completely distinct from the original (or analysis)
sample period in order to illustrate the predictive
ability of the model.
1. This is a method of testing that the
discriminant model is not sample-specific. For
fuller explanation, see Chapter 6.
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They further claimed that evidence of ex ante predictive
power requires intertemporal validation and not merely
cross validation. (By cross validation, they mean
verification using a time-coincident holdout sample). Joy
and Tollef son did admit, however, that under the
assumption of stationarity (of the parameters and
variables of the discriminant function) ex post 
discrimination (or validation) is tantamount to
prediction, provided the researcher proves that
stationarity indeed exists. Otherwise, according to them,
ex post discriminations (or cross validations) merely are
useful for making inferences about the importance of
individual variables.
Eisenbeis (1977) contended that Joy and Tollefson
incorrectly viewed the process of prediction as only
making inferences into the future. As a result, they
excluded instances when one is interested only in
predicting whether or not an event will occur without
reference to a particular time period and when one is
willing to assume stationarity. In such cases, Eisenbeis
claimed that cross validation is not inappropriate or
meaningless. According to Eisenbeis, divergency in ex
ante and ex post classifications constitutes a crude test
of the stationarity hypothesis.
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Despite the shortcomings of Altman's study, it was
important for introducing multiple discriminant analysis
to failure prediction and reconfirmed the usefulness of
ratio analysis. To date, it is the most widely referenced
failure-prediction model.
Deakin (1972) combined the approaches of Beaver
(1966) and Altman (1968). He used Beaver's 14 financial
ratios as independent variables in a multiple discriminant
analysis. An attempt was made by Deakin to eliminate some
ratios from the discriminant function, but this resulted
in substantially increased misclassication rates, hence
the 14 ratios were retained.
Deakin performed his discriminant analysis on 32
pairs of failed and non-failed firms which were matched
according to industry classification and asset size. A
separate analysis was performed for each of the five years
preceding failure. The results indicated that
misclassification errors averaged 3%, 4.5%, and 4% for the
first, second and third years respectively. The error
rates increased markedly in the fourth and fifth years
rising to 21% and 17% respectively.
Deakin's model was tested on an independent sample
consisting of 11 failed and 23 non-failed firms selected
at random from the 1964 and 1963 Moody's Industrial
Manual. Error rates of 22%, 6%, 12%, 23% and 15% were
observed for each of the five years prior to failure. The
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deterioration in the classification accuracy of the model is
expected when applying a statistical test to sample populations
other than the population from which the model was drawn.
However, the deterioration of the first year appears rather
severe and Deakin was unable to explain the result.
Deakin's study emphasized the failure prediction ability of
MDA models, using financial ratios as the input, for three years
preceding failure - a result Altman was unable to obtain.
Compared with the classification reSults obtained by previous
studies, Deakin's model appears to give consistently better
results than either the best prediction variable (Beaver (1966)),
in the dichotomous test or of the single-year discriminant
analysis (Altman (1968)), see Table 5.3
Table 5.3
CLASSIFICATION ERROR RAT= FOR PREDICTING FUTURE BANKRUPTICES1
Year before	 Beaver's Cash	 Altman's	 Deakin's
failure	 flow/total debt	 discriminant	 Discriminant
function	 function
1 13 5 3.0
2 21 28 4.5
3 23 52 4.0
4 24 71 21.0
5 22 64 17.0
Sources: Beaver (1966), Altman (1968) Deakin (1972)
1. Based on original samples.
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Most of the bankruptcy prediction models have
concentrated on medium to large-sized companies. Edmister
(1972) attempted to apply a technique similar to Altman's
to small business. He pointed out that when many closely
correlated variables are included, the resulting function
is likely to be biased toward the sample from which it was
-
developed. Thus, its reliability would be limited to
samples similar to the sample that determined the
function. The sample firms employed by Edmister were
borrowers and guarantee recipients from the U.S. Small
Business Administrations (SBA), for the period 1954 to
1969. Loss borrowers were designated as failures and
non-loss borrowers were considered to be non-failures.
Under the stipulation that three consecutive annual
financial statements be available from the period prior to
the date when the loan was granted, his sample of loss
borrowers consisted of 42 firms.
Edmister analyzed 19 financial ratios, including most
of those found to be important in previous failure
prediction studies such as Beaver (1966) and Altman
(1968). In order to mitigate the problem of
multicollinearity, he used a stepwise inclusion of
discriminating variables. A variable was excluded if its
correlation with another variable was greater than 0.31.
This approach led to the reduction of the 19 ratios to
seven.
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Edmister claimed that the seven-variable function
correctly discriminated in 39 out of 42 cases (93%) when
the decision rule was to predict failure if Z < .520 and
non-failure if Z > .520.
Edmister's study does not stand clear from criticism
for the following reasons. First, his sample frame was
drawn from the population of SBA loan applicants.
Although aversion to the risk of either Type I or Type II
error l may vary among lenders, the U.S. SBA seems disposed
to accept greater Type I risk than is acceptable to some
conventional private lenders. Such a disposition is
suggested by the following statement:
"By law, the Agency may not make a loan if a business
can obtain funds from a bank or other private
source. One, therefore, must first seek private
financing before applying to SBA".2
1. Type I Error is lending to borrowers who will
default and Type II refusing to lend to borrowers who
would repay.
2. U.S. Small Business Administration,
SBA Business Loans (Washington, D.C.) Office of
Public Information, Oct. 1969, p.1.
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The SBA may lend only to applicants who are
presumably judged by other lenders to be too risky. The
'last resort' lending activities of the SBA could imply
that the financial statements of these applicants may have
already indicated "financial distress". In other words,
Edmister's model derivation and its subsequent validation
was developed from an alread y 'biased' population.
A second, perhaps more fundamental, weakness of the
study is what Joy and Tollefson (1975) referred to as
inconsistency of the purpose of the study and
characteristics of the analysis. Joy and Tollef son
maintain that for the 'rule of multiple discriminant
analysis to hold, the sampling frame should be
conceptually identical to the populations toward which the
research question is directed'. If, for example, the
intended use of the MDA model is to discriminate between
good and bad loan applicants (as in the case of Edmister),
the samples should be drawn from a sample of loan
applicants. It is perhaps erroneous to draw the test
sample from a population of good and bad loan acceptances
where applicants that were denied loans have been
excluded. The Edminster study illustrates an
inconsistency between purpose and analysis. His intent
was to assess the usefulness of financial ratio analysis
in predicting failure of small business. However, his
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data, collected from SBA loan records, were from only
those that were granted loans. His sample design might
lead one to conclude that his conclusions related to firms
that were granted loans.
Finally, Edmister concluded that the 3-year average
of a ratio is a predictor of small business failure. He
argued inter alia, "averaging is expected to smooth the
ratios and to result in a more representative figure than
that calculated from only the most recent statement"...p
1481. It is quite understandable to argue that a year's
financial statement may not be sufficient for a "trend" to
emerge, but it can also be argued that averaging may
obscure the benefits of trend. If, for example, a company
has the following ratios (Net Profit/Sales) in the years
prior to failure 3.0%, 4.5%, 6.0%, for year one, two and
three respectively. It is easy to see that the ratios are
falling. However, if the average of the 3-years is taken
(as Edmister did), the "representative figure" will be
4.5%. The representative figure improves the ratios and
hides to some extent the nature of the trend to the
analyst.
Despite the shortcomings of Edmister's study, his work
is significant in that he related ratio analysis to the
prediction of small business failure, an area previous
researchers had avoided.
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The development of bankruptcy prediction models is
not confined to the United States of America. Taffler
(1982) developed such a model, using United Kingdom data
This model has received the most exposure and testing to
date in the U.K. He selected a sample of failed firms
consisting of 46 manufacturing firms quoted on the London
Stock Exchange failing in the 8-year period to the end of
1976 which met 'certain criteria to ensure reliable source
data'. Bankruptcy was defined as one of the following (a)
appointment of a receiver; (b) entry into creditor's
voluntary liquidation; (c) winding up by Order of the
Court or (d) clear action on the part of the government.
Taffler used principal component analysis (PCA) to help
avoid multicollinearity problems and a stepwise linear
discriminant analysis produced a model consisting of the
following four variables:
Z = Xi + X2 + X3 + X4
where X1 = profit before taxes/current liabilities (53%)
X2 = current assets/total liabilities (13%)
X3 = current liabilities/total assets (18%)
X4 = no-credit interval (16%).
(The percentage figures are the relative
contribution of individual variables to the
discriminant function).
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Taffler reported that out of the 92 companies from
which the Z-function was derived, only two firms were
apparently misclassified by the cut-off of -1.95. One of
the misclassified firms was Rolls Royce, which Taffler
argued convincingly was not a true misclassification. He
stated "in the case of Rolls Royce, it is doubtful whether
it was actually insolvent at the date of appointment of
the receiver,., since all creditors and debenture holders
were subsequently repaid in full and the distribution to
ordinary shareholders amounted to three and a half times
the share price when finally suspended" (p.299).
Taffler's study appears to follow the 'usual'
bankruptcy prediction models frequently produced in the
U.S.A. However, it differs in many respects. The most
important difference relates to the matching procedures.
Most U.S.A. studies have taken a random sample of
nonfailed companies to match with the failed companies
according to accounting year end. Taffler recognized
explicitly that a company still in business is not
necessarily financially sound and that many companies
presently in existence resemble previous failed companies
in terms of their financial profile. Consequently,
selection on a matched stratified random basis reduces the
discriminatory power of the computed models and increases
particularly their Type II errors (misclassification of a
non-bankrupt as a bankrupt). Taffler concludes "the group
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of continuing exterprises should consist of financially
sound,.. and consequently distinct companies for correct
application of the methods"..p343.
Taffler also pointed out that matching according to
industries is incorrect, "particularly as some industries
are more failure-prone than others". On the matching
according to financial year, Taffler argued that the data
for the non-failed firms should be drawn from their most
recent financial statements as the derived function is to
be applied prospectively.
A spin-off from Taffler's model is the construction of
Performance Analysis Score (PAS). Taffler pointed out
that the "Z-score" of a firm lies above or below a
cut-off point and thus identifies a firm as resembling
more closely previous failures or non-failed companies.
In this regard, the Z-score has no range limits, so no
ratio scale applies, "thus, a Z-score of 2.0 can only be
viewed as better than a value of 1.0, not that it is twice
as good". To provide an avenue of measuring the relative
strength or weakness of a firm, Taffler developed the
PAS. A company's PAS in a particular year is arrived at
by ranking the Z-scores of all companies for that year in
ascending order and observing the percentile in which the
Z-score of the company lies. Taffler invoked Shashua and
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Goldschmidt (1974) 1 to illustrate that the PAS-score
explicitly meets all the criteria necessary to constitute
an efficient and operational measure of relative economic
performance. (The PAS-score is used in the present study
to analyse the performance of acquiring companies - see
Chapter 9).
Taffler's studies highlight some salient issues in
the development of bankruptcy models which apparently have
gone unnoticed over the years and make a useful
.
contribution in the development of the performance
analysis score.
1. Shashua and Goldschmidt (1974) specify the
following criteria for an efficient performance index:
(a) it can be readily interpreted;
(b) each of its constituent elements is consistent;
(c) each is independent and non-tautological;
(d) each is monotonic and has the same partial
correlation with the performance index;
(d) the index has fixed scale limits, and
(f) it has a linear relationship with company
utility.
163
5.6. Summary of the Section: 
The foregoing studies illustrate efforts made to
develop a predictive model based on financial ratios. The
next stage in the information process is the ability of
information processors to use the model. Or to put it in
another way, whether information processors thought the
empirical studies were in the right direction. This
aspect of information processing is discussed in the next
section.
5.7. Predictive Ability as a Criterion of Usefulness: 
Predictive ability as a criterion of usefulness is
based on a simple assumption that in order to make a
decision, one has to at least implicitly make a
prediction. It has been contended that a more
comprehensive test of the usefulness of financial or
accounting information would be the prediction achievement
criterion (Libby (1974),(1975)) rather than mere
prediction ability as established by the studies
reviewed. However, according to the prediction
achievement criterion, the usefulness of accounting
information, or any format thereof (e.g. ratios), is a
function of not only the predictive ability of the
information per se (i.e. the ability of the information to
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predict the relevant event, given its correct usage), but
also of the ability of the users to interpret and
correctly use the data. The criterion is based on the
Brunswick Lens Model (Brunswick (1952)). The lens
framework is a general descriptive information processing
model which attempts to model the examination of
judgmental situations where men make decisions or
predictions based on a set of explicit cues or pieces of
information from the environment which are
probabilistically related to a relevant environmental
event (see Figure 5.1).
Figure 5.1 depicts a version of the Lens model as per
Dudyacha and Naylor (1956) and correlation statistics are
used to outline the elements of the model (although any
other appropriately similar measure may suffice).
The predictive ability system describes the
relationship between the information set (X) (e.g.
ratios), and a relevant environmental event (Ye) (e.g.
failure or non-failure). The correlation coefficient rie
called the ecological validity of the cue, indicates the
relationship between each individual piece of information
or cue (Xi) and the environmental event to be predicted.
The multivariate linear relationship between that
environmental event and
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the whole set of information is what is labelled
environmental predictability (Re ). On the other side of
the model, the correlation coefficient (ris) known as the
utilization coefficient defines the relationship between
an information cue (Xi) and the decision maker's
prediction (Ys); and the multivariate equivalent relating
all cues to the decision maker's prediction is called the
response linearity (Rs). The prediction achievement index
(ra=rYeYs) measures the prediction accuracy by the
decision maker himself; and this is what is deemed to be
the relevant index of the usefulness of information.
The Brunswick Lens Model highlights the relationship
between predictive ability of the information and the
information utilization because high prediction
achievement demands both high predictive ability and the
correct utilization of the information.
Altman and McGough (1974) compared the predictions of
auditors in the form of going-concern qualifications to
the predictions of a multiple discriminant model. They
found that the model predicted almost twice as many
failures as the auditors. The interpretation of the
results is debatable. For the auditor to make a
going-concern qualification, he must have predicted
failure. However, an auditor might have believed that a
firm was going to fail and yet not disclosed this through
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a disclaimer or qualified opinion. The disclosure is a
function of both the prediction of failure and the utility
function of the auditor regarding the disclosure of the
results of that prediction. The auditor might have
believed that the firm had some chance of recovery and
that a going-concern qualification would have induced the
demise of the firm. The auditor might have felt that to
avoid this was preferable to making full disclosure of his
belief regarding the firm's future. This might explain
why the auditors in Altman and McGough's study failed to
do as well as the model. The study was important, despite
this problem, for showing that according to the prediction
model, more bankruptcies should have been disclosed by
auditors through a going-concern qualification. It also
suggests the potential usefulness of the models for
auditors in deciding whether or not to issue a
going-concern qualification.
In a recent study using U.K. companies, Taffler and
Tseung (1984) studied the extent of the going-concern
qualification among quoted companies over a seven-year
period. They examined specifically the proportion of
companies failing without having such qualifications in
their audit reports compared to those which did have such
qualifications. They found the ratio to be 3 to 1, and
they asserted that in most of the latter cases, the
qualification could be described as obvious. They also
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found that only 43% cases of companies failing within six
months of publication of their accounts were qualified and
that twice as many companies at serious risk of
bankruptcy, as measured by derivatives of the Z-score
approach, were not qualified as were qualified.
They recommended the use of a reliable Z-score and
associated statisitical techniques to aid auditors in
their assessment of 'qualification' risks. They also
argued that such techniques could provide the auditor with
an unbiased measurement tool to help alert management to
problems in its business and also "strengthen the
auditor's hand when discussing a possible qualification or
related audit matters with client management" (p.269).
As with the Altman and McGough study, it is debatable
whether these results indicate auditors' inability to use
the Z-score model or merely an unwillingness, though the
latter seems the more likely.
Libby (1975) adopted the lens model paradigm to
determine whether accounting ratios provide useful
information to loan officers in the prediction of business
failure. In particular, he examined the accuracy,
consistency (over time), and consensus of loan officers'
predictions of business failure made on the basis of
accounting ratios and the ability of a linear model to
predict these judgments.
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In the study "43 experienced loan officers" made
business failure predictions for 70 real firms, on the
basis of five-ratio financial profiles. Half of these
firms had prevously failed within 3 years of the financial
statement date. The lens model statistics were measured
by the percentage of correct predictions. Libby found
that the bankers' predictions were quite accurate. Their
achievement (ra) ranged from 45% to 83% correct and
averaged 74% correct. Environmental predictability (Re)
which sets an upper limit for achievement, was 85% as
determined by a linear discriminant analysis model. Based
on this result, Libby concluded that "traditional
confidence in ratio analysis for credit rating seems
justified" (1975 p.156).
Casey (1980) in a replication of Libby's study asked
48 loan officers to evaluate financial ratio profiles
representing 30 firms, half of which had failed within
three to five years of the financial statement date. The
cases were represented only by six accounting ratios. The
environmental predictability of the cue set (based on the
original sample) was 80%, 83.3% and 73.3% for the third to
fifth year before failure respectively. The individual's
accuracy averaged 56.7% which was not very high compared
with chance.
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In a similar study, Zimmer (1980) asked Australian
bankers to predict failure for Australian firms. The
major difference between Zimmer's study and Casey's was
that the former told his subjects in advance that half of
the firms had failed. Forty loan officers evaluated 42
firms, one-half of which had failed within three years of
the financial statement date. The individual's accuracy
averaged 72%. Table 5.4 summaries the findings of the
three studies.
Table 5.4.
MAN VERSUS MODEL 
RESULTS OF BANKRUPTCY PREDICTION
Attributes	 Study by
Libby l Casey2 Zimmer3
Individual's % % %
Accuracy 74 56.7 77
Consensus 80 80.0 72
Discriminant Model 88 (not reported) 90
Notes: 1. Libby, Robert, (1975)
	
(pp 150-61)
2. Casey C.J., (Jr.) (1980) (pp 603-613)
3. Zimmer, I.
	 (1980) pp. 629-36
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The major limitation of these studies relates to the
generalizability of the results with respect to (a)
subjects (b) the real world situation. Participants in
the studies were not randomly selected and the lending
policy of a particular bank might affect the individual
loan officer's perception of financial information. In
the actual lending decision, loan officers have an
abundance of multi-period quantitative and qualitative
information available to them.
Notwithstanding the limitations of these studies, the
attempt to test the usefulness of only a small segment of
the available quantitative information in single-period
form is a step in the right direction. The information
set used in the studies was chosen because of the apparent
theoretical and empirical support concerning the
relationship between single period financial ratios and
business failures. The accuracy of the individuals
prediction also illustrates that the usefulness of
accounting information is a function of the predictive
ability of the information and the ability of users to
interpret the data.
In the previous two sections, the bankruptcy
prediction model and predictive ability as a criterion of
usefulness have been discussed. In the next section, a
discussion of circumstances under which a firm would be
forced into bankruptcy is made.
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5.8 , Bankruptcy Condition:
Bulow and Shoven (1978) developed a model to
investigate the circumstances under which a firm would be
forced into bankruptcy. Their model focussed on the
conflicts of interest among the various claimants to the
assets and income of the firm. They derived conditions
under which the necessary funds for continuation would not
be forthcoming and illustrated the importance of liquidity
and debt maturity structure in warding off bankruptcy.
They found the conditions for bankrutpcy more complex than
previously believed.
Their model included three separate groups of
claimants on the assets and income of the firm:
bondholders, bank lenders and equity holders. They
assumed that bondholders have a fixed time pattern of
claims on the firms should it remain in business and
cannot negotiate to alter the terms of their loan if
bankruptcy should become probable. Bank lenders, on the
other hand, were assumed to have the ability to negotiate
with equity holders to alter the terms of their loans.
Bulow and Shoven assumed that as residual claimants, the
equity holders would always try to avoid bankruptcy.
Equity holders were assumed to be willing to give up part,
or all, of their claim to convince bank lenders to keep
the firm in business. This would make continuance more
valuable than bankruptcy for the banklender.
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The following algebric expression represents Bulow
and Shoven's condition for bankruptcy:
Ec <
	 Bb _	 Bc
where Ec . present value of the equity holders'
claim with continuance:
Bb . value of the (large loan) bank's claim
under immediate bankruptcy; and
Bc . present expected value of the claim of
the (large loan) bank if the firm is
allowed to continue one more period with
the additional loans granted at the same
interest rate.
Thus, a firm will go bankrupt if the banks'
bankruptcy claim is greater than or equal to its
continuation claim, even after the equity holders have
forfeited their entire claim to the bank.
In order to further explore the conditions of
bankruptcy, Bulow and Shoven replaced Equation (1) with a
more specific two-period framework. Their expanded model
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can be expressed as follows:
NEGATIVE NET WORTH CONDITION
C + P < (1 + 1.13 )B + r 1 + D1 + D2(1 + rp) ...(2)
1 + i
C + L < (1 + r E )B1	 + r1 + D 1 + D2	 (3)
ILLIQUIDITY CONDITION
C <	 (1	 + r3 )B1	 + r1 + D1	 	  (4)
where: C	 cash or liquid assets of the firm;
present expected value of future
earnings of the plant;
L =	 liquidation value of the plant;
rE =	 the bank's first period interest
rate of loans to the firm;
BI =	 the principal outstanding to the
bank at the beginning of period one:
r 1 =	 the bond interest due in period one;
Di =	 the bond principal due in period one
D2 =	 the bond principal due in period two
rci =	 the interest rate paid on the bonds
maturing in period two; and
i = the bank's discount rate.
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Bulow and Shoven used the extended model to
illustrate the following results:
1. A firm may stay in business with a negative
net worth and a cash shortage.
2. A firm may be liquidated even if the going
concern value (C+P) exceeds the liquidation
value (C+L).
3. A firm may be allowed to continue, even if
its liquidation value exceeds its going concern
value.
4. Given two firms with identical bankruptcy
costs, identical variance in their returns from
staying in business, identical liabilities, and
assets of equal value, it is possible that the
one with the most cash will be allowed to
remain in business while the other will be
forced into bankruptcy.
By expanding their model to include taxes and
mergers, Bulow and Shoven illustrate the following:
1. A tax which treats gains and losses
differently increase the attractiveness
of merger or bankruptcy. This is only
true for firms which might experience
losses sufficiently large that their
taxes would be negative with a symmetric
tax system.
2. Even a symmetric tax system can make
bankruptcy more attractive by reducing
the variance in the income of the firm.
Bulow and Shoven concluded that bankruptcy depends on
several variables in addition to the firm's net worth and
the cost of bankruptcy. The maturity structure, priority
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structure, and the ownership of the firm's debt must also
be considered. The decision is also affected by the
composition of the firm's asset portfolio and the
variability of potential returns to that portfolio.
Generally, a longer-term debt structure, a more liquid
asset portfolio, and a more variable return decreased the
probability of a firm being forced into bankruptcy.
Bulow and Shoven's findings confirmed and explained
many of the empirical results, (Beaver (1966), Altman
(1968), Tafflei. (1982) and others)). By showing that a
combination of factors must be present for bankruptcy to
occur, they explained why the multivariate models
out-performed the univariate models. The findings also
explained why a company can maintain a "failing" Z-score
over many years without being declared bankrupt and
conversely why a company with a "high" Z-score may be
declared bankrupt. Since the bankruptcy process, as
analyzed by Bulow and Shoven, was so complex, this helps
to explain the large error rates which were found by
others in the prediction studies. Their results also show
that the empiricists were looking at the right factors in
designing their experiments: debt structure, liquidity and
cash flows. The possibility that further knowledge of the
bankruptcy process may be gained by additional work on
Bulow and Shoven's model must be recognized.
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5.9
	 Summary: 
The present chapter has described and evaluated only
a few of the many ratio analysis studies that have been
conducted. Some of the studies were chosen for discussion
because they made a significant contribution to the
development of ratio analysis. Others were chosen because
they presented opportunities to observe and discuss some
of the many difficulties encountered by researchers in the
field of ratio analysis. Still others were selected
because they illustrated the general trend of progress in
the field.
In the studies reviewed, the dominant statistical
method for analysis has been the multivariate discriminant
analysis (MDA). The growing interest in MDA and the
proliferation of MDA studies appear to have won
recognition in many financial analysis textbooks (Lev
(1974), Foster (1978), Van Horne (1980) for the
significance of the method of analyzing financial
information. The recognition of MDA of financial ratios
by textbook authors and researchers all over the
free-economy world, is evidence of a growing awareness of
the need for more effective tools for evaluating a
company's financial condition in a complex and rapidly
changing business, financial and economic environment.
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The following chapters discuss multivariate
discriminant analysis and its use in analyzing financial
ratios of a sample of failed and non-failed companies, and
the susbsequent application of the derived model to a
group of acquired and non-acquired companies to determine
their financial profile prior to acquisition.
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CHAPTER 6
METHODOLOGY AND HYPOTHESIS
6.1. Introduction: 
In the previous chapter, a review of the literature
on the development and use of financial ratios as
variables for model building was made. The main
objectives of the study set out in Chapter One were to:
(1) determine whether acquired firms were in
danger of failing prior to acquisition:
(2) determine whether acquiring firms were in
danger of failing prior to acquisition:
(3) determine the impact of acquisition on
acquiring companies; and particularly to
consider whether their performance differs
according to whether or not the companies they
acquired appeared to be in danger of failing.
This chapter expands on this broad outline by
explaining in detail for each of these main objectives;
the research hypotheses within the objective, the
strategies to be used for testing the hypotheses and the
detailed methodology for each strategy.
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6.2 DERIVING A RATIO MODEL TO IDENTIFY FAILING COMPANIES:
THE FAILING COMPANY HYPOTHESIS: 
6.2.1. Acquired and Non-Acquired Companies: 
The bankruptcy prediction model provides a benchmark
to measure whether or not a company possessed financial
characteristics similar to previous failed companies. The
model is useful in testing the proportion of firms
possessing failing characteristics in two groups of
unclassified companies. This is the approach formulated.
to test the following null hypothesis:
Ho:	 There is no significant difference
between the proportion of firms
possessing failing characteristics in the
sets of acquired and non-acquired firms:
The alternative hypothesis is:
H1:	 There is a larger proportion of firms
possessing failing characteristics in the
set of acquired firms.
Rejection of the null hypothesis will be interpreted
as supporting the hypothesis that more acquired firms were
on their way to failure, in other words, supporting
bankruptcy cost avoidance as one of the more important
rationales for merger activities.
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6.2.2. Acquiring and Non-acquiring Companies: 
It has been evidenced (Weston and Mansinghka,(1971))
that some companies acquire 'defensively' to avoid
impending bankruptcy. To seek support for the evidence, a
similar approach adopted in testing the failing company
hypothesis for the acquired companies was adopted for the
acquiring companies. This led to the formulation of the
following null hypothesis:
Ho:	 There is no significant difference
between the proportion of firms
possessing failing characteristics in the
sets of acquiring and non-acquiring firms:
The alternative hypothesis is:
H1 :	 There is a larger proportion of firms
possessing failing characteristics in the
set of acquiring firms.
It is important to note that the test of the bankruptcy
cost avoidance merger motive depends not on the absolute
magnitude of the frequency at which acquired or acquiring
firms might have failed, but upon whether this frequency is
larger or smaller than that observed in non-acquired or
non-acquiring firms (Stevens and Shrieves, (1979)).
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6.2.3 RESEARCH STRATEGY: 
The following steps are required to test the failing
company hypothesis:
_
(1)	 To select or formulate financial ratios
which may be related to the ability of
firms to survive and to derive the values
of these ratios from the financial
statements of a sample of companies drawn
from a population of failed and
non-failed companies.
(2)	 To choose 'appropriate' ratios and
develop a mathematical model that
classifies companies in the sample so
that disagreement of the results, when
compared to the known outcomes, is
minimized and
(3)	 To validate the model by
(a) classification of an
independent holdout sample of both
failed and non-failed companies, and
(b) using the Lachenbruch (1967)
jackknife technique.
(4)	 To apply the model developed in (2) above
to a sample of companies involved in
merger activity in testing the failing
company hypothesis for both acquired and
acquiring companies.
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6.3 BANKRUPTCY PREDICTION MODEL - METHODOLOGY AND 
DISCUSSION: 
6.3.1 Choice of Financial Variables: 
Several studies have employed financial ratios as
variables in their analyses. The authors of these studies
have argued that their chosen ratios were useful.
However, because ratio analysis lacks a precise theory,
the recurring question has been the determination of an
appropriate set of ratios to be analyzed to obtain the
required information. Hundreds of ratios can be computed
from a given set of financial statements and many have
been reported in the literature as being useful.
Naturally, different researchers have included different
ratios and discrimination is therefore needed to identify
a limited set of financial ratios.
Given such a heterogeneous set of useful financial
ratios, the decision maker might encounter some problems
in selecting ratios for the task in hand. It is not
conceivable that all ratios are significant and equally
important in a multi-ratio model. Ideally, the financial
ratios to be computed should be selected on some
theoretical basis, coupled with demonstrated empirical
evidence of their usefulness. However, an acceptable
theoretical foundation for the selection of ratios for
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decision-making is yet to be found. Similarly, the
scattered empirical evidence in published studies does not
identify a complete set of useful ratios. Despite the
problems of selecting useful ratios, one may argue that
certain ratios are capable of measuring certain dimensions
of a company's financial structure.
6.3.2. Sample of Financial Ratios: 
Twenty-two financial ratios were selected for the
group of failed and non-failed companies in order to
provide appropriate ratios for selection in the derivation
of the model (see Table 6.1). The selection of these
ratios was based on their apparent usefulness in previous
studies.
Previous research studies have shown that
multicollinearity between ratios can lead to sample
specific results and steps had to be taken to reduce this
problem. A brief discussion of the relevant research and
the resulting techniques is presented in the following
section.
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6.3.4. Multicollinearity: 
Horrigan (1968) noted that collinearity is a problem
with the use of financial ratios. Stevens (1973) also
noted that multicollinearity is a problem coincident with
the use of multiple discriminant analysis (MDA) with
ratios and with most empirical studies in finance. The
phenomenon occurs because several financial ratios might
be measuring the same dimension of a company's performance
as a result of sharing common factors. An assumption of
most statistical techniques derived from the general
linear model is that the independent variables are
mutually uncorrelated.
Morrison (1969) pointed out that moderate departures
from the assumption that the independent variables are
uncorrelated do not significantly impair the results.
However, he conceded that when the variables are highly
collinear, the weights in the resulting model are highly
unstable, and the model tends to be highly sample
sensitive, and interpretation becomes very difficult. The
multicollinearity problem was evident in the bankruptcy
study by Altman (1968). He noted the high
multicollinearity in the ratio set from which he derived a
discriminant model. He emphasized the need to choose the
variables for the model carefully, and his selection was
achieved through a large number of trial computer runs.
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The current study used MDA, and at the same time
employed a fair number of ratio data. It was expected
that multicollinearity could be a problem. In order to
reduce the problem, the technique of factor analysis was
adopted. This approach has been adopted by previous
researchers (Piches and Mingo (1973); Stevens (1973),
Libby (1975) and Taffler (1982)).
6.3.5 Factor Analysis: 
Factor analysis is based on the proposition that
there is a systematic interdependence among a set of
observed variables which must be due to something more
fundamental (latent) which creates this commonality. The
variables are therefore considered as simply indicators of
this fundamental factor. The questions likely to be asked
are: what is this factor?, can it be extracted from the
observed data and their relationship established? and how
can it be extracted?. Is the factor unidimensional or
multidimensional? For example, can a company's liquidity,
profitability and level of activity be considered as
indicators of financial viability. Conversely, factor
analysis may also be used as a data-reduction technique
which summarizes the commonality of all the manifest
variables into a few factors. Factor analysis can
therefore be used as a descriptive and/or data reduction
technique.
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One of the goals of factor analysis is to construct a
small number of variables (called Factors) that can convey
the information present in a large number of variables.
For example, a 22-ratio set might be designed to secure
information on a company's liquidity, profitability and
activity in general. Factor analysis assumes that the
variables are correlated with each other. If the
correlations between variables are small, it is unlikely
that they share common factors. The null hypothesis that
the correlation matrix is an identity can be tested.
(This test is done in Chapter 7, Section 7.2).
In the example involving a 22-ratio set, each of the
22-ratio set would define a separate variable. Each
company in the sample would have 22-ratios, and each of
these ratios would vary across the sample of companies. A
factor analysis of the financial dimension of the sampled
companies would begin by calculating the correlation
coefficient between every pair of ratios. Two variables
have a correlation of zero if scores on one have no
relationship to scores on the other. If two ratios on the
company scale had a correlation of zero, it would mean
that companies' financial dimension to one of the ratios
would not be linearly related to the other.
Conversely, a pair of ratios on the scale might have
had a correlation of 1.0. The new pair of ratios would
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apparently be measuring the same kind of dimension, since
higher scale to one of the ratios would always correspond
to higher scale to the other ratio. A single variable
would convey as much information about the companies'
financial dimension as the two original variables. That
single variable is called a 'factor'. Its meaning would
be determined by the content of the pair of ratios it
represented.
6.3.6. Derivation of Factors: 
Principal component analysis (PCA) is a procedure for
deriving factors from sets of variables. Its basic
objective is to determine factors that can convey the
essential information in a larger set of variables. PCA
assumes that each of the original variables can be divided
into two parts, an error component that reflects the
less-than-perfect reliability of all companies dimension,
and a true-score component that is common to all of the
variables being factor analyzed.
After the correlations between every pair of
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variables have been computed, PCA determines a set of
factors called an 'Initial Solution' or an unrotated
solution. This is done be selecting a factor that has the
largest EIGENVALUE l . In an unrotated solution, an initial
factor that represents best all the variables is
determined first. Then a second factor that next
represents all the variables is found. The second factor
is required to be uncorrelated with the first. Next, a
third factor that is uncorrelated with the first two
factors is found. This factor must also represent best
the information in all the variables, subject to the
requirement that it cannot be correlated with the first
and second factors. PCA proceeds in this way, until the
number of factors determined is equal to the number of
variables being factor analyzed. (The analysis is made in
Chapter 7, Section 7.3).
1. It indicates how much of the variation in
the entire set of original variables is
accounted for' by each factor.
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6.3.7. The Rotation Phase: 
The factor matrix obtained in the extraction phase
indicates the relationship between the factors and the
individual variables. However, it is usually difficult to
identify meaningful factors based on this matrix. Often
the variables and factors do not appear correlated in any
interpretable pattern. Most factors are correlated with
many variables. Since one of the goals of factor analysis
is to identify factors that are susbstantively meaningful
(in the sense that they summarise sets of closely related
variables), the rotation phase of factor analysis attempts
to transform the initial matrix into one that is easier to
interpret. Ideally, after rotation, each group of
variables will have high correlations with one of the
rotated factors, and low correlations with all of the
others. This is the sense in which it is claimed that a
factor 'represents' a group of variables, (Rummel,(1 970) ).
6.3.8. Selecting a Variable to Represent a Factor: 
A variable (ratio) is selected to represent a factor
because each group of variables will have high
correlations with one of the rotated factors, and low
correlations with all of the others. By such a procedure,
the number of variables selected is reduced from the
original variables. The question of which variable should
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represent a factor has yet to be resolved. The popular
procedure has been to select a variable with a 'high'
loading . Stevens (1973) and Chen and Shimerda (1981)
argued that the selection of a variable with the 'highest'
absolute factor loading makes the selection sensitive to
the sample. They further stated that such a procedure may
_
be satisfactory for data reduction purposes, but may not
be satisfactory for model building or theory construction.
The appealing procedure is therefore to select a
variable with a 'high' loading to represent a factor.
However, the selection of the 'best' variable for a factor
is not independent of the variables selected for other
factors. This is because each variable contains common as
well as unique information. The common information is
shared by any other variables in the factor while the
unique information is not shared by other variables.
Intuitively, the selection of variables should be made in
a manner which seeks to capture most of the common
information contained in their factors, as a group and at
the same time more of the unique information than any
other set of variables. A combination of both procedures
was adopted in the present study (in other words, in some
cases, the variable with the 'highest' loading was
selected and in others a variable with a 'high' loading).
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6.3.9. Drawback of Factor Analysis: 
There are several reasons for the increasing
popularity of factor analysis among researchers. Factor
analysis appears to be an objective way to reduce the
available data to a more manageable level. It is also
effective in reducing the problems of multicollinearity
and redundancy often associated with the use of large
numbers of financial ratios. Moreover, in the absence of
a well-established theory to guide the selection of
variables in the context of a specific decision or event,
factor analysis can be an expedient means of choosing
variables.
In spite of these advantages, several problems exist
in the use of factor analysis. There is no absolute
guarantee that variables so selected necessarily represent
all relevant dimensions of the subject area under study.
Neither will all dimensions be equally represented (Chen
and Lew, (1984)). For example, when initial variables are
selected by examining the literature, with additions and
deletions made on the basis of the researcher's judgment,
an important dimension will be included only if it is
already in the literature or if the researcher is aware of
it.
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Factor analysis like other research tools has
limitations. However, the overriding requirement in its
usage is for the researcher to bear its limitations in
mind when interpretating the results of its use.
In Chapter 7, an application of factor analysis to
the actual research data of the present study is made.
However, a description of discriminant analysis procedure
follows in the next section.
6.3.10 Multiple Discriminant Analysis Phase (MDA):
In the previous section, it was stated that the
purpose of factor analysis was to reduce
multicollinearity. This approach leads to the reduction
of the data set. The reduced data set becomes an input
into the MDA phase that generates a linear function
capable of separating failed and non-failed companies.
Multiple discriminant analysis is a statistical
procedure that classifies subjects into one of two or more
a priori classes based on an analysis of selected
characteristics believed to be related to class membership.
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6.3.11 Class Membership: 
The first step in MDA is to define the classes into
which subjects are to be classified; for the purpose of
the present study, failed and non-failed companies. The
classes should be mutually exclusive and collectively
exhaustive. The two classes in this study are exhaustive
and mutually exclusive subsets of business outcome.
6.3.12 Variable Selection: 
The second step in the procedure is to identify
variables which may be correlated with a particular
outcome class, for example, business failure outcome. The
variables identified for analysis in the present study
consist of a number of financial ratios, the reduced set
resulting from the factor analysis.
6.3.13 Basis for Selecting MDA as Method of Analysis: 
The variables of MDA are equivalent to the
'independent' variables of regression analysis, and the
outcome class variable of MDA is similar to the
'dependent' variables of regression analysis. MDA was
first used by Fisher (1936) to classify plants into one or
another of three groups. Fisher also showed that, when
outcome classes can be defined dichotomously, the
mathematics of regression analysis and MDA is essentially
the same. The choice between the two methods depends upon
the objective of the analysis. If the dependent variable
is to be expressed quantitatively (metric) then regression
analysis is the appropriate method. Conversely, when the
dependent or outcome variable is expressed qualitatively
(non-metric), for example, yes or no, failed or
non-failed, acquired or non-acquired, then MDA is
appropriate.
The MDA sets each observation into the class the
observation resembles most closely. Resemblance is
measured by comparing the profile of an observation to the
mean profile of known members of each of the outcome
classes. The profile reflects the values of the indicator
variables being used.
Table 6.2 is a reproduction of Lubin's (1950)
criteria for choosing among various statistical techniques
for analysis.
197
Table 6.2
Lubin's Methods of Solution for Various Statistical Problems 
Dependent
Variate
Independent
Variate
Method of
Solution
1. Quantitative Quantitative Multiple Regression
2. Quantitative Qualitative Analysis of Variance
3. Qualitative Quantitative Discriminant Function
4. Qualitative Qualitative ?
Source:	 Lubin, A.(1950) "Linear and Non-Linear
Discriminating Function": British Journal
of Psychology, No.3 Part II Statistical
Section (June), pp 90-104.
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The criteria for using MDA are met in the present
study. The two possible values of the outcome variable
can be described qualitatively, and the indicator
variables are readily measurable in quantitative terms.
In the next section, the classification procedure of
discriminant analysis is outlined.
6.3.14 Linear Classification Procedure: 
The objectives of a discriminant analysis have been
explained, the notations and classification procedures are
summarized below:
Let each individual's discriminant score Z i be
a linear function of the independent
variables. That is:
Zi = 100 + 101 X1i + b2X 2i + .... bnXni
The classification procedure follows:
If Zi > Z crit: classify individual i as
belonging to Group 1.
If Zi < Z crit: classify individual i as
belonging to Group 2.
Where Xji = the ith individual's value of the jth
independent variable
. = the discriminant coefficient for the}D J
jth variable
Zi = the ith individual's discriminant
score
Z crit. = the critical value of the
discriminant score.
199
The linear classification procedure allows an
interpretation of the effect of each of the independent
variables. Suppose the independent variable X1 is
profitability and the classification procedure is if Zi >
Z crit., classify the company as not being in danger of
failing, i.e., the higher the value of Zi, the more likely
the company is solvent. If the sign of bi is positive,
then higher profitability implies a better solvency, and
the larger the size of bi, the more important variable X1
is in discriminating between Group 1 and Group 2
companies. Therefore, if bi . 0, then X1 has no effect.
The outline of discriminant analysis has been noted.
In the next section, its assumptions are discussed.
6.3.15 Assumptions of Discriminant Analysis: 
Linear discriminant analysis is dependent on three
assumptions. Firstly, that each group is drawn from a
population which has a multivariate normal distribution.
Such a distribution exists when each variable has a normal
distribution about fixed values on all the others
(Blalock, (1979), p.452)). The normal distribution
permits the precise computation of tests of significance
and probabilities of group membership. When this
assumption is violated, the computed probabilities may not
be exact, but they may still be quite useful if
interpreted with caution (Lachenbruch, 1975)(p41-46).
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The second assumption is that the population
covariance matrices are equal for each group. The
covariance between the variables is a measure of how much
they vary together. Relaxation of this assumption affects
the significance tests for the differences in group means
and the appropriate form of the classification rules.
The third assumption is that the groups must be
mutually exclusive. This assumption has been met in this
study because a failed company cannot at the same time be
a non-failed company or vice versa.
The first and second assumptions have been examined
by empirical methods. Kerlinger (1973) set up artificial
populations, drew samples from them and performed I t' and
'F' tests. He invoked the conclusions reached by other
authors, (Lindquist, (1953) and Boneau (1960)) and
concluded that the importance of the normality and
homogeneity of variance are overrated. Kerlinger quoting
Lindquist suggested that the F. distribution is amazingly
insensitive to the form of the distribution of criterion
measures in the parent population.
He also argued that unless variances were so
heterogeneous as to be readily apparent, that is
relatively large differences exist, the effect on the F
test would probably be negligible. Boneau appears to
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confirm the view, when he stated that in a large number of
research situations the probability statements resulting
from the use of 't' and 'F' tests, even when these two
assumptions are violated, will be highly accurate.
Kerlinger summarized the violation of the assumptions
issue by stating:
"..unless there is good evidence to believe
that populations are rather seriously
non-normal and that variances are
heterogeneous, it is usually unwise to use a
non-parametric statistical test i in place of a
parametric one. The reason for this is that
parametric tests are almost always more
powerful than non-parametric tests. (The power
of a statistical test is the probability that
the null hypothesis will be rejected when it is
actually false)" . p.287.
Several attempts have been made to circumvent or
minimize the effects of the violation of the assumptions.
One such attempt is to minimize the effect of
non-normality by prior transformation of the variables.
Unfortunately, prior transformation of accounting ratio
data to approximate normality has been found to be
ineffective (Deakin (1976), Altman et al (1981)).
However, other authors, notably, Gilbert (1968),
Krzanowski (1975) and Lachenbruch (1975) have shown that
discriminant analysis is a rather robust technique which
can tolerate some deviation.
1. A non-parametric statistical test is a test
whose model does not specify conditions about
the parameters of the population from which the
sample was drawn (Siegel, (1956)).
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If the assumptions of group covariances are not met,
a quadratic discriminant function rather than a linear one
is required to minimize the probability of
misclassification. However, simulation studies by Marks
and Dunn (1974), Wahl and Kronmal (1977) suggest that with
small sample sizes (like in the present study), the
quadratic rule can perform quite poorly. Similarly, in
the case of dichotomous variables, most evidence suggests
that the linear discriminant function often performs
reasonably well (Gilbert (1981); Moore (1973)).
The equality of group covariance can be tested for
statistical significance (Box (1949)). This is based on
the determinants of the group covariance ;ratrices. The
significance probability is based on an F-transformation.
A small probability leads to the rejection of the null
hypothesis that the covariance matrices are equal.
However, Norusis (1985) noted that when sanple sizes in
the groups are large, the significance probability may be
small even if the group covariance matrices are not too
dissimilar. More importantly, the test is very sensitive
to departures from multivariate normality. In other
words, it tends to call matrices unequal if the normality
assumption is violated, so it is unclear whether the
outcome of the test is as a result of epartures from
multivariate normality or of unequal group
 covariance
matrice. Because the test presents interloretational
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difficulties, it is ignored in the present study. Even
where the test has been adopted in previous studies, the
authors caution readers on its interpretation (Singh
(1971), Taffler (1982)).
There are other methods to assess the effectiveness
of a discriminant model. These methods are discussed
below.
6.3.16 Evaluation of Classification Error Rates: 
The discriminant analysis model derived is likely to
exhibit a high accuracy rate in classifying members of the
study sample. Undoubtedly, the classification rate is due
largely to favourable bias that results from the intensive
search routine carried out in the multivariate
discriminant analysis. The bias element inherent in the
initial model was present in the studies of Singh (1971)
and Tzoannos and Samuels (1972). The bias element has
been discussed in detail by Frank et al (1965) and by
Morrison (1969). The greater the number of variables
analyzed, the more intensive the search.
The effect of intensive search bias does not persist
beyond the study sample classification procedure. There
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is no search in the same sense of the validation sample
and therefore no search-related bias. It has been well
documented in the economics and finance literature to some
extent by studies by Frank et al (1965), that
reclassification of the original sample used to estimate
the sample rules as a means to estimate error rates leads
to biased and overly optimistic results. A number of
alternative methods have been suggested and evaluated for
estimating classification errorsl.
There are two basic methods of obtaining estimates of
error rates. These methods are (a) the original sample
method (using Lachenbruch 'jackknife' method and (b) the
hold-out sample method.
(a) Lachenbruch (1967) Method: 
This method is based on the original sample
used in the derivation of the model. The
method holds out one observation at a time,
estimates the discriminant functions based upon
N1 + N2 - 1 observations (where N1
	 non-failed
company and N2
	failed company) and classifies
the holdout observation. The process is
1. see Lachenbruch (1967, 1968, 1975);
Lachenbruch and Mickey (1968) and Frank, Massey
and Morrison (1965).
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repeated until all observations are
classified. The misclassified observations for
each group are used as "almost unbiased"
estimates of the misclassification error
rates. Moreover, it may be used when sample
sizes are small.
(b) Holdout Method: 
The holdout sample method (Lachenbruch and
Mickey (1968), Frank et al (1965)) divides the
sample groups into two sub-samples. The first
subsample is used to develop the classification
functions, which are tested on the second
subsample. The estimates are consistent and
unbiased but require larger samples.
In order to mitigate any limitation arising from any
of the methods, each of the two methods was subsequently
adopted. The adoption of the methods is to ensure that
the MDA model is robust. This is because the outcome of
the present study (e.g. both the failing company
hypothesis test and the consideration of performance
between acquirers of failing and non-failing companies)
depends on it.
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A further problem in application of the MDA technique
relates to the selection of appropriate a priori 
probabilities (e.g. of failure and non-failure) and a
cut-off point. Discussion follows in the next section.
6.3.17 Adjusting for Prior Probabilities or Cost of 
Misclassification: 
The standard discriminant analysis classification
rules incorporate a priori probabilities to account for
the relative occurrence of observations in different
populations and misclassification costs. These
probabilities could be adjusted because some
classification errors may be more serious (e.g. costly)
than others. Ideally, the prior probability should
reflect the probability of failure for the period and
sample for which predictions are to be made. However,
because of the subjective nature of such a policy, it has
been practice to either (i) let the prior probability of
failure equal 0.5 or (ii) let it reflect the proportion of
failures in the base sample. However, Altman et al (1981)
argued that the latter method is appropriate, provided the
pooled data represent a random sample from the combined
group populations. Where the condition is not met, they
further stated that the resulting classifications would
only minimize the classification errors in the sample
rather than provide estimates of the population error
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rates. Because the condition required for the use of the
method (ii) above is not met in most studies, method (i)
has often been somewhat arbitrarily adopted.
Eisenbeis (1977) (and more recently Palepu (1986))
argued that the use of arbitrary cutoff probabilities is
one of the serious 'pitfalls' in using discriminant
analysis. The effect is that the misclassification rate
of the model is underrated. In order to derive the
optimal cutoff probability, it is necessary to specify the
decision context of interest, an appropriate payoff
function, and the prior state probabilities. The prior
state probability for a bankruptcy prediction model is the
likelihood that one of the firms will be bankrupt in a
given year. This assessment can only be reasonably
assessed by observation. Hence the criticisms of the use
of arbitrary cutoff probabilities by earlier studies.
However, the task of the current study is different
from previous ones in that the objective is not to predict
bankruptcy in the future (where it would be difficult to
know likelihood of failure). Rather, it is to estimate
the number of acquired firms which had similar
characteristics to failed companies at a particular time
in the past. The emphasis is backward looking and
probability of failure can be observed and reasonably
estimated.
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Similarly, the costs of misclassification in the
present study are very different from 'normal'. From the
research angle of this study, the cost of misclassifying a
failed firm as non-failed merely understates the likely
conclusion in the "bankruptcy alternative to merger"
testing. The opposite misclassication is more important
since this could tend to overstate the result.
Table 6.3 presents the number of companies on the
Department of Trade's Register and their mortality rate
for the relevant period of the present study. The average
mortality rate for public companies during the period
under review was 12.3%. However, this figure represents
all types of liquidition (including 'members voluntary'
liquidation) and also small and large companies. Since
mortality rate appears to vary with the size of companies,
it can be reasonably argued that the rate for 'large'
companies (the subject of the present study) would be
about one-quarter of the observed rate. Assuming 3%
represents the mortality rate for large companies and 1%
the over-estimation as a result of inclusion of members
voluntary liquidation (which is outside the definition of
bankruptcy for the purpose of the present study), 2% is
therefore considered as a reasonable compromise for the
mortality rate for large companies. The prior
probabilities for the present study is therefore 0.98 :
0.02 to reflect the decision context (i.e. 2% failure
likelihood).
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However, a slight problem in the assessment of prior
probabilities in this study is that, it is being hypothesized that
some "about to be merged" companies are actually failing. Thus any
assessment of likelihood of failure based on published failure
numbers will actually understate reality, since some failures will
never be 'published' (or even occur) as they will be acquired
instead.
Table 6.3
Number of Public Companies on the Department of Trade Register
Details	 1978	 1979	 1980	 1981	 1982	 1983 Total
Public Companies 
On Registers at
31 December
Of which, in
Liquidation or
course of
Removal
16,954 17,154 10,325 	 9,206	 6,511	 6,508
1,129	 1,139	 1,162	 1,188	 1,1871	 1,173
Effective Number
on Register at
31st December	 15,825 16,015	 9,163	 8,018	 5,324	 5,335
24ortality Rate % 	 6.7%	 6.6%	 11.3%	 12.9%	 13.2%	 18.0%	 12.3%
Notes: 1. Includes a number of old public companies which did not
re-register as public limited company (PLC) as they were in the
process of being removed from the Register.
Source: Department of Trade Companies (Annual Reports)
(various issues).
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Thus the importance of misclassification costs is
revised in comparison with the normal intended use of the
MDA model in predicting future bankruptcies.
In the second stage of this research, in considering
the post-acquisition performance and particularly, the
differential performance by those acquiring failing (as
opposed to non-failing) companies, misclassification of
companies in either direction will tend to reduce the
observation of any differential performance. This must be
remembered when interpreting these results.
Having developed an MDA model, it is important from a
practical point of view to ascertain the contribution of
the individual variables. This issue is discussed in the
next section.
211
6.3.18 The Relative Significance of Individual Variables: 
A number of different criteria for evaluating the
contribution of individual variables have been proposed.
Among these are: (a) ranking according to their
standardized coefficients (b) ranking by maximizing Rao's
V ratio and (c) minimizing Mahalanobis Distance (D2).
(a)	 Standardized Coefficients Method:
Under this method, the discriminant coefficient
is multiplied by the pooled-within groups
variable standard deviations and divided by the
pooled within-groups z-score standard
deviations, (Weiner and Dunn (1966), Morrison
(1969) and Eisenbeis et al (1973)). The
standardized coefficients are represented thus:
ci =	 ui	 Wii
- g
	
where W i i =	 the sum of squares for variable i
n = the number of cases
g = number of groups
	
ci =	 standardardized coefficients for
variable i
ui = unstandardized coefficients for
variable i
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The standard coefficients can be used to determine
which variables contribute most in determining scores on
the function. This is done by examining the magnitude of
the standardized coefficients (ignoring the sign). The
larger the magnitude, the greater is its contribution.
While the standardized coefficient measures the relative
importance of the variable, the unstandardized coefficient
measures the absolute contribution of a variable in
determining the discriminant score.
Although, the magnitude of a variable determines the
absolute contribution, it is not easy for one to determine
the extent of the differences between the contribution of
two individual variables. For example, if variables X1
and X2 have weights 0.60 and 0.70 respectively, it is
clear that variable X 2
 contributes more than variable Xl.
However, X 2
 does not contribute 16.7% greater than Xl.
(b) Rao's	 : 
Another way to evaluate the contribution of a
variable is to examine how much it increases Rao's V when
it is added to the model. The larger the differences
between group means, the larger Rao's V. Rao's V is
defined thus:
	
P	 P	 g
	
...	 E::	 '2E=
	
V = (n- g) i =
	 1	 j =	 1 Wij* k = 1 nk (Xik - Xi)(Xjk - Xj)
where p = the number of variables in the model
g = the number of groups
	
n	 = is the sample size
nk = is the sample size in the kth group
Xik = the mean of the kth group
	
Xi	 = mean of the ith variable for all groups combinedW ..*ij	 = an element of the inverse of the within-groups
covariance matrix.
The sampling distribution of V is approximately a
chi-square with p(g - 1) degrees of freedom. A test of
the significance of the change in Rao's V when a variable
is included can also be based on the chi-square
distribution. However, it has been pointed out (Klecka
(1980) and Norusis (1985)) that it is possible for a
variable to actually decrease Rao's V when it is added to
a model. So V does not insure maximum separation between
every pair of groups.
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(c) Mahalanobis Distance (112._):
This is a generalized measure of the distance between
two groups. The distance between groups a and b is
defined as:
P	 P
t!:-.--
Dab2 = (n - g)i = 1	 j = 1	 wij* (Xia - Xib)(Xja - . b )X3
where p = the number of variables in the model
g = number of groups
Xia = the mean for the ith variable in group a
Xib = the mean for the ith variable in group b
wij* = an element from the inverse of the within-groups
covariance matrix.
When Mahalanobis' distance is the criterion for
variable selection, the distances between all pairs of
groups are calculated first. In general, the greater D2
for the two populations, the lower is the probability of
misclassification.
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A test of the null hypothesis that the two sets of
population means are equal can be based on Mahalonobis
distance: The F statistic is
(n-1-p)n1, n2
D2ab
P(n - 2 )( n 1	 n2)
The F value can also be used for variable selection. At
each step, the variable chosen for inclusion is the one
with the largest F value.
Joy and Tollef son (1975) suggested that ranking of
relative importance of variables based on standardized
coefficients may be incorrect. They recommended a
separation-of-means measure. The separation of means
measure is given by Mosteller and Wallace (1963) and is
based on the proportion of Mahalanobis distance.
The complexity of the problem of ranking the
contributions of individual variables in a linear function
is further explored by Scott (1978). Scott proved that
when certain requisite assumptions are met, both the
standardized coefficients method employed by Altman (1968)
and the separation of means method (Taffler (1982))
produce accurate rankings of the individual variables.
However, Scott also pointed out that the requisite
condition is non-collinearity among variables, which was
not met in Altman's function.
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Therefore neither the standardized coefficients nor the •
separation of means computation will reliably rank
variables according to their discriminant contributions
when collinearity exists.
The implication of Scott's observation appears to be
that where collinearity has been 'reduced', either of the
methods could suffice. In Chapter 7, each of the above
methods is adopted in assessing the relative contribution
of the discriminating variables.
6.3.19	 Summary:
The main hypotheses and methodology of the failing
company doctrine have been stated. In the next chapter,
the detailed methodology is followed in order to derive a
discriminant model capable of discriminating between
failed and non-failed companies. However, in the
remaining part of this chapter, the other hypotheses and
methodology are discussed.
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6.4. EXAMINATION OF DIFFERENTIAL PERFORMANCE OF ACQUIRING 
COMPANIES: 
6.4.1 Hypotheses: 
In this Section, there are two sets of hypothesis to
be tested:
1. Pre-Post-Acquisition Comparison: 
The following hypotheses are to be tested:
Ho:	 There is no significant change in
performance of the acquiring company
(group) post acquisition.
The alternative is:
H1:	 There is a significant change in
performance of the acquiring company
(group) post acquisition.
As three different measures are to be used in testing, the
detailed hypotheses are different for each measurement
scheme as is the interpretation of results (presented in
Chapter 9).
2. Post-Acquisition Performance As A Function Of The 
Characteristics of the Acquired Company: 
One of the major aims of the study is to consider the
impact of the strength/weakness of the acquired company on
post-acquisition performance.
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The resulting null hypothesis is:
Ho:
	
There is no difference in
post-acquisition performance between
companies who acquire firms with failing
characteristics and those that acquire
firms with non-failing characteristics.
The alternative is:
H1:	 There is a significant difference in
post-acquisition performance dependent
upon the financial characteristics of the
acquired firm.
Once again, the hypothesis is to be tested for each of the
three measurement schemes.
6.4.2. Research Strategy: 
In order to examine the post-acquisition performance
of acquiring companies, three different types of
performance measure were used: (detailed measurements are
given in Appendix C at the end of this Chapter)
1. The absolute changes in financial ratio
performance measures.
2. The 'normalised profitability measurement'
suggested by Meeks (1977). This approach
compares the 'new' profitability achieved by
the combined group after the ac•Jaisition with
the expected profitability which might have
resulted had the merger not taken place. It
uses weighted industry average measures as
surrogates for the latter.
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3. Changes in Taffler's 'performance analysis
scores' (PAS-scores) following the acquisition,
(Taffler and Soper (1983) and Taffler and Gomar
(1985)). This technique adopts a single
measure of performance based on the relative
ranking of 'Z-scores' of companies.
6.5 DISCUSSION OF THE PERFORMANCE MEASURES:
6.5.1 Changes in Financial Ratios: 
Changes in financial ratios have been widely used in
measuring the performance of companies over a period and
also for inter-firm comparison. There is growing evidence
that financial analysts pay attention to changes in the
financial ratios of companies. It is assumed that
whatever may be the stated motives for a merger, the
outcome should be reflected on the post-merger financial
variables of the companies. A comparison of the
post-merger changes in the financial ratios with those
experienced by non-acquiring companies (control group)
over the period would enable an opinion to be formed as to
whether the merger led to improved performance.
Theoretically, the method seems efficient in
isolating the impact of mergers. In practice, however,
the 'matched-pair' technique may have a drawback since in
view of the widespread nature of acquisition activity, it
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is not always possible to obtain appropriate 'matched'
companies l . Even where it may be possible to obtain
'appropriate' matching it is fair to judge the
post-acquisition performance of the acquiring company in
relation to the performance of the companies in the sector
of the economy from which the acquisition was made. It
was for this reason the alternative methodology of
normalised profitability was considered appealing.
6.5.2	 Normalised Profitability Measure: 
This method takes into account the systematic
influences on profitability other than acquisitions and
allowance is made for changes in the firms' environment
during the period of comparison. This is because
profitability has pronounced cyclical fluctuations, and
some industries have been more sensitive than others to
these fluctuations. Moreover, the level of merger
activity has been highly uneven between years and between
industries. The effect of this is that for reasons not
directly associated with mergers, years of numerous
mergers may have been followed by years of above or below
average profitability. The emphasis of the normalised
profitability measure is on efficiency and the method has
been used by Meeks (1977).
1.	 Despite the obvious limitations of this
methodology, it has widely been used (Singh
(1971), Utton (1974) and Cosh, Hughes and Singh
(1980)) in measuring the post-merger
performance of acquiring companies.
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There may be ambiguity in interpreting the changes in
the normalised profitability because of the distortions
which lead to an overestimate of the post-merger
profitability. Meeks and Meeks (1981) suggested that
changes in the bargaining power of the participant
companies lead to an overestimate of post-merger
profitability. They argued like others (Hannah and Kay
(1977), Meeks (1980) and Singh (1971)) that mergers on
average enhance the bargaining power of the participants
(combined group) and as such post-merger profitability
could rise even though efficiency remained unchanged or
actually fell. Meeks and Meeks explained:
n ... For with upward bias in the figures,
higher profitability would yet be consistent
with an efficiency loss (though consistent too
with no change in efficiency or with a gain),
whilst unchanged profitability would imply a
definite efficiency decline. And an observed
decline in profitability would imply a more
serious deterioration in underlying
efficiency. Thus the profitability measures in
question could be used as possible indicators
of efficiency decline but not of efficiency
amelioration".. .p 342.
Therefore, if any inferences for merger efficiency is
to be drawn, the size of the improvement in profitability
should be very high to offset the implied upward bias. A
decline in efficiency may not adversely affect the
shareholder if there has been an increase in profitability
which enhanced the share price. However, in the long-run,
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if inefficiency becomes apparent, the stock market may
revise its assessment of the company and this could lead
to a fall in the share price.
In addition to the above disadvantage, the normalised
profitability measurement is deficient in that it
(profitability) is taken as a single unit of
'performance'. However, there are several motivations for
merger which may not be amenable to profit measurement.
One motive that has received wider audience is
diversification which may lead to risk reduction. In this
situation, profitability, whether normalized or not, may
not be an adequate measure of merger 'success'. The
inadequacy of profitability as a measure of performance
led to the search for an 'all-embracing' methodology.
6.5.3	 Performance Analysis-Scores Paradigm (PAS-Scores): 
This technique adopts a single measure of performance
based on the relative ranking of Z-scores of companies.
The Z-score is derived from financial ratios l . Each
constituent ratio of the Z-score model separately measures
a distinct interpretable dimension of company
1. The Z-score is derived from Taffler's model
(discussed in Chapter 5). The provision of the
PAS-scores for use in the present study is
gratefully acknowledged.
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performance. The dimensions are, profitability, working
capital position, financial risk and liquidity. An
appropriate transformation of the Z-score can therefore be
used to provide a measure of relative company
performance. A company's PAS-score in a particular year
is derived by ranking all Z-scores for firms in that year
in ascending order and observation of the Z-score of a
particular company can indicate its relative performance.
It was, however, necessary to use Taffler's PAS-scores,
because they are only available with his model.
This measure of performance offers the advantage of
combining both the balance sheet strength and corporate
profitability (an advantage not offered by the normalised
profitability measure) of a company. By this approach, a
company's performance is normalised to take into
consideration the environmental events (changes in the
economy). Similarly, by the process the PAS-scores can be
averaged and compared between different years.
There is however, a limitation in the use of the
PAS-scores to compare the post-acquisition performance of
acquirers of 'non-failing' and 'failing' companies. The
relative low PAS-scores for the 'failing' companies may
dilute the post-acquisition PAS-scores of the acquirers
and any conclusion reached as to the relative
post-acquisition performance of the acquiring companies
may be biased.
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In addition to the individual weakness of each of the
methods, all the methods are likely to suffer from 'dirty
pooling' (Lintner,(1971)). This is the suppression of
asset costs at the time of merger to pad subsequent
earnings, and other accounting devices which are likely to
mislead outsiders on the actual impact of the acquisition.
Despite the weaknesses of each of the methods, the
three different measures taken together should be able to
provide a basis for testing the hypothesis of the present
study.
6.6. Data Collection: 
Financial statements were obtained for a sample of
industrial and manufacturing companies quoted on the
London Stock Exchange between 1978 and 1984. The sample
consisted of six different groups of companies, paired
into three sets and the breakdown is as follows:
1. Non-Failed Companies	 54
2. Failed Companies	 54
3. Acquired Companies	 104
4. Non-Acquired Companies 	 ,144
5. Acquiring Companies	 76
6. Non-Acquiring Companies	 124
Total number of companies 	 556
====
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The failed and non-failed set represents companies
known to have failed or survived during the period under
review. The failed com panies were required to have
published accounts for at least three years prior to
failure. The date of delisting was confirmed with the
Extel Register for Negligible Securities and the Extel
Dividend Year Book, (The list of the Companies is in
Appendix D).
The acquired companies consisted of the largest
acquisitions of quoted (industrial and manufacturing)
companies between January 1979 and March 1984 (see
Appendix E). The selection was made because one of the
aims of the present study was to consider whether
financial crises amongst large companies were resolved
through the merger process. A merger was consummated when
more than 50% of a company's equity had been acquired by
another firm. This category of acquisitions is compiled
and published by the 'Times 1000' under the heading
'Largest Acquisitions and Mergers'.
A reference was made to the List of Acquisitions and
Mergers published by the Department of Trade and Industry
to confirm the acquisitions. However, the following
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groups of 'acquisitions' were excluded:
(i) reorganisations and reconstruction of
companies which are also listed as acquisitions
and mergers in both the Department of Trade's
publications and the 'Times 1000'.
(ii) where the value of consideration was less
than E2m. In other words, acquisitions less
than this figure were not considered as
'large'. The acquisition has to be large
enough for a significant impact on the
performance of the acquiring company to be
expected.
The non-acquired companies were also quoted on the
Stock Exchange and approximated the size (assets) and
industrial classification of the acquired companies. By
virtue of being observed for the same year, and being
similar in size to the acquired companies, one would
expect the incidence of predicted bankruptcy to be similar
for the two groups.
The acquiring companies consisted of those which
acquired the acquired companies during the period under
review. However, acquisitions made by foreign and
unlisted companies were excluded. Similarly, multiple
acquirers (i.e. those involved in more than one
acquisition during the period) were also excluded. This
was necessary to help isolate the observation of
individual acquisition. The non-acquiring companies
consisted of companies in the same industrial
classification as those of the acquiring set matched by
size and year on one by one basis.
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The bankruptcy prediction model was derived from a
sub-set of the failed and non-failed companies (60 in
total, split 30 failed and 30 non-failed). The remaining
24 failed and 24 (Appendix F) non-failed companies were
used to validate the model. The model was applied to the
set of acquired companies and the acquiring companies to
test the failing company hypothesis. The set of
non-acquired companies acted as a 'control' group for the
acquired companies, while the set of non-acquiring acted
as a 'control' group for the acquiring companies.
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APPENDIX C
MEASUREMENT TECHNIQUES ADOPTED
1. THE CHANGES IN FINANCIAL RATIOS: 
	
Let Y =	 Pt + 1 - Pt - 1
	
where Y =	 the absolute change in the variables
P = value of the particular ratio
	
i- =
	 the year of merger, such that
t + 1 =	 one year post-merger
t - 1 =	 one year pre-merger
t + 2 =	 two years post-merger
	
Yt+1 =	 over the two year period t - 1 to t + 1
	
Yt+2 =	 over the three year period t - 1 to t + 2
The change in the variables in t - 1 and t was
not measured because the time was considered
too early for the impact of the merger to be
felt.
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2. NORMALISED PROFITABILITY MEASURE:
The precise form of the tests which are carried out can be
considered using the following symbols:
R:	 profitability
N:	 profit before tax
D:	 Net Assets
x:	 contributions (in terms of net assets) of
victim to amalgamation
v:	 victim (acquired)
q:	 acquirer
y:	 year of merger
u:	 victim's industry
w:	 acquirer's industry
j:	 a post-merger year (including year of merger)
z:	 amalgamation, when, standardized
m:	 amalgamation (not standardized)
k:	 average of two pre-merger years
E:	 change in standardized profitability
Profitability for any year t, is defined as profit flow
during the year divided by the net assets employed during the
year.
Rt	 Profit before tax	 Nt
Average Net Assets	 1/2( Dt-1	 Dt)
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To compare the profitability of two merging companies with
what one would have expected from the average industry results, a
weighted average profitability of the two separate industries is
obtained: thus,
Let Net Assets of the Acquirer (Dq) = 140m
Let Net Assets of the Victim (Dv) = g2m in year before
merger for the two groups.
Let the standardized weights be x, 1 - x
where x = Dv	 2	 2
Dq + Dv	 10	 2	 12
= proportion in Victims Industry, and
1 - x = 1 - 2 = 10 = proportion in Acquirer's
industry
12	 12
So expected profitability of combined group based on average
industry performance =
x X Average profitability of victim's industry + (1 - x) X
Average profitability of Acquirer's industry =
kRut
	
(1 - x)Rwt
If one compares the actual performance of the amalgmated group
after merger (Rid) with this, one can see whether the group
has performed better or worse than expected:
Rz3  (for time j ) = 	 Rmj
xRu3	 - x)Rwi
If group profitability is as 'expected', then this ratio will
be 1. (since R /113 will be xRui + (1 - x)Rwj ). If it performs
better than 'expected' the ratio will be above 1 and if worse
below 1.
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To see whether the merger has improved the relative performance
of the two firms when combined, compared to the profitability
before merger, need to calculate Rzk as follows:
Rmt = Average profitability of the two separate companies in
the years immediately prior to merger =
Nvb + Ncit
1/2(Dvt_1 + Dt) + 1/2(Dqt-1
	 Dqt)
= Total profitability of two separate companies in Year
t/ Average Net Assets of the two companies.
This Rmt must then be compared to the weighted
industry-average performance xRut + (1 - x)Rwt to get
the pre-acquisition profitability index measure Rzt
i.e. Rzt = Rmt
xRut
 + (1 -x)Rwt
To avoid problems associated with unusual one-year
results prior to the accruisition, the average of the two
year's profitability index, R zt was calculated:
i.e. Rzk
	 = 112(Rz,y_2 + Rz,y_i)
The change in profitability is therefore:
Ezj	 = Rzj	 Rzk-
3. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS SCORES 
Changes in performance analysis scores as for (1) above.
CHAPTER 7
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BANKRUPTCY PREDICTION MODEL
7.1 Introduction: 
In the previous chapter, the methodology and the
hypotheses of the study were stated. The present chapter
develops a bankruptcy prediction model for use in testing
the failing company hypothesis of mergers.
Several bankruptcy prediction models have already
been developed. It was thought necessary for the purpose
of the present study to develop a new model for two
reasons: (i) a model contemporary with the available data
for acquired and acquiring companies, was required to
avoid problems resulting from the instability of financial
ratios over time and (ii) to overcome a major limitation
of previous models following the use of arbitrary cutoff
probabilities.
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7.2 BUILDING THE MULTIVARIATE DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS (MDA) 
MODEL: 
7.2.1 Factor Analysis of Ratio Data: 
In the previous chapter, a discussion of factor
analysis as a technique to reduce collinearity in the
financial ratios was made. The result of MDA for the
present study is reported here. Twenty -two financial
ratios were computed from financial data of sixty
companies (30 failed and 30 non-failed) for the period
1978 to 1983.
The financial ratios were factor analysed in order to
provide a reduced set for input to the discriminant
function. The assumption of factor analysis is that
variables must be related to each other for the factor
model to be appropriate.
	 In order to test the
hypothesis that the variables are related to one another,
the correlation matrix of the ratios is presented in Table
7.1. All variables are correlated with one another.
Consider, for example, R1 (EBIT/TA), has a very strong
positive correlation with R7 (EBIT/CL) and R13 (EBIT/S).
These variables measure return on investment. Similarly,
R4 (CA/CL) has strong correlations with variables R10
(QA/CL), R14 (WC/TA), R17 (NCI), R21 (WC/SALES) and R22
(CA/TL). These ratios tend to measure the liquidity
aspect of the companies.
TABLE 7.1
R1
R1
1.00000
R2
CORRELATION MATRIX:
R3	 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9
R2 -0.25459 1.00000
R3 -0.62952 .45736 1.00000
R4 .36984 .19705 -0.52868 1.00000
RS .30856 -0.03777 -0.36031 .30307 1.00000
R6 -0.11965 .39773 .06161 .40553 .11027 1.00000
R7 .93026 -0.33037 -0.71124 .48101 .35746 -0.06179 1.00000
R8 .12589 .57061 .13682 .15083 .25032 .14225 .05546 1.00000
R9 .64111 -0.17683 -0.61307 .44285 .31926 -0.02911 .72498 .09315 1.00000
R10
R11
R12
R13
R14
R15
R16
R17
R18
R19
R20
R21
R22
.50624
.29732
-0.26638
.88307
.27337
-0.20984
.55068
.46143
.12560
.08151
-0.54744
.26873
.28339
.09572
-0.15708
.44156
-0.29269
.37747
-0.39138
-0.10637
-0.08817
.09454
.28641
.55341
.19873
.28604
-0.52468
-0.30729
.18095
-0.63070
-0.33481
.19696
-0.54830
-0.55520
-0.07651
.16305
.77462
-0.46086
-0.58410
.76335
.14901
.34665
.42596
.79884
-0.11883
.49938
.60275
.23280
-0.21536
-0.61857
.81966
.72390
.43599
.64502
-0.23976
.42124
.33221
-0.00584
.83786
.71465
.46288
-0.07793
-0.36674
.46796
.21079
.18296
.03526
.76350
.05324
.30247
-0.15746
.11661
-0.06104
.64443
-0.56502
.08099
.50084
.34737
.57798
.32832
-0.22888
.86833
.29028
-0.17494
.63846
.52958
.17674
-0.06336
-0.64890
.33629
,36081
.54422
.13944
-0.24843
.08004
.23916
-0.27186
.28349
.38571
.51293
.29765
.22505
.05382
.24036
.53194
.17343
-0.14339
.60864
.40855
-0.22541
.55682
.50132
.13532
-0.05661
-0.52209
.41452
.40908
R10
R10
1.00000
Ri1 R12 R13 R14 R15 R16 R17 R18
R11 .12737 1.00000
R12 -0.15966 -0.23517 1.00000
R13 .51267 .39274 -0.18743 1.00000
R14 .60996 .15701 .30426 .29172 1.00000
R15 -0.11112 .02072 -0.16864 -0.09971 -0.13656 1.00000
R16 .65473 .63147 -0.24222 .60515 .44141
-0.04887 1.00000
R17 .81237 .36058 -0.38555 .50073 .53901 .04937 .76548 1.00000
R18 .48593 .34363 .02026 .30268 .13271
-0.03536
.48329 .36901 1.00000
R19 -0.09060 -0.06798 -0.37801 -0.13746 -0.06493
-0.25708
-0.06507 .05142
-0.45036
R20 -0.56926 -0.31195 .16987 -0.60873 -0.48441
-0.22133
-0.54441
-0.66572
-0.09786
R21 .54545 .22430 .43925 .36212 .87415
-0.08634 .51042 .54875
.24904
R22 .58559 .07293 .25751 .30088 .52323
-0.49053 .33488
.40512 .16471
R19 R20 R21 R22
R19	 1.00000
R20	 .30775	 1.00000
R21	 -0.25457 -0.53715	 1.00000
R22	 -0.01659 -0.27759	 .60859	 1.00000
KAISER-MEYER-OLKIN MEASURE OF SAMPLING ADEQUACY 	 .76220
BARTLETT TEST OF SPHERICITY = 1810.6448, SIGNIFICANCE =
	 .00000
THERE ARE	 0 ( .0%) OFF-DIAGONAL ELEMENTS OF AIC MATRIX > 0.09
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Bartlett's test of sphericity can be used to test the
hypothesis that the correlation matrix is an identity
matrix. That is, all diagonal terms are 1 and all
off-diagonal terms are 0. From the Correlation Table, the
value of the test statistic for sphericity (based on a
chi-square transformation of the determinant of the
correlation matrix) is large and the associated
significance level is small (0.000). Therefore, the null
hypothesis that the population matrix is an identity is
rejected. The test confirms that the variables are
related to one another.
Table 7.2 contains the initial statistics of each
factor. Each factor represents a ratio and forms a linear
combination of the financial ratios. The total variance,
by each Factor is listed in the column labelled
EIGENVALUE. The next column contains the percentage of
the total variance attributable to each factor. For
example, the linear combination formed by Factor 3 has a
variance of 2.45, which is 11.1% of the total variance of
22 (ratios). The last column, the cumulative percentage,
indicates the percentage of variance attributable to that
factor and those that precede it in the Table. The
factors are arranged in descending order of variance
explained.
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Table 7.2
Factor Analysis:	 Initial Statistics:
CUM PCTFACTOR EIGENVALUE PCT OF VAR
1 8.41525 38.3 38.3
2 3.68060 16.7 55.0
3 2.44670 11.1 66.1
4 2.11591 9.6 75•7
5 1.46743 6.7 82.4
6 1.08571 4.9 87.3
7 .78348 3.6 90.9
8 .49188 2.2 93.1
9 .35621 1.6 94.7
10 .29545 1.3 96.1
11 .21160 1.0 97.0
12 .19323 .9 97.9
13 .12399 .6 98.5
14 .08954 .4 98.9
15 .07441 .3 99.2
16 .05270 .2 99.5
17 .03948 .2 99.7
13 .02949 .1 99.8
19 .02498 .1 99.9
20 .01110 .1 100.0
21 .00669 .0 100.0
22 .00417 .0 100.0
Principal Component Analysis extracted 6 Factors
- those with Eigenvalue higher than 1.0.
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7.2.2 Number of Factors Extracted: 
Table 7.2 also shows the six factors which were
extracted for further analysis. The factors extracted
were those with associated eigenvalue greater than a
somewhat arbitrary cut-off of 1.0. In that way, only
factors that convey a non-trivial proportion of the
information in the original variables are retained for
interpretation. Because of the ways factors are defined
in a principal components analysis, the first factor has
the largest eigenvalue; the second factor the next largest
eigenvalue and so on. Since, the eigenvalues associated
with succeeding factors will be progressively smaller, a
decision to ignore some of the latter factors is often
justifiable, (Rummel, (1970); Jaeger (1983)).
Figure 7.1 is a plot of the total variance associated
with each factor. Typically, the plot shows a distinct
break between the steep slope of the large factors and the
gradual trailing off of the rest of the factors. Cattell
(1966) calls the gradual trailing off a scree, because it
resembles the rubble that forms at the foot of a
mountain. Experimental evidence indicates that the scree
begins at the kth factor, where k is the true number of
factors. From the scree plot, it appears that a four- or
five-factor model may be adequate for the financial
profile of the sixty companies.
FIGURE 7. 1
SCREE PLOT OF FACTOR ANALYSIS 
2.447 +
2.116 +
I
1.467 +
1.086 +
.783 +
.492 +
.193 +
.000 +--+--+--+--+--+--+ ----- -----	 IF * *	 = * * *  * *
/	 2 3 4 5 6 - 5 3. T B TT 1/ T3 T4 15	 111 1 11 21 21 12
PC EXTRACTED 6 FACTORS.
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7.2.3	 Factor Rotation: 
As stated in the previous cha pter, the purpose of
factor rotation is to transform the initial matrix into
one that is easier to intrepret. After rotation, each
group of variables will have high correlations with one of
the rotated factors and low correlations with all of the
others. Table 7.3 shows the rotated factor matrix.
The examination of the ratios in certain factors led
to the interpretation that the six factors appear to
represent (a) return on investment; (b) working capital
position; (c) cash position; (d) asset turnover; (e)
short-term liquidity and (f) financial leverage. However,
any such 'labelling' of factors must be viewed with a
certain degree of scepticism (e.g. the ratio Total
Liabilities/Total Assets can hardly be considered as a
ratio describing 'return on investment').
Therefore, whereas the original data consisted of one
set of 22 ratios with high intercorrelations, the factor
analysis transformed the data into six less correlated
factors.
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The result of the factor analysis confirms the
existence of common ratio classifications and offers an
empirical basis for grouping financial ratios. This is in
line with the evidence presented by Chen and Shimerda
(1981). They reconciled financial ratios used in previous
bankruptcy prediction studies and concluded that the
ratios can be represented by seven factors. These factors
were:
1. Return on Investment
2. Financial Leverage
3. Capital Turnover
4. Short-term liquidity
5. Cash position
6. Inventory turnover and
7. Receivables turnover.
The current analysis produces a similar set with the
exception that the asset turnover factors are combined in
one (Factor 4) and the extra dimension of working capital
is implied.
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7.2.4 Comparison With Previous Factor Analysis Studies: 
As mentioned in Chapter 6, some studies have employed the
technique of factor analysis in an effort to eliminate redundant
information. In the interest of obtaining some measure of
comparability between these studies and the present one, the results
are summarised in Table 7.4. For example, in the Pinches and Mingo
studies, they reduced their data set for bond ratings from 35 to 7
ratios (an 80% reduction) and still accounted for 63% of the
variance in the original data matrix.
Table 7.4
DATA REDUCTION IN FACTOR-ANALYZED FINANCIAL RATIO STUDIES 
Study by No. of.
Original
Ratios
No. of
Ratios
Extracted
%
Reduction
in Ratios
% of
Variance
Accounted
Pinches and Mingo
(1973) 35 7 80 83
Stevens (1973) 20 6 85 82
Libby (1975) 14 5 64 not
reported
Present Study 22 6 73 87
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7.2.5	 Multivariate Discriminant Analysis (MDA) Phase: 
Twenty-two financial ratios were factor analysed and
a reduced number of six factors was obtained. A ratio
with a 'high loading' was selected to represent each
factor. The MDA model was derived with five of the six
ratios selected by the factor analysis. The sixth factor
measuring cash position, did not enter the equation
because its presence did not improve the discriminating
ability of the model. This may be for two reasons.
Firstly, the other selected factors (Working
Capital/Sales; Quick Assets/Total Assets and Current
Assets/Total Assets) have a 'cash' element in their
composition. Secondly, the absence of 'cash' may not be
an important factor in discriminating between a failed and
non-failed company.
The reduced ratio set for the sample of 60 companies,
was the input to the MDA that generated a linear function
which best separated the failed and non-failed companies.
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It gives a single function Z, called the discriminant
function which is a linear combination of the various
discriminating variables used in the model. The Z
equation is stated generally as follows:
Z	 .	 f(Xl, X2, X3, X4, X5) .... (1)
where X1 = Earnings before Interest and Taxes/current
liabilities
X2 = Quick Assets/Total Assets
X3 = Working Capital/Sales
X4 = Stock/Sales
X5
 = Current Assets/Total Assets.
The ordering of these five variables is derived from
the discriminant computer program which selects variables
in the order of their contributory importance. The
process, a stepwise discriminant analysis, first chooses
the variable with the smallest Wilks' lambda l
 and
correspondingly the largest F-to-enter. Table 7.5
presents the means and standard deviations for the two
groups of companies. The differences in means of some of
the ratios are glaring.
1. Wilks' lambda is the ratio of the within-groups
sum of squares to the total sum of squares. It
is the proportion of the total variance in the
discriminant scores not explained by
differences among groups. Small values of
lambda are associated with functions that have
much variability between groups and little
variability within groups. A lambda of 1
occurs when the mean of the discriminant scores
is the same in all groups and there is no
between-groups variability.
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Table 7.5
GROUP HEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATION
Variable Non-Failing
Group
(%)
N = 30
Failing
Group
(%)
N = 30
X1 (EBIT/CL) 45.10 -11.87
(15.90) (17.73)
X2 (QA/TA) 29.49 25.55
(13.28) (9.49)
X3 (WC/SALES) 17.62 8.90
(13.03) (18.24)
X4 (STOCK/SALES) 16.19 30.16
(8.45) (13.13)
X5 (CA/TA) 51.50 66.88
(18.50) (12.69)
Figures in parentheses are the group standard
deviation.
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7.2.6 Test of Equality of Group Means: (Univariate Method):
Table 7.6 shows significance tests for the equality of
group means for each variable. The F values and their
significance are shown in columns 3 and 4. (The F value is
the square of the t value from the two-sample t test). If
the observed significance level is small (usually less than
0.05), the hypothesis that all group means are equal is
rejected. From Table 7.6, Variable X2 (QA/TA) is not
statisitically significant at any reasonable level of
testing. However, Cochran (1964) has shown, that seemingly
insignificant or unimportant variables on a univariate
basis may be very important when combined with other
variables, hence the justification to retain the variable
for further analysis.
Table 7.6
Group Univariate F-Ratio 
Variable Wilks' Lambda l F Sig. Level
X1	 (EBIT/CL) 0.2549 169.5 0.0000
X2	 (QA/TA) 0.9708 1.74 0.1920
X3	 (WC/SALES) 0.9275 4.53 0.0375
X4	 (STOCK/SALES) 0.7072 24.01 0.0000
X5	 (CA/TA) 0.8046 14.09 0.0004
Notes: 1. The higher a variable's F-value, the
lower its Wilks' Lambda.
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7.2.7 Prior Probabilities: 
As pointed out in the previous chapter, the use of
arbitrary cut-off probabilities of 0.5 tends to
underestimate the classification error rates of a model.
It was also argued that the optimal prior probabilities
should reflect the decision context of the model. Instead
of the 'usual' 0.5 prior probability, the PRIORS were set
at 0.98 : 0.02 to reflect the decision context (i.e. 2%
failure likelihood).
7.2.8	 Estimating the Coefficients: 
The linear combination of the independent variables
formed serves as a basis for assigning cases to groups.
Thus, information contained in multiple independent
variables is summarized in a simple index. For example,
by finding a weighted average of the five variables,
a score that distinguished between failed and non-failed
companies was obtained. In other words, the following
discriminant function was derived.
Z = 0.053X1 + 0.021X2 + 0.028X3 - 0.063X4 - 0.026X5 + 1.142
where X1 = Earnings Before interests and Taxes/current
liabilities;
X2 = Quick Assets/Total Assets;
X3
 = Working Capital/Sales
X4 = Stock/Sales
X5
 = Current Assets/Total Assets.
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7.3 CLASSIFICATION: USING THE MODEL: 
Table 7.7 shows the classification summary of applying the derived
model to the original sample of 60 companies (30 failed and 30
nonfailed) (Appendix D).
	
Correctly classified cases appear on the
diagonal of the Table since the predicted and actual groups are the
same. Thirty cases of non-failed companies were predicted correctly
(100.0%). Similarly, 23 out of 30 of the failed companies were
identified correctly and 2 (6.7%) were misclassified. The overall
percentage of cases classified correctly was 96.7% (58 out of 60 cases).
Table 7.7
CLASSIFICATION RESULTS: ORIGINAL SAMPLE: 
Actual Group No of
Cases
Predicted Group Membership
1 2
Non-Failed
Failed
1
2
30
30
30
(100.0%)
(6.7%)
0
(0.0%)
28
(93.3%)
PERCENT OF 'COMBINED' CASES CORRECTLY CLASSIFIED: 96.7%
249
The overall accuracy rate of the discriminant model
was 100.00% when the 0.5 prior probability was used.
However, when the prior probability was adjusted to
reflect the decision context, the accuracy rate of the
model decreased to 96.7% (with two misclassifications when
applied to sample data). This is the nature of the
underestimation error of previous models which ignored the
adjustment of the prior probability.
The misclassification is in the form of Type I
error. Type I error is the misclassification of a failed
company as non-failed. A cut-off of -0.1795 for the
discriminant score was selected. Stated in a different
way, no non-failed company scored less than -0.1795 and
the two failed companies that scored above this point were
i misclassified l as non-failed. It is to be noted that the
cut-off point would have been different if the prior
probability was set at 0.50.
Figure 7.2 shows the all-groups histogram for the
discriminant . function. Symbols used in the plots are (1)
for non-failed companies and (2) for failed companies.
Four symbols represent each company, there are 120
symbols. The failed companies had negative values, while
the non-failed companies had positive values. There was
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no overlap in the classification of the model. However,
the two misclassified failed companies scored a little
less than zero. If zero was used as the cut-off point,
the model could have produced a 100% accuracy rate.
For the overall purpose of the present study, the
result appears encouraging, in the sense that the model is
unlikely to misclassify acquired companies as possessing
financial characterisitics similar to previous failed
companies. This allays the danger of giving undue weight
to the 'failing company' hypothesis of mergers.
The reported results of the model on the original
sample of failed and non-failed companies appear
impressive. However, it is important that the model is
validated to ensure the results are not sample specific.
In addition, for a more meaningful interpretation of the
results to be made, closer examination of the relative
significance of the individual variables is necessary. In
other words, it is necessary to ensure that the
relationship between variables and bankruptcy seem valid.
7.4 THE RELATIVE SIGNIFICANCE OF INDIVIDUAL VARIABLES:
In Chapter 6, several methods were discussed for
ranking the relative contributions of each of the
variables. The results of these methods are presented in
Table 7.8.
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Table 7.8
RELATIVE CONTRIBUTION OF INDIVIDUAL VARIABLES: 
Variables	 Methcds
Standardized
Coefficientsl
R2
Rao's V
R2 Mahalanobis
D2
R2
X1 EBIT/CL 0.90641 1 169.54 1 11.30(52%) 1
X4 ST/SALES -0.69509 2 96.89 2 17.76(30%) 2
X3 WC/SALES 0.44578 3 38.43 3 20.32(12%) 3
X5 CA/TA -0.41520 4 13.54 4 21.22	 (4%) 4
X2 QA/TA 0.25331 5 7.40 5 21.72	 (2%) 5
Notes:
1.	 The larger the magnitude, the greater is the contribution
of the variable, (ignoring the sign).
2	 R denotes the ranking of the variables.
3. Figures in percentage are relative contributions of the
individual variables using Mosteller and Wallace (1963)
criteria.
The three separate methods produced identical ranking of the
contribution of the individual variables.
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7.4.1 Discussion of the Ranking of the Variables: 
The high contributions of the profitability and asset
turnover dimensions indicate their importance. For
example, the variable (EBIT/CL) measuring profitability
contributed most in distinguishing between the failed and
non-failed companies. This indicates the ability of a
company to cover its current liabilities through its
earning power. The positive sign (Standard Coefficients)
indicates the correlation of the ratio with the survival
of the company. It may be argued that for any business to
survive, it has to make profits. If a business
continuously sustains a loss, it is bound to go bankrupt
eventually. However, a firm can be liquidated with
positive profit records.
The next variable that contributes most in
distinguishing between failed and non-failed companies is
Stock/Sales. This ratio measures the relationship between
stock and sales (the inverse of stock turnover), and is
negatively correlated with business survival. Although,
the ratio varies with the nature of business, a high ratio
in comparison with companies of the same business portends
danger.	 A high ratio would result from a comparatively
high stock level or alternatively a comparatively low
turnover of stock. These may result from poor stock
control by management or from poor trading conditions
leading to a build-up of stocks.
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Further, a high build-up of stock implies additional
interest charges (or loss of interest) on funds tied 1 10 in
stocks. Similarly, there may be further costs for
storage, and the risk of being left with obsolete goods.
These extra costs have the effect of reducing the
company's profitability. The reduction in profitability
will lead in due course to decreases in the previous
variable (EBIT/CL), which is very important for the
survival of a business. In fact, the high ranking of the
two variables is sufficient for an adequate bankruptcy
prediction model.
The third variable that contributes most in the
discriminant function is Working Capital/Sales. This
ratio shows how much capital is required to finance
operations in addition to capital invested in fixed
assets. It gives some indication of the likely additional
cash needed with increased turnover. Although the ratio
can vary, depending upon the type of business, it is
generally viewed that a falling of the ratio indicates a
sign of overtrading. The positive sign of the ratio in
the present model indicates that the greater the ratio,
the less likelihood of failure.
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The fourth ranked variable is Current Assets/Total
Assets. This ratio represents the extent of a company's
commitments and investment both in stock and in
uncollected debts. Companies increase their level of
bankruptcy risk as the rate of stock turnover declines and
there is a build-up in uncollected debts. The negative
sign indicates the larger the proportion, the higher the
probability of failure.
The Quick Assets/Total Assets variable contributed
the least. However, it is positively correlated with
business survival. It represents another form of
measuring the liquid asset of a company. In the
short-term liquid resources are needed to pay liabilities
as they fall due. A shortage of quick assets can
precipitate business failure.
The five variables taken together measure the risk
profile of the company which is summarized by the Z-score
in the discriminant analysis. This can be interpreted as
showing the level of similarity of a company's financial
structure to that of companies which have gone out of
business or are still in business. The model established
two main characteristics of a firm with a high level
bankruptcy risk. Firstly, a firm with a poor profit
generating capability and secondly, a decline in sales
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(cash flow) from trading operations which could lead to a
build-up in stocks and results in less funds being
available from internal sources to finance its activities.
The relative contribution of the individual
variables to the discriminant function as well as the
significance of the variables have been discussed. In the
next section, an assessment of the effectiveness of the
discriminant function is made.
7.5 ASSESSING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE DISCRIMINANT 
FUNCTION:	 .
Norusis (1985) suggested two indicators for measuring
the effectiveness of the discriminant function. One
indicator is the actual percentage of cases classified
correctly, discussed above in Section 7.3; the other is a
test of the null hypothesis that in the populations from
which the samples are drawn there is no difference between
the group means.
The test of the null hypothesis is based on Wilks'
lambda. Lambda is transformed to a variable which has
approximately a chi-square distribution. The SPSS-X output
shows that a lambda of 0.151143 is transformed to a
chi-square value of 104.88. The observed significance level
is 0.0000 (i.e. shows likely error of less than 1%). Thus,
it appears unlikely that failed companies and non-failed
companies have the same means on the discriminant function.
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However, Norusis pointed out that even though Wilks'
lambda may be statistically significant, it may not provide
enough information about the effectiveness of the
discriminant function in classification. What it does
provide, he argued is a test of the null hyloothesis that the
population means are equal. He concluded that small
differences may be statistically significant but still not
permit good discrimination among the groups. However,- if
the means and covariance matrices are equal, discrimination
is not possible.
If the effectiveness of a discriminant function can
be measured on Norusis' criteria, one may reasonably
assume that the discriminant function of this study
appears effective. The reasons for such suppositions are
(a) the percentage of cases classified correctly is high
(96.67%), and (b) the null hypothesis that there is no
difference between the means of the two groups is strongly
rejected.
7.6 VALIDATION OF THE MODEL: 
In chapter six, various methods for evaluating the
classification error rates of discriminate analysis were
discussed. Some of these methods (those likely to enhance
the achievement of the objective of the present study)
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were applied to the derived model. The following methods were
employed to validate the derived model:
(i) The Lachenbruch (1967) Method: 
The Lachenhruch (jackknife) method was used for
developing and testing the accuracy of the
discriminant function. This method requires the
calculation of (60) separate discriminant functions
holding out a different company for each calculation.
That company is then classified using the function
calculated while it was held out. The misclassified
observations for each group are used as "almost
unbiased" estimates of the classification error
rates. The result of the validation test produced two
misclassifications (see Table 7.9). The same two
companies were also misclassified by the original
model.
Table 7.9
LACHENBRUCH CLASSIFICATION RESULTS: ORIGINAL SAnPLE: 
Actual Group	 NO of	 Predicted Group Membership
Cases
1 2
Non-Failed
Failed
1
2
30
30
30
(100.0%)
2
0
(0.0%)
28
(6.7%)	 (93.3%)
PERCENT OF 'COMBINED' CASES CORRECiLY CLASSIFIED: 96.7%
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(ii) Hold-Out Method: 
This involves the validation of a model using a
time-coincident holdout sample. 	 In order to test
the stability of the ratios over the study period,
the derived model was tested on a 'new' group of
companies. This group consisted of 24 failed and 24
non-failed companies during the study period (see
Appendix F). The model misclassified 5 companies
(almost a 90% accuracy rate). The breakdown of the
misclassification shows that 4 failed companies (Type
I error) and one non-failed company (type II error)
were misclassified (see Table 7.10).
Table 7.10
Hold-Out Sample Method 
Classification Results for Hold-out Companies:
Actual Group NO of
Cases
Predicted Group Membership
1 2
Non-Failed
Failed
1
2
24
24
23
(95.8%)
4
(16.7%)
1
(4.2%)
20
(83.3%)
Percent of "Combined" Cases correctly classified: 89.6%
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The result of the hold-out test shows a decline in
the accuracy of the original model. However, the slight
decline in the accuracy of the model is to be expected
because of the intensive search bias in the original model
(Frank, et al (1965) and Morrison (1969)). The shrinkage
in the accuracy also illustrates that some companies still
trading possess financial characteristics similar to
previous failed companies. This misclassification result
of the validation is similar to those obtained from the
original sample and the other validation technique
subsequently employed. The major misclassification
problem was of Type I nature. This type of error could
imply that the model had a slight tendency to classify
failed companies as non-failed and not vice versa. Thus,
it might be argued that the classification of companies as
failing is slightly understated by the model.
Joy and Tollef son (1975) argued that
cross-validations "are not predictions of corporate
bankruptcy but merely ex post discriminations". They
contended that a holdout sample should be drawn from a
future period completely distinct from the original (or
analysis) sample period in order to illustrate the
predictive ability of the model. In other words, evidence
of ex ante predictive power requires intertemporal
validation and not merely cross-validation. However, Joy
and Tollefson did admit that under the assumption of
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stationarity (of the parameters and variables of the
discriminant function) ex post discrimination (or
validation) is tantamount to prediction, provided the
researcher proves that stationarity indeed exists.
The objections raised by Joy and Tollef son do not
invalidate the use of the technique in the present study.
This is because the primary objective of model derivation
in this study is not to predict bankruptcy per se, but to
classify companies (ex post discriminations). Their
suggestion that the technique is useful in testing the
stability of the variables over a period is also helpful.
One can assume that cross-validation provides a means of
testing the stability of the variables (ratios) for the
period under review.
7.7 COMPARISON WITH PREVIOUS STUDIES: 
As noted in Chapter 5, several studies have adopted
discriminant analysis to assess the likelihood of
bankruptcy. The misclassification error rates reported in
these studies are summarised in Table 7.11 in order to
provide a form of comparison with the present study.
Although, the prevailing economic condition during the
relative period of these studies are not homogeneous, the
results of the present study appear to be on comparable
terms with the previous studies.
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Table 7.11
Misclassification Rates of Bankruptcy Prediction Studies: 
Study by
Type 1
Error Rates
Type II	 Overall Holdout
Beaver
	 (1966) 22% 5% 10% 13%
Altman
	 (1968) 6% 3% 5% 27%
Deakin
	 (1974) 3% 3% 3% 22%
Blum	 (1976) 4% 7% 7% 5%
Altman et al (1977) 7% 10% 9% 7%
Taffler
	 (1983) 4.3% 0% 2% 15.3%1
Present Study 6.7% 0% 3.3% 10%
Notes: 1. The holdout sample was constructed in
a different manner from other studies. The
holdout sample consisted of sample population in
EXSTAT tape from 1973 to 1980. The error rate
indicates the average percentage of companies 'at
risk' over the eight-year period.
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7.8 VIOLATION OF LINEAR DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS 
ASSUMPTIONS: 
In Chapter 6, Section 6.3, two important assumptions
which underlie the application of linear discriminant
analysis were stated - multivariate normal distribution
and identical population co-variance matrices. The latter
assumption implies not only that the K variables are the
_
same in the two populations, but also that the same
relationship (covariance) holds between any two variables,
for example, profitability and liquidity. It is important
to discover the extent to which the assumptions have been
violated in the present study. This issue is discussed
below.
7.8.1 Sensitivity Analysis: 
As stated in Chapter 6, Section 6.3.13, the similarity
of the variance-covariance matrices can be tested using
Box's M Test, which is based on the determinants of the
group covariance matrices. However, this test was not used
in the present study because of its interpretational
difficulties. Instead, the Mahalanobis distance D2
statistic was used (in addition to other methods, see
Section 7.4). Singh (1971) invoked Reyment (1962) to argue
that a notable property of the D 2 statistic is its
insensitivity to moderate departures from the homogeneity
of dispersion matrices, provided the numbers of
observations in the two groups are equal.
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The second assumption which may affect the outcome of
the present study is the assumption of multivariate
normality. Although there is no evidence that the
sampling distribution of the groups in the present study
is seriously non-normal, it is difficult to obtain a
normally distributed sample in practice. However, the
central limit theorem may imply a reduction in the
seriousness of non-normality. According to the theorem,
the sampling distribution of any mean will approach
normality as the sample size increases, regardless of the
form of the distribution of the variable in the population
from which the samples are drawn, provided only that the
population distribution has a finite mean and variance.
Lachenbruch (1975) has shown that discriminant
analysis is not particularly sensitive to minor violations
of the normality assumption. The consequence is some
reduction in efficiency and accuracy. If classificatory
accuracy is a benchmark for violation of the normality
assumption, one can conclude that it was not violated in
the present study, since a high accuracy rate was achieved.
The relevant question is whether an alternative model
could have achieved the same or better degree of accuracy
and at the same time fulfilled the intended objectives of
the present study. An alternative method of
classification is possible: the use of quadratic
discrimination rule to classify failed and non-failed
companies.
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7.8.2 Quadratic Discrimination Rule 
The quadratic discrimination rule uses individual
group covariance matrices for computing the probability of
membership. However, empirical evidence (already referred
to in Chapter 6) has shown that the method performs poorly
with small sample sizes. Equally, deviations from
normality seriously affect the quadratic discriminant
function. Taffler (1982) invoked Lachenbruch (1975, p29)
to state "..although in theory this is a fine
procedure (quadratic), it . is not robust to non-normality,
particularly if the distribution has longer tails than the
normal" p.350.
According to Taffler, none of the related empirical
studies has shown the superior discriminatory ability of a
quadratic function "on other data than those from which
the function was derived".
The implication of the foregoing statement is that
even though the quadratic function may have succeeded in
the classification of the original sample in the present
chapter, it would probably have been ineffective in
testing the failing-company hypothesis which formed one of
the major objectives of the present study. This technique
was therefore not used in testing the data in the current
study.
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7.9 SUMMARY OF CHAPTER: 
A bankruptcy model was derived from a sample of
thirty failed and thirty non-failed companies. The
overall accuracy rate of the discriminant model was 96.7%
(with two misclassifications) when applied to the same
sample data. A series of validation tests were carried
out in order to establish the robustness of the model;
Both the Lachenbruch test (96.7% overall accuracy) and
application of the model to an independent time-coincident
sample (89.6%) suggest that the derived bankruptcy model
is not sample-specific. In the next chapter, the model is
utilized in testing the failing company hypothesis of
mergers.
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CHAPTER 8
FAILING COMPANY MERGER MOTIVE
THE EVIDENCE
8.1 Introduction: 
One of the objectives of the present study is to
determine if acquired companies possessed financial
characteristics similar to previous failed companies. In
order to achieve the objective, a bankruptcy prediction
model was derived from a group of failed and non-failed
companies (chapter 7). The model exhibited a high degree
of accuracy. Subsequent validations of the model
illustrated its robustness for the particular time-period
and also the non-sample-specific nature of the model. The
purpose of this chapter is to apply the model derived in
testing the failing company hypothesis of merger.
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8.2 PROCEDURES USED FOR SPECIFIC HYPOTHESIS: 
The bankruptcy prediction model was developed in
order to test the following hypothesis:
Ho:	 There is no significant difference
between the proportion of firms
possessing 'failing' characteristics in
the sets of acquired and non-acquired
companies:
H1:	 There is a larger proportion of firms
possessing failing characteristics in the
set of acquired companies:
8.3 THE TEST GROUP (ACQUIRED COMPANIES): 
The derived model was applied to a group of acquired
companies. As stated in chapter chapter, they were
comprised of the largest acquisitions in the period from
January 1979 to June 1983 listed in the 'Times 1000'. A
total of 104 companies met the selection criteria.
8.3.1 Result of the Test Group: 
On the application of the discriminant function to
the group of 104 acquired companies, thirty-seven
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companies (35.6%) 1
 exhibited financial characteristics
similar to failed companies from which the model was
derived (see Appendix E). At a glance, this appears to be
an impressive result, if one takes into consideration the
nature of the misclassification in the original model and
the subsequent validations. The misclassification was of
Type I nature, this type of error could imply that the
model had a slight tendency to *classify failed companies
as non-failed and not vice versa. Thus it might be argued
that tke classification of companies as failing is
slightly understated by the model.
8.4 THE CONTROL GROUP: 
In order to interpret the above results consideration
needs to be given to the result of applying the model to
the alternative group of companies (Control group). The
control group consisted of companies similar to the Test
group, but which were not acquired during the period under
review. A random sample of 104 companies, listed
consistently in the 'Financial Times' over the five year
period (1979-1983) (see Appendix G) was selected.
1. If the prior probability was set at 0.5,
the acquired companies classified as possessing
financial characteristics similar to failed
companies would have been 42 (40.4%).
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8.4.1. Result of the Control Group: 
On the application of the model to the control group
of 104 companies, 16 (15.4%) exhibited financial
characteristics similar to previous failed companies (see
Table 8.1). Of the 16 companies, four have been acquired
in subsequent years, two have been declared bankrupt and
the rest are still trading. The results illustrate once
more that some of the companies still trading possess
financial characterisitics similar to previous failed
companies.
However, the test of merger as an alternative to
bankruptcy does not depend on the absolute magnitude of
the frequency at which acquired firms might have failed,
but upon whether this frequency is larger or smaller than
that observed in non-acquired firms.
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Table 8.1
NUMBER OF PREDICTED BANKRUPTCIES IN
SUBSAMPLFS OF ACQUIRED AND NON-ACQUIRED COMPANIES 
Samples
Model
	
Group 2	 Group 1
Prediction
	
(Nonacquired)	 (Acquired)
Non-Failing	 88	 67
(84.6%)	 (64.4%)
Failing1 f 2	 6	 37
(15.4%)
	
(35.6%)
Total Companies	 104	 104
(100.0%)	 (100.0%)
Notes: 1. The observed difference between the proportion of
failing firms in Group 1 and Group 2 is different from 0 at the
0.1% level of significance (one tail test).
The Test statistic is
(Psi - Ps2) - (P1 - P2)
N/P (1 - P) (1/n1 + 1/n2)
Psi =	 Ps2 = x2/n2
where Psi = sample proportion obtained from
population 1
Ps2
 = sample proportion obtained from
population 2
P1 - p2
 = hypothesised population
differences between proportions
(i.e. = 0)
number of failures in Sample 1
x2 = number of failures in Sample 2
ni	 size of sample taken from
population 1
n2	 size of sample taken from
population 2
pooled estimate of the population
proportion. The estimate P is the
number of 'failures' in the two
samples combined (x1 + x2)
divided by the total sample size
(ni + n2)
2. The observed difference is also significant at the 0.2%
level when tested using 2 with Yates Correction (je = 10.1).
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There is strong evidence to reject the null hypothesis. It
seems most likely that there are statistically significantly
more companies having failing characteristics in the acquired
set.
This evidence lends credence to bankruptcy avoidance as a
motive for mergers for the acquired companies. The result is
therefore in line with the argument advanced by Dawey (1961)
and the empirical findings of Shrieves and Stevens (1979) and
Taffler and Soper (1983). However, the finding is only
evidence that some companies possessed financial
characteristics similar to failed companies and may not imply
bankruptcy avoidance per se since it is impossible to observe
the bankruptcy.
Moreover, Taffler and Soper suggested that the evidence of
merger as an alternative to bankruptcy varies with the state of
the economy. In order to investigate if this assertion holds
for the data used in the present study, the companies were
split into financial years to reflect the state of the
economy.
	
The financial years up to 1980/81 were regarded as
a pre-recession period, while the later years were regarded as
recession period. Table 8.2 shows the z-score distribution of
the companies. In the pre-recession years (1979/80 and
1980/81), there was no evidence to reject the null hypothesis.
In other words, it seems most unlikely that there were
statistically significantly l more companies possessing failing
characteristics in the acquired set.
1. Test statistic as in Table 8.1
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Table 8.2
CLASSIFICATION OF Z-SCORES BY STATE OF THE ECONOMY 
Predicted 1979/80 1980/81 1981/82 1982/83 1983/84 Total
ACQUIRED:
Failing 6 6 6 6 13 37
Non-Failing 15 20 9 13 10 67
Total 21 26 15 19 23 104
% Failing
NON-ACQUIRED:
28.6 23.1 40.0 31.6 56.6 35.6
Failing 4 7 1 2 2 16
Non-Failing 27 16 21 19 5 88
Total 31 23 22 21 7 104
% Failing 12.9 30.4 4.5 9.5 28.6 15.4
Table 8.3 shows a comparison of the size (net assets) of the two
groups of acquired companies. The evidence indicates a significant
difference between the net assets of the two groups. This implies that
acquired companies with financial characteristics similar to previous
failed companies are smaller in size compared with the other set of
acquired companies. This finding may reinforce the notion that the
mortality rate of small companies is higher than larger companies.
However, this evidence does not warrant an inferrence that firms fail
because they are small.
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Table 8.3
SIZE (NET ASSETS) DISTRIBUTION OF ACQUIRED COMPANIES: 
Acquired Mean Std No of
Companies (M) Deviation Companies
'Failing' 38.33 43.09 37
'Non-Failing' 69.99 137.24 67
T-Statistic	 1.35*
*statistically different from 0 at 1%
level (one-tailed test).
8.4.2 Paired-Sample Procedure: 
In order to eliminate possible bias as a result of
industry, year and size of companies, another group of
acquired and non-acquired companies was selected. The
acquired group (Group 3) consisted of forty randomly
selected companies from the one hundred and four acquired
companies in Group 1. The non-acquired group (Group 4)
consisted of a 'fresh' forty companies selected to match
the acquired companies (in Group 3) by size (net assets),
industrial classification and year of account. By such an
approach, a non-acquired company is considered as an
alternative acquisition target. (This extra new group of
non-acquired companies has not been involved in any part
of the analysis so far) (see Appendix H).
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Table 8.4 shows the size distribution of the two groups
of companies. The minimum net asset value for the acquired
companies was km3.90 and the maximum was Z111377.60 with a mean
of L143.06. Similarly, the minimum and maximum net asset
values for the non-acquired companies were Ea1 4.05 and E0341.63
respectively with a mean of 4 62.41. There was no significant
difference between the net asset values of the two groups.
Table 8.4
SIZE (NET ASSETS) DISTRIBUTION OF THE ACQUIRED 
AND NON-ACQUIRED COMPANIES (GROUP 3 AND GROUP 4) 
Classification Mean Std Std
of Companies (M) Deviation Error N
Acquired 63.06 80.89 12.79 40
Non-Acquired 62.41 79.10 12.50 40
T-statistic	 0.04
The results of the matched-pairs are presented in Table
8.5. The result confirms the significant difference
between the acquired and non-acquired companies, though at
the 5% significance level. The observed percentage of
failing in the set of acquired companies is very similar
to Table 8.1.
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Table 8.5
NUMBER OF PREDICTED BANKRUPTCIES IN 
SUBSAMPLES OF ACQUIRED AND NON-ACQUIRED COMPANIES 
Samples
Model
Prediction
Group 4
(Non-acquired)
Group 3
(Acquired)
Non-Failing 34 25
(85.0%) (63.0%)
Failing1,2 6 15
(15.0%) (37.5%)
Total Companies 40 40
(100.0%) (100.0%)
Notes: 1. The observed difference between the
proportion of failing firms in Group 3 and
Group 4 is statistically different from 0 at
the 0.5% level of significance (one tail test).
2. The observed difference is also significant
at the 0.5% level when tested using 2 with
Yates CorrectionA 2 = 4.12).
.	 ,
8.4.3 Comparison With Previous Studies: 
As stated in Chapter 4, the bankruptcy avoidance rationale has been
previously investigated using a bankruptcy prediction model. The results
of these studies together with the findings of the present study are
summarised in Table 8.6.
Table 8.6
NUMBER OF PREDICTED BANKRUPICIES IN SUB-SAMPLFS OF 
ACQUIRED AND NON-ACQUIRED COMPANIES IN PREVIOUS STUDTPs 
Predicted Bankruptcies
Author Country
Non-acquired
Companies
Acquired
Companies
Shrieves and Stevens (1979) (USA) 5	 (4.5%) 17(15.2%)
No. of companies 112 112
Taffler and Soper (1983) (UK) 10(12.5%) 14(17.5%)
No. of companies 80 80
Present Study (UK) 6(15.0%) 15(37.5%)
(Paired Control Group)
No of companies 40 40
Present Study (UK) 16(15.4%) 37(35.6%)
(Random Control Group)
No. of Companies 	 104	 104
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The low prediction rate for the non-acquired
companies in the Shrieves and Steven's study is
surprising. It is possible that this results from
different general failure rates in the USA, but it seems
out of line with other studies using the same model
(Taffler and Soper (1983)). This led Taffler and Soper to
suggest "some methodological problems despite the valid
paired sample approach used". However, it is reasonable
to argue that some industries are more failure prone than
others. So if acquisition activity is low in a particular
industry during a study period, it could invariably
exclude companies from the industry for the pair-match
procedure.
Further, an alternative reason which appears
plausible is that the pair-matching procedure is necessary
to eliminate possible bias arising from different asset
size and accounting year. By this approach, a matched
non-acquired company is considered as an alternative
acquisition target to the acquired company. The
advantages of the procedure notwithstanding, the problem
of matching companies by size and industry should also be
noted. Theoretically, it is possible to match companies
by size and industrial classifications. However, in
practice, (especially for acquisition purposes), it is
difficult to match companies by such criteria. The major
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problem is matching the actual size of the acquired
company, either by net assets value or sales. For
example, if the acquired company is the 'largest' company
in the industrial grouping, and other companies are
clustered within the lower decile of the industry, it is
difficult to match the acquired company with the remaining
companies. Conversely, if the acquired company is the
'smallest' in the industrial classification group,
matching it with a non-acquired company appears somewhat
arbitrary. Therefore, caution should be applied in the
interpretation of the matched-pair procedure.
In the next section, the failing-company hypothesis
for the acquiring companies is tested.
8.5 FAILING-COMPANY HYPOTHESIS FOR THE ACQUIRING COMPANY: 
As already stated, Weston and Manshingka (1971)
provided empirical evidence to suggest that some companies
adopt an acquisition strategy in order to avoid
bankruptcy. This version of the failing-company
hypothesis is tested in this section.
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8.5.1 Formal Hypothesis: 
Ho:	 There is no significant difference
between the proportion of firms
possessing 'failing' characteristics in
the sets of acquiring and non-acquiring
companies:
H 1 :	 There is a larger proportion of firms
possessing failing characteristics in the
set of acquiring firms:
8.5.2. The Test Group (Acquiring Companies):
In order to test the failing company hypothesis for
the acquiring companies, the model derived in the previous
chapter and used in the previous section was applied to a
group of acquiring companies. This group consisted of
companies that made 'large' acquisition during the period
under review. The number was less than 104, (see Appendix
E) because of the exclusion of foreign and unlisted
companies. Eleven companies out of seventy-six companies
were classified as possessing failure characteristics
(see Table 8.7). This result contrasts sharply with the
one obtained when the model was applied to the group of
acquired companies. A comparison was also made with the
group of non-acquiring companies during the review period
(see Appendix I). This group consisted of companies that
did not make any significant acquisition during the study
period. Twelve companies out of seventy-six
64
(84.2%)
12
(15.8%)
Non-Failing
Failingl
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non-acquiring companies were classified as possessing
financial characteristics similar to previous failed
companies.
Table 8.7
NUMBER OF PREDICTED BANKRUPTCIES IN 
SUB-SAMPLES OF ACQUIRING AND NON-ACQUIRING COMPANIES 
Samples
Model Prediction
Group 2	 Group 1
(Non-acquiring)	 (Acquiring)
Total Companies	 76
	
762
(100.0%)	 (100.0%)
Note: 1. This is not statistically significant, i.e.,
there is no evidence to reject the null hypothesis.
It seems likely that there is no significant
difference between the proportion of companies
possessing failing characteristics in the two sets
of companies.
2. Five companies were involved in the derivation
of the discriminant model (Chapter 7). However, in
four cases, the financial statements were drawn from
different accounting years, hence the retention of
these companies does not imply double counting. One
of the five companies was excluded from the analysis
because the financial statements would have been
drawn from the same accounting year.
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The result presented in Table 8.7 indicate that there
is no difference between the proportion of companies
possessing failing characteristics in the two sets of
companies.
Based on the outcome of the test, there is therefore
no evidence to suggest that acquiring companies during the
period of this study embarked on acquisition in order to
avoid bankruptcy. The failing-company hypothesis as
advanced by Weston and Manshingka (1971) is therefore
refuted.
However, an examination of the financial
characteristics of the companies they acquired indicated
the following pattern. Of the eleven acquiring companies,
with 'danger' z-scores, five acquired companies with
similar z-scores, three acquired companies with better
z-scores than theirs and the targets of the other three
were not eligible for consideration in the present study
(see Appendix E).
The findings of this study are in the direction that
theory might suggest - that is, that acquiring companies
would be stronger performers than the acquired companies.
This is consistent with the findings of Tzoannos and
Samuels (1972), Firth (1976) and Taffler and Soper (1983).
The rejection of the failing-company hypothesis for the
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acquiring companies is not surprising. In a climate of
contested takeover bids as has been prevalent in recent
times, it is unlikely that a potential acquirer with a
'weak' financial record could make a successful
acquisition. Defensive 'rhetorics' have included the
criticism of the profitability, growth records or the
managerial 'competence' of the acquiring companies. It is
possible that any evidence to support the criticism might
'help' to influence the outcome of the takeover bid.
However, the size of a company appears to be an important
factor in takeover decision (see Table 8.8).
Table 8.8 shows the difference in size between the
acquired and acquiring companies. The findings confirm
previous studies (summarized in Chapter 2, Appendix A.)
that size is a strategic factor in takeover decision.
Smaller companies are more likely to be taken over than
larger companies.
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Table 8.8
SIZE DISTRIBUTION:
ACQUIRED AND ACQUIRING COMPANIES 
Type of
	
Mean	 Std	 No of
Company	 (EM)	 Deviation	 Companies
Acquired	 58.93	 114.26	 104
Acquiring	 218.38	 280.78
	
751
T-Statistic	 -5.21*
*statistically different from 0 at 1% level
(one-tailed test).
Notes. 1. Two companies had net assets value over
,E113 and were excluded from the number. (One of
the two companies was involved in the derivation
of the model and was excluded from the analyses in
Tables 8.6 and 8.7 and were excluded from the
number).
8.6. Conclusion and Summary: 
The bankruptcy prediction model developed in chapter
seven was applied to a group of acquired and non-acquired
companies. The result indicated that a higher proportion
(statistically significant at the 1% level) of acquired
companies possessed failing characteristics than
non-acquired companies. The result tends to support the
merger as an alternative to bankruptcy rationale. This
evidence is in line with the theoretical framework
discussed in Chapter 4, and consistent with other recent
empirical findings (Shrieves and Stevens (1979) and
Taffler and Soper (1983)).
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The bankruptcy prediction model was also applied to a
group of acquiring and non-acquiring companies in an
attempt to test the failing company hypothesis for the
acquiring companies. The results obtained indicate that
there was no difference between the proportion of
companies possessing failing characteristics in the two
sets of companies. Following this result, the
failing-company hypothesis for the acquiring companies is
therefore refuted.	 The outcome is consistent with
previous empirical studies which have tended to suggest
that acquiring companies are stronger performers than the
acquired companies or perhaps to the view that it is the
strong firms that take over the weak.
The empirical approach adopted in this chapter allowed
the dichotomisation of the acquiring companies (i.e. into
those firms who acquired others which possessed 'failing'
characteristics and those who acquired 'non-failing'
firms). In the next chapter, the post acquisition
performance of the acquiring companies is considered.
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CHAPTER NINE
POST-MERGER PERFORMANCE OF ACQUIRING COMPANIES
9.1. INTRODUCTION: 
In Chapter 3, it was reported that previous studies
by Singh (1971), Utton (1974) and Meeks (1977) showed that
acquisitions did not improve the profitability of the
acquirer, and in most cases, they suffer a decline in
profitability subsequent to acquisition. However, these
studies treated acquisitions as a homogeneous set. It is
hypothesized in the present study, that such an approach
might mask differential effects resulting from the nature
(failing or not) of the firms being acquired. To
investigate this possibility, it was first necessary to
split the acquiring companies into two groups - those
acquiring others with 'failing' characteristics and those
acquiring others with 'non-failing' characteristics - and
to measure the post-combination performance of each group
separately.
In chapter eight, fairly convincing evidence that
mergers seem to have provided a more attractive
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alternative to bankruptcy has been presented. The
procedures adopted enabled acquiring companies to be
classified according to the financial characteristics of
the firm acquired. The post-acquisition performance of
the two groups will be considered in the current chapter
to see whether any differential performance is observed.
The observation of superior performance by either group
would have fairly obvious policy implications.
9.2 PERFORMANCE MEASURES: 
The performance measurements used in this study were
mainly 'accounting-based', including profitability and
gearing ratios (see Table 9.1). Other measures used were
the Meeks' (1977) industry-standardized profitability
measure and Taffler's (1982) performance analysis score
(PAS), which seeks to measure relative strength by ranking
company 'Z-scores'.
Table 9.1
Accounting Based Ratiosl
Terms
	 Meaning
EBIT/TA
EBIT/NA
PBT/TA
PBT/NA
PBT/SA
TD/EQT
SALES/TA
Earnings before interests and taxes/total assets
Earnings before interests and taxes/net assets
Profit before taxes/total assets
Profit before taxes/net assets
Profit before taxes/sales
Total Debts/Equity
Sales/Total assets
1. These are the ratios used by InterCompany
Comparisons (ICC) for their interfirm comparisons.
288
9.3 THE EFFECT OF ACQUISITION ON PROFITABILITY: 
In Chapter three, the likely effects of acquisition
on profitability were discussed. Most of the studies to
date show that on average profitability declined after
merger. Singh (1971) and Meeks (1977) showed that on -
average profitability declined after merger, whilst Cosh,
Hughes and Singh (1980) showed that profitability either
increased, or remained the same following merger. It is
therefore important to investigate the effect on
profitability for the sample in the present study.
However, as Steiner (1975) pointed out, there are a
number of motivational factors which would influence the
outcome of a merger. For example, if the acquirer's
management aims at maximising profits, they would expect
an increase in the profitability of the combined company,
over what the weighted average of the profitability of the
two combining companies would have been had they not
merged. Similarly, as Hindley (1973) has argued, the sale
of a business takes ,
 place only when "the buyer has higher
expectations of its future profitability than the
seller". If these higher expectations ara fulfilled after
sale, then an increase in profitability should result.
However, that may not be a sufficient condition even for a
profit-maximising acquirer. It may be that the
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expectations of the profitability of the company by the
participants (buyer and seller) are at equilibrium, and
the buyer takes the view that the independent existence of
the companies will result in a lower profit for both of
them than would be the case if they merged.
-
In the behavioural theories, a merger may exhibit a
potential for higher profitability, either through
increased market power or lower average costs for the
combined firm, and yet the profitability may not be
achieved in practice. This may be due to relaxation of
effort on the part of management. As Leibenstein (1966)
stated:
il ... firms and economies do not operate on an
outer-bound production possibility surface
consistent with their resources. Rather they
actually work on a production surface that is
well within that outer bound. This means that
for a variety of reasons people and
organisations normally work neither as hard nor
as effectively as they could. In situations
where competitive pressure is light, many
people will trade the disutility of greater
effort, of search, and the control of other
peoples' activities for the utility of feeling
less pressure and of better interpersonal
relations" p.413.
Leibenstein refers to the relaxation of effort in terms of
an increase in 'X-inefficiency'.
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Following from Cyert and March (1963), it may be
argued that a company's performance depends to a
considerable extent on managerial aspirations. The
aspirations are relatively stable in the short run. In
such situation, a change in the environment which exhibits
potentiality for higher profitability may not in the
circumstance lead to it; either the company may not
realise the potential benefits or they may be absorbed in
less efficient production or administration.
In view of the foregoing discussions, it appears that
the use of profit indicators as a measurement of merger
success is not a simple one. However, of particular
relevance in the present study is whether by acquisition,
the acquiring companies have prevented impending failures,
in other words, generating a 'social' gain. In such
situations, the observation of no decline in profitability
might still be considered beneficial.
c
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9.4 THE FORMAL HYPOTHESIS: 
Using the variables defined in Table 9.1, the formal
hypothesis tested can be stated in the following manner:
Ho: There is no significant difference between the
post-acquisition and pre-acquisition
performance of the acquiring companies:
H1: There is significant difference between the
post-acquisition and pre-acquisition
performance of the acquiring companies.
9.5 SAMPLE SELECTION: 
In order to test the above hypothesis and others,
financial variables were computed from the financial
statements of the acquiring companies defined in chapter
eight. To be considered eligible for inclusion, it was
required that in the two years immediately following the
acquisition the company made no further acquisitions.
This is important if the impact of the particular
acquisition is to be observed. A longer acquisition-free
period would have allowed longer-term effects to be
observed (as in Meeks,(1977)). Although the two-year
period appears arbitrary, it was considered a reasonable
compromise given that many of the firms in the sample did
not have a longer acquisition-free period. It could also
be argued that a shorter period is more likely to capture
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the.'impact' of acquisition on the acquiring firms'
performance. In a longer period, assuming no further
acquisitions, the impact of the merger is more likely to
be neutralized and polluted by other environmental
influences.
9.6 TEST OF SIGNIFICANCE USED: 
The student-t test was employed to test the
differences between the pre-and post-performance of the
acquiring companies. Similarly, the two-sample-t test was
employed to test the difference in the performance of the
two groups of companies. Based on the sampling
distributions of the stated statistic, one can calculate
the probability that a difference at least as large as the
one observed would occur if the two population means are
equal. This probability is called the observed
significance level. If the observed significance level is
small enough, usually less than 0.05 or 0.01, the
hypothesis that the population means are equal is rejected.
One objection of using parametric instead of
non-parametric tests is the distributional assumptions of
the former. The parametric tests assume that the samples
are normally distributed. In practice, however, the
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assumption of normality
 is rarely met, but the central
limit theorem implies that as the sample size gets large
enough, the sampling distribution of the mean can be
approximated by the normal distribution, even when the
population distribution is significantly non-normal. In
most of the tests this condition appears to be met. The
power of the parametric test makes it appropriate for the
present analysis, because it is more likely than the
non-parametric in detecting the true differences between
two populations.
9.7 SIMPLE RATIO MEASURES: 
9.7.1 Initial Tests: 
As a first step toward testing the hypothesis, the
average (arithmetic mean) values of variables Y1..Y7 were
computed for all acquiring companies (see Appendix J).
The results are shown in Tables 9.2 and 9.3. The changes
in the ratios following the acquisition are reported as
well as the result of testing whether the observed change
was different from zero.
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TABLE 9.2
ABSOLUTE CHANGES IN MEANS OF THE VARIABLES FOR THE ACQUIRING COMPANIES 
(t + 1) 1 0ne year Post
Variables	 Pi-e-Merger	 Post-Merger	 D	 T-Value
Means.	 Means	 (note 3)
1 EBIT/TA	 12.76	 10.51	 -2.25	 -2.82
2 EBIT/NA	 21.22	 17.34	
-3.88	 -2.36
3 PET/TA	 11.09
	 7.90	 -3.19	 -3.54
4 PBT/NA	 17.96	 13.04	
-4.92	 -2.83
5 PBT/SA	 7.39	 5.29	 -2.10	 -3.27
6 TD/EQT
	
122.52	 144.80
	 22.28	 2.71
7 SALES/TA	 174.96
	 167.61	
-7.35	 -1.54
Sig
level
N
(note 4)
0.00* 48
0.02** 48
0.00* 48
0.00* 48
0.00* 48
0.00* 48
0.13 48
Notes: 1. Changes in the means: (t + 1) - (t - 1) where t + 1 =
One year after the merger and t - 1, one year before
merger.
2. Units of measurements are in percentages.
3. Difference between post-merger and rire-merger means.
4. Number of companies.
statistically different from 0 at the 1% level (using a
two-tail t-test)
** statistically different from 0 at the 5% level.
TABLE 9.3
ABSOLUTE CHANGES IN MEANS OF THEVARIABLES FOR THE ACQUIRING COMPANIES
(t + 2)1 two year Post 
Variables Pre-Merger
Means-.4
Post-Merger
Means (note 3)
T-Value Sig
level
N
(note 4)
1 EBIT/TA 12.76 10.56 -2.20 -2.46 0.01* 48
2 EBIT/NA 21.22 17.74 -3.48 -1.98 0.05** 48
3 PET/TA 11.09 7.99 -3.10 -3.15 0.00* 48
4 PBT/NA 17.96 13.29 -4.67 -2.58 0.01* 48
5 PBT/SA 7.39 5.27 -2.12 -3.11 0.00* 48
6 TD/I' 122.52 138.99 16.47 2.14 0.03** 48
7 SALES/TA 174.96 174.00 -0.96 -0.21 0.83 48
Notes as in 'Table 9.2
The results indicate that the profit-related
performance variables (1 - 5 in Tables) decreased one and
two years after acquisition. The decline is statistically
significant at levels ranging from 0.0% to 2% for the
first year, and 0.0% to 5% for the second year after
acquisitions. Conversely the gearing ratio increased for
the two years; the increase is statistically significant
from zero in both years. However, no causation can be
inferred until a comparison is made with the performance
of non-acquiring companies. The differences in means of
Sales/Total Assets pre and post-mergers are not
statistically significant.
9.7.2 Further Tests Holding Industry Constant:
The statistical test employed implicitly assumes that
except for the classificatory variables, there are no
other omitted variables which exert systematic effects
upon the dependent variables. The most obvious variable
omitted from the initial tests is the performance of
non-acquiring companies during the study period. There
are reasons to believe that mergers occur more frequently
in some industries than in others and growth in the
financial variables generally differ from one industry to
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another. In order to determine whether the effects
revealed in Tables 9.2 and 9.3 could be due entirely to
acquisition, further statistical tests were conducted in
order to eliminate industry and economy related factors.
-
To test the performance of non-acquiring companies
during the period, forty-eight companies were selected and
matched with the acquiring companies according to their
industrial classification, year of acquisition and year of
accounts (see also Appendix J). The comparable results of
pre- and post-merger performance measurements for
non-acquiring companies are shown in Tables 9.4 and 9.5.
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TABLE 9.4
ABSOLUTE CHANGES IN MEANS OF THE VARIABLES FOR THE NON-ACQUIRING COMPANIES 
(t + 1)1_One Year Post 
Variables Pre-Merger
Means
Post-Merger
Means
D
(note 3)
T-Value Sig
level (note 4)
1 EBIT/TA 11.91 11.79 -0.12 -0.29 0.77 48
2 EBIT/NA 17.54 17.43 -0.11 -0.16 0.88 48
3 PBT/TA 9.90 9.43 -0.47 -1.04 0.30 48
4 PBT/NA 14.61 13.64 -0.97 -1.12 0.27 48
5 PBT/SA 7.24 7.00 -0.24 -0.73 0.47 48
6 TD/EQT 113.59 117.14 3.55 0.70 0.48 48
7 SALES/TA 157.35 160.46 3.11 0.70 0.49 48
Notes as in Table 9.2
TABLE 9.5
ABSOLUTE CHANGES IN MEANS OF TBE VARIABLES FOR THE NON-ACQUIRING CCOIDANIES 
(t + 2)1 Two Year Post 
Variables Pre-Merger
Means.
Post-Merger D
(note 3)
T-Value Sig
level (note 4)
1 EB1T/TA 11.91 11.25 -0.66 -1.07 0.29 48
2 EBIT/NA 17.54 16.65 -0.89 -0.86 0.40 48
3 PBT/TA 9.90 9.12 -0.78 -1.25 0.22 48
4 PBT/NA 14.61 13.48 -1.13 -1.09 0.28 48
5 PBT/SA 7.24 6.95 -0.29 -0.71 0.47 48
6 TD/EQT 113.59 119.51 5.92 0.82 0.42 48
7 SALES/TA 157.35 162.28 4.93 0.84 0.41 48
Notes as in Table 9.2
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The results shown in Tables 9.4 and 9.3 for the first
and second year respectively indicate a very slight
decrease in the profit-related variables of the
non-acquiring companies. These decreases are not only
much smaller than those obtained for the acquiring
companies, but they indicate a decline which is of no
statistical significance. The decline in profitability
measures of the non-acquiring companies is to be expected,
because the period between December 1978 and December 1981
saw British industry as a whole having to weather the
worst effect of the world recession. It is to be noted
that the majority of the companies in this study were
selected from this time period.
What is important, however, is whether the impact of
the recession was more severe on the acquiring than on the
non-acquiring companies. To shed more light on the
difference between the performance of the two groups,
two-sample-t tests were conducted on the differences in
means between the acquiring and non-acquiring companies.
The results are presented in Tables 9.6 and 9.7.
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TABLE 9.6
DIFFERENCES IN MEANS1. OF ACQUIRING AND NON-ACQUIRING COMPANTPS: 
(One-Year Post) 
Variables Acquiring
Means
Non-Acq.
Means
D
(note 2)
T-Value Sig
level
1. EBTIYTA -2.25 -0.12 -2.13 2.37 0.02** 48
2. EBrr/NA -3.88 -0.11 -3.77 2.10 0.03** 48
3. PET/TA -3.20 -0.47 -2.73 2.70 0.00* 48
4. PBT/NA -4.92 -0.97 -3.95 2.04 0.04** 48
5. PET/SA -2.09 -0.24 -1.85 2.56 0.01* 48
6. TD/EQT 22.28 3.55 18.73 -1.94 0.05** 48
7. SALES/TA -7.35 3.11 -10.46 1.60 0.11 48
Notes:
1.	 A two-sample-t test on the difference between the
'differences in the means' of the variables for the two
independent groups. This approach is considered
appropriate in order to determine the severity or
otherwise of the changes incurred by each of the two
groups.
2. Difference between the mean change in ratio observed for
acquiring and non-acquiring groups.
statistically different from 0 at 1% level;
** statisfically different from 0 at 5%
The results shown in Table 9.6 indicate that there is a significant
difference between the changes incurred in the profitability variables
of the two groups of companies. There was a small difference (not
statistically significant) in the asset-utilisation variable. However,
the change observed in the gearing ratio was significant, perhaps
suggesting that the acquiring ccmpanies may have increased the variable
in order to finance the acquisitions.
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TABLE 9.7
DIFFERENCFS IN MEANS1 OF ACQUIRING AND NON-ACQUIRING COMPANIES: 
(TWO YEAR POST) 
Variables Acquiring
Means
Non-acq.
Means
D
(note 2)
T-value Sig
level
1. EBIT/TA -0.20 -0.66 -0.46 1.41 0.16 48
2. EBIT/NA -3.48 -0.88 -2.60 1.27 0.21 48
3. PBT/TA -3.10 -0.78 -2.32 2.00 0.04** 48
4. PBT/NA -4.67 -1.13 -3.54 1.70 0.09 48
5 PET/SA -2.12 -0.29 -1.83 2.29 0.02** 48
6 TD/EQT 16.49 5.92 10.57 -1.00 0.32 48
7 SALES/TA -0.96 4.94 -5.90 0.80 0.43 48
** Statistically different from 0 at 5% level
Notes as in Table 9.6
Table 9.7 presents the result of the second year after
acquisiton. The gap in the changes between the two groups of
companies narrowed indicating perhaps the 'severe' impact of
acquisition on the year immediately after the incidence. This result
may indicate that in the long-run, the 'adverse' effect of
acquisition may become negligible. However, there is little evidence
to support the proposition, given that studies like Utton (1974) and
Meeks (1977) Which considered the impact of acquisition on
profitability for a longer period of time also showed continued
decline in profitability.
The foregoing evidence illustrates the effect of acquisition on
the measurement variables used in the present study. The results
show that the profit-related performance
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variables of the acquiring companies decreased one and two
years after acquisition. The findings confirm to some extent
the findings of previous studies that acquisition does not
improve profitability, thus kindling some support for the
managerial motive for mergers.
However, while the profitability measures decline at
statistically significant levels for the two years, the gearing
ratio increased. The increase is statistically significant for
both years. This perhaps suggests that the acquiring companies
have increased gearing ratios in order to finance the
acquisitions. On the asset utilisation variable, the acquiring
companies incurred a slight decline (not statistically
significant) for the two years after acquisition. This
indicates, albeit weakly, that in the first year after
acquisition the acquiring companies' management may possibly
have lost control over the combined assets or perhaps more
likely that it took at least one year to "prune-out" duplicated
or wasteful assets.
In view of the above evidence, there appear to be
convincing reasons to reject the null hypothesis that there is
no difference between the post-acquisition and pre-acquisition
performance of the acquiring companies, where performance is
measured by the profitability variables (1 - 5) in Table 9.1.
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9.7.3 Summary of the results on acquisition generally: 
The results presented above indicate that on average
acquiring companies appear to experience a decline in
their profit related financial variables one and two years
after acquisition. The differences are significant when
compared with a control group of non-acquiring companies
of the same industry and same time period. The tentative
conclusion of this Section is in line with previous
studies reviewed in Chapter 3. These studies hold the
view that merging does not improve profitability.
However, while both the previous studies and the
current study generally uphold the non-positive effect
(often negative) of acquisition on profitability, no
evidence has been advanced on how this effect might be
"distributed" between the two sets of acquiring
companies. In other words, whether the general decline in
profitability is as a result of acquisition of potentially
failing companies (or even previously 'successful'
companies), or the general negative effect of
acquisitions. In the next section, tests are carried out
to determine the differential effects on the performance
of the two sets of acquiring companies.
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9.8 SIMPLE RATIO MEASURES - COMPARISON BETWEEN 
ACQUIRERS: 'NON-FAILING' (SNF) AND 'FAILING' (SF):
9.8.1 Introduction: 
The results obtained in the previous section suggest
a significant difference between the post-acquisition
performance of acquiring and non-acquiring companies.
Acquiring companies generally seem to suffer decline in
profitability variables. It would be interesting to know
whether such a decline is experienced equally by companies
which have acquired firms with 'failing' characteristics
('SF') and those which have acquired 'non-failing' (ISNF')
firms.
9.8.2 Formal Hypothesis: 
Ho:	 There is no significant difference
between the performance of the group
acquiring others with 'non-failing'
characteristics and those with 'failing'
characteristics:
H1:	 There is significant difference between
the performance of the group acquiring
others with 'non-failing' characteristics
and those with 'failing' characteristics.
9.8.3 Discussion of Results: 
Tables 9.8 and 9.9 present the individual results for
the groups for the first year and Tables 9.10 and 9.11 for
the second year respectively. The results in these Tables
confirm the evidence already obtained in the previous
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section that acquiring companies suffered decline in their
post-acquisition profitability measures. However, the
additional information added by splitting the group into
two is that it shows how the decline in post-acquisition
profitability was distributed. Tables 9.12 and 9.13
report the differential effects observed for those that
acquired 'non-failing' companies and those that acquired
'failing' companies. The SNF group suffered greater
decline in their profitability measures. While the
decline is statistically significant for the SNF group,
decline in the SF group was not. However, the SF group
incurred an increase in their gearing ratio.
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Table 9.8
ABSOLUTE CHANGES IN MEANS1 OF THE VARIABLES FOR THE ACQUIRERS: 
'NON-FAILING GROUP': ONE YEAR POST-MERGER 
Variables	 Pre-Merger	 Post-Merger	 D	 T-Value	 Sig
Means2	Means	 (note 3)	 Level (note 4)
1. EBIT/TA 13.74 11.03 -2.71 -2.64 0.01* 26
2. EBIT/NA 21.90 17.53 -4.37 -2.00 0.05** 26
3 PBT/TA 12.24 8.46 -3.78 -3.19 0.00* 26
4 PBT/NA 19.54 13.57 -5.97 -2.48 0.02** 26
5. PBT/SA 8.42 5.24 -3.18 -4.11 0.00* 26
6. TD/EQT 117.83 129.65 11.82 1.53 0.14 26
7. SALES/TA 179.57 179.58 0.01 0.00 1.00 26
Notes: 
1. changes in the means: (t + 1) - (t - 1) where t + 1 =
one year after the merger and t - 1, one year before
merger.
2. difference between post-merger and pre-merger means.
3. Number of companies.
*statistically different from 0 at 1% level (using a two-tail test)
**statistically different from 0 at 5% level.
Table 9.9
ABSOLUTE CHANGES IN MEANS" OF THE VARIABLRS FOR THE ACQUIRERS: 
'FAILING GROUP': ONE YEAR POST-MERGER 
Variables	 Pre-Merger	 Post-Merger	 D ,	 T-Value	 Sig
Means2	Means	 (note 3)	 Level (note 4)
1. EBIT/TA 11.60 9.87 -1.73 -1.35 0.09 22
2. EBIT/NA 20.41 17.11 -3.30 -1.30 0.11 22
3 PBT/TA 9.74 7.23 -2.51 -1.79 0.04** 22
4 PBT/NA 16.09 12.40 -3.69 -1.45 0.08 22
5. PBT/SA 6.17 5.35 -0.82 -0.81 0.21 22
6. TD/EQT 128.06 162.69 34.63 2.27 0.01* 22
7. SALES/TA 169.52 153.46 -16.06 -1.86 0.04** 22
Notes as in Table 9.8
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Table 9.10
ABSOLUTE CHANGES IN MEANS1. OF THE VARIABLES FOR THE ACQUIRERS: 
'NON-FAILING GROUP': TWO YEAR POST-MERGER 
Variables	 Pre-Merger	 Post-Merger	 D	 T-Value	 Sig
Means2	Means	 (note 3)	 Level (note 4)
1. EBIT/TA 13.74 10.54 -3.20 -2.89 0.00* 26
2. EBIT/NA 21.90 17.60 -4.30 -1.78 0.08** 26
3 PBT/TA 12.24 8.15 -4.09 -3.54 0.00* 26
4 PBT/NA 19.54 13.52 -6.02 -2.44 0.02** 26
5. PBT/SA 8.42 5.26 -3.16 -4.60 0.00* 26
6. TD/EQT 117.83 128.37 10.54 1.41 0.17 26
7. SALES/TA 179.57 181.48 1.91 0.30 0.77 26
Notes as in Table 9.8
Table 9.11
ABSOLUTE CHANGES IN MEANS1_ OF THE VARIABLES FOR THE ACQUIRERS: 
FAILINO GROUP': TWO YEAR POST-MERGER 
Variables
	 Pre-Merger	 Post-Merger	 D	 T-Value	 Sig
Means2
	Means	 (note 3)	 Level (note 4)
1. EBIT/TA 11.60 10.58 -1.02 -0.71 0.24 22
2. EBIT/NA 20.41 17.91 -2.50 -0.96 0.18 22
3 PBT/TA 9.74 7.80 -1.94 -1.17 0.13 22
4 PBT/NA 16.09 13.01 -3.08 -1.14 0.14 22
5. PBT/SA 6.17 5.29 -0.88 -0.73 0.24 22
6. TD/EQT 128.06 151.54 23.48 1.64 0.06 22
7. SALES/TA 169.52 165.17 -4.35 -0.70 0.25 22
Notes as in Table 9.8
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The differences in the performance of the two groups
of acquiring companies could be attributed to the
financial strength of the target companies. It may be
fairly assumed that acquirers of potentially failing
companies are likely to pay less for their acquisitions
(other things being equal) than acquirers of non-failing
companies. The difference in the 'cost' of acquisition
might affect the post-acquisition profitability in three
major ways.
Firstly, one theoretical explanation is the working
mechanism of the stock market. The basis for this
supposition is that if companies are valued by the stock
market on the platform of their achieved performance (in
other words, performance under existing management), it
will be beneficial for the acquirer's management to
purchase (other things being equal) a company whose
performance is below average within an industry. There
are two justifications for this: (a) a company performing
less well than others would be relatively cheaper to
acquire in relation to its assets and (b) there will be
more opportunity for improving the performance of the firm
with a lower performance index relative to its industry.
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The second possible explanation for the difference in
performance between the two groups of acquiring companies
is that since the acquirers of non-failing companies are
• likely to pay more than the other acquirers, this could
give rise to a higher 'goodwill', which has the effect of
understating the post-acquisition profitability position
of the acquiring company l . Consider two companies with
equal book values of assets (other things being equal),
one failing and the other not failing. It is fair to
assume that the acquirer of the non-failing company is
likely to pay substantially higher than the acquirer of
the failing company. Invariably, the higher acquisition
costs gives rise to a higher value of goodwill which can
reduce the post-merger profitability. However, the
validity of this argument is reduced by the imposition of
SSAP 22 on Goodwill which requires companies to
consolidate the assets of the acquired companies at 'fair
value'.
Thirdly, the acquisitions of non-failing companies are
more likely to be contested, higher defence (attack!)
costs being incurred. These incidental costs are likely
to be written off in the profit and loss account, which in
turn reduces profitability, either in the year of
acquisition or soon after.
1. The effect of goodwill on post-merger
profitability is discussed in Section 9.11.4
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The increase in the gearing ratio of the group
acquiring 'failing' companies could be attributed to the
leverage-related acquisition motive suggested by Lewellen
(1971) and to a lesser extent by Lintner (1971). They
argued that firms might adopt an acquisition strategy in
order to take advantage of 'latent debt capacity' because
borrowing costs decline with size of firm. One can
therefore argue that by acquiring potentially failing
companies, the acquirers aimed at reducing their borrowing
costs which in turn led to an improvement in their
profitability record as compared with the acquirers of
non-failing companies.
Tables 9.12 and 9.13 present two-sample t tests for
the differences in changes in means reported in Tables 9.8
to 9.11 for the first year and second year after
acquisition respectively. The results indicate that a
higher decline in profitability measures was incurred by
the group acquiring non-failing companies. The reported
differences were not statistically significant (except for
one variable) possibly partly as a result of the small
sample sizes; the differences are nevertheless, quite
interesting.
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Table 9.12
DIFFERENCES IN MEANS'. BETWEEN THE ACQUIRERS: 
FAILING AND NON-FAILING GROUP 
(ONE-YEAR POST-ACQUISITION) 
Variables Failing
Group
Non-Failing
Group
D
(note 2)
T-value Sig.
level
EBIT/TA -1.73 -2.71 -0.98 -0.60 0.28
EBIT/NA -3.30 -4.37 -1.07 -0.31 0.38
PBT/TA -2.51 -3.78 -1.27 -0.69 0.25
PBT/NA -3.69 -5.97 -2.28 -0.65 0.26
PBT/SA -0.82 -3.18 -2.36 -1.85 0.04**
TD/EQT 34.63 11.82 22.81 -1.33 0.10
SALES/TA -16.06 00.01 -16.07 1.64 0.06
Notes:
1. A two-sample t test on the difference between the
'differences in the means' of the variables for the two
independent groups. This approach is considered appropriate
in order to determine the severity or otherwise of the changes
incurred by each of the two groups.
2. Difference between the mean change in ratio observed for
acquirers of non-failing and failing companies.
**statistically different from 0 at 5% level.
Tables 9.13
DIFFERENCES IN MEANS1BEIWEEN THE ACQUIRERS: 
FAILING AND NON-FAILING GROUPS 
TWO-YEAR POST-ACQUISITION 
Variables	 Failing	 Non-Failing	 D	 T-value	 Sig
Group	 Group	 (note 2)	 level
EBIT/TA -1.02 -3.20 -2.18 -1.20 0.12
EBIT/NA -2.50 -4.30 -1.80 -0.51 0.31
PBT/TA -1.94 -4.09 -2.15 -1.07 0.15
PBT/NA -3.08 -6.02 -2.94 -0.80 0.22
PBT/SA -0.88 -3.16 -2.28 -1.63 0.06
TD/I' 23.48 10.54 12.94 -0.80 0.22
SALES/TA -4.35 1.91 -6.26 0.70 0.25
Notes as in Table 9.12.
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9.8.4 Summary of the Results of Comparing Acquirers: 
'Non-failing' (SNF) and 'Failing' (SF): 
The foregoing results indicate how the decline in
profitability variables of the acquiring companies was
distributed. Based on the profit-related variables used,
the hypothesis of no apparent difference between the two
groups of acquiring companies cannot be formally
rejected. However, the findings indicate that the group
acquiring others with 'non-failing' characteristics
generally suffer a greater decline in their performance
variables. In other words, it could be argued that
companies acquiring others with 'failing' characteristics
perform better than the other group.
However, the results obtained so far have only
partially taken into consideration the systematic
influences on profitability measures other than
acquisitions. In the next Section, a methodology which
seeks to consider changes in the companies' environment
during the period of comparison is adopted.
312
9.9 NORMALISED PROFITABILITY MEASURES: 
9.9.1 Introduction: 
The 'normalised profitability' methodology aims at
taking into account external influences on mergers by
expressing each individual firm's profitability as a
proportion of the current year's mean profitability
observed in its own industry in aggregate. This is a
type of 'profitability index'. Profitability is taken as
a proxy for internal efficiency, and therefore observation
of the effect of mergers on this normalised profitability
is expected to give some indication of whether mergers
have improved efficiency.
9.9.2 The Approach: 
The empirical approach adopted is to isolate the
effect of acquisitions on profitability. There are three
steps in the methodology. First, for each merger, the
pre-merger profitability of the merging firms was
calculated in relation to the relevant industries'
profitability. The pre-merger reference period was taken
to be an average of two years. Second, post-merger
profitability was calculated for the amalgamation, again
in relation to the relevant industries' profitability.
Third, the difference in the pre-merger and post-merger
profitability of merging firms was averaged across the
firms and tested for statistical significance.
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9.9.3 Hypothesis: 
The main null hypotheses can be stated thus:
(a) Ho:	 There is no change in normalised
profitability as a result of merger:
The alternative hypothesis is:
H1:	 There is change in normalised
profitability as a result of merger
(b) Ho:	 The proportion of companies showing
increase in normalised
profitability . 0.50
The alternative hypothesis is:
H1:
	
The proportion of companies showing
increase in normalised
profitability is not equal to 0.50.
The sample of mergers eligible for inclusion was
reduced from forty-eight to thirty-five in the first year,
and thirty in the second year after acquisition. This was
because of the non-availability of either the ICC
industrial data or the Department of Trade equivalent
figures for 1984/85 onwards. These figures had not been
published at the time of writing.
The results obtained for the sample eligible for
inclusion appear in Table 9.14. A profitability index,
for a particular firm, of 1.0 would show that its return
on capital employed (profit before tax/average net assets)
(ROCE) was equal to the industry average ROCE. Row 1, for
example, shows that for the thirty-five mergers for which
a comparison could be made, the mean profitability index
THE CHANGE IN MEAN NORMALISED PROFITABILITY: ALL ACQUISITIONS:
Year	 N1	 Pre-Merger4	 Post-Merger
normalised	 normalised
profitability profitability
P5
T-value4
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was 1.02, i.e. on average the companies had ROCE measures 2% above
their respective industry ROCE. For the first year after merger,
this increased slightly to 1.04 (a 2% per cent increase). The
marked feature of these results is that the average relative
profitability of merging firms shows an improvement over the
pre-merger level for both post-merger years, although it is not
statistically significant. (Note also that the year of merger has
been excluded in all the analyses).
Table 9.14
t + 1 35 1.02 1.04 0.02 0.15 0.54
t + 2 30 1.07 1.18 0.11 0.66 0.47
Note 6 30 1.07 1.11 0.04 0.27 0.43
Notes: 1 N denotes number of companies
2. Average of two years pre-merger profitability
3. Difference between pre-and post- merger
profitability.
4 None of the differences is statistically different
from 0 when applying a two-tail t-test.
5. P denotes the proportion of firms which had an
increase in post-merger normalised profitability.
6. average of two years post-merger profitability.
315
The statistic P (column 7, Table 9.14) shows the proportion of
mergers showing an improvement, regardless of the actual magnitude
of the improvement. It indicates, for example, that for the first
year after merger, 46 per cent of the companies showed some decline
(P 0.54) and for the second year after merger 53 per cent were in
a similar position (P 0.47). Although, the majority of the firms
showed an increase in their post-merger profitability, the
proportion of firms showing an improvement in profitability was not
different from 0.50 at a reasonable level of statistical
significance. (The null hypothesis is that P 0.50, and the
standard binomial probability test is used)1.
1. The binominal test is constructed thus: For each pair of
merging firms, denote the difference (post-merger - pre-merger
performance) being positive as a 'success'.
Let n be the number of pairs of firms. Then if the null
hypothesis (that there is no change in firms' performance) is
true, the number of successes is a binomial variable, say x,
corresponding to independent trials for an experiment for which
the probability of success 0.5
The binomial distribution can be approximated by a normal
distribution, the approximation being accurate even for small
n. The test of the null hypothesis P (pb = 0.50 in this
case) is then based on the statistic
(x	 nPo) 
\inpb (1 - p0)
Since the binomial distribution is discrete, to set up a
correspondence between the set of binomial ordinates and the
areas under the normal curve, the standard correction was
applied (that is decrease the absolute value of x - np b by
0.50). Such a test not only has an obvious intuitive appeal,
but also possesses the advantage of being distribution free.
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An objection may be raised to the results presented
in Table 9.14. in that there may be aggregation bias
present as a result of aggregating the results of the
mergers irrespective of the size of the acquired company
in relation to the size of the acquiring company. It may
therefore be less appropriate to compare the combined
performance of the firm with the aggregate pre-merger
performance of the firms. This is because when the size
of the acquired firm is relatively disproportionate with
the size of the acquirer, the outcome of any post-merger
comparison may present a distorted figure as a result of
the likely insignificant 'contribution' of the acquired
firm to the performance of the combined firm.
Table 9.15
SIZE OF ACQUISITION: NET ASSETS EXPRESSED AS A PERCENTAGE
OF THE ACQUIRING COMPANIES NET ASSETS 
Net Assets of the Acquired
as a % of Net Assets of
the Acquirer
Number of Companies
10% 8
10 -	 20% 4
20 -	 30% 5
30 -	 40% 3
	
40% and above l	15
	
Total	 35
Notes: 1.	 In six cases, the net assets of the
acquired companies were greater than that of
the acquiring companies.
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To eliminate the potential bias, those mergers where the net
assets of the acquired firm were less than 10% of the acquirer's net
assets were excluded (see Table 9.15). This approach further
reduced the sample to twenty-seven for the first year and twenty-two
for the second year after merger. The results are presented in
Table 9.16.
The results show a similar pattern to those presented in Table
9.14. Based on that outcome, one may not argue convincingly that
the inclusion of 'insignificant' acquisitions seriously affected the
earlier results.
There are, however other distortions which are likely to be
encountered in the use of profitability measures as indicators of
average post-merger efficiency. These factors are discussed in
Section 9.11.
Table 9.16
THE CHANGE IN MEAN NORMALISED PROFITABILITY: ACQUISITIONS OVER 10% 
OF NET ASShTS OF THE ACQUIRED TO THE ACQUIRER 
Year	 N1	Pre,Merger2	 Post-Merger	 D3	 T-value4 P5
normalised	 normalised
profitability profitability
t + 1 27 1.02 1.06 0.04 0.21 0.59
t + 2 22 1.09 1.14 0.05 0.26 0.50
Note 6 22 1.09 1.11 0.02 0.08 0.45
notes as in Table 9.14.
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9.9.4 Comparison of Results with Meeks (1977):.
Meeks employed a similar methodology but obtained
different results. However, there are several differences
between this study and that of Meeks. In the Meeks study,
the pre-acquisition reference period was defined as 'the
average of three pre-merger years'. In this study, the
pre-acquisition reference period was defined as the
average of two pre-merger years. Although, Meeks
suggested (footnote 24 p.17) that the choice of
pre-acquisition reference period was unlikely to make much
difference, the effect, of the one year difference is
unclear.
The number of companies used in the Meeks study was
greater than in the present study. In his study, 211
acquiring companies were involved in the first year after
merger compared with 35 in this study. The outcome of the
present study may have been affected by the comparatively
small number of companies analysed.
Moreover, his study covered a nine year period, (1964
- 1972) while the present study covered only a five-year
period. During the period of the two studies, there have
been changes in the economic environment and also in the
financial reporting framework. This however, does not
suggest that acquisition has become more 'profitable' than
in the earlier days.
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In the next section, the post combination performance
of the acquiring companies are further analysed with a
view to ascertaining which of the two groups (SNF or SF)
performed' better.
9.10. NORMALISED PROFITABILITY INDEX: ACQUIRING COMPANIES 
'NON-FAILING GROUP' AND 'FAILING Group': 
9.10.1 Introduction: 
In Section 9.8. it was observed that the acquiring
companies suffered decline in their profitability after
the merger when profitability was measured using simple
accounting ratios. On closer examination, it was observed
that the SNF group suffered a greater decline than the SF
group. This result could imply that the SF group
performed' better than the SNF on acquisition. A similar
analysis using the normalised profitability measure was
carried out.
9.10.2 Formal Hypothesis: 
The main null hypothesis can be stated thus:
(a)	 Ho:	 There is no difference between the
normalised profitability of the
group acquiring others with
non-failing characteristics and
those with failing characteristics:
The alternative hypothesis is:
H1:	 There is difference between the
normalised profitability of the
group acquiring others with
non-failing characteristic and
those with failing characteristics.
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The second hypothesis is stated thus:
(b)	 Ho:	 There is no difference between the
proportion of companies showing an
increase in normalised
profitability in the two groups of
acquiring companies (i.e. SF and
SNF):
_
The alternative hypothesis is stated thus:
H1:	 There is significant difference
between the proportion of companies
showing an increase in normalised
profitability in the two groups of
acquiring companies (i.e. SF and
SNF).
Tables 9.17 and 9.18 present the performance of each
of the groups when the environmental effects are taken
into consideration. The thirty-five acquiring companies
reported in the previous section were split into two. Of
the 35, 22 companies fall into the SNF group and 13 into
the SF group.
In the second year after acquisition, the thirty
companies were split into nineteen for the SNF and eleven
for the SF. The reduction in the size of the sample is as
a result of unavailability of the ICC industrial data for
1984/85 onwards.
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Table 9.17
CHANGES IN MEAN NORMALISED PROFITABILITY OF ACQUIRERS: 
'NON-FAILING Group'
N1
 Pre-Merger2
	Post-Merger
	 D3	 P5
Year	 Normalised
	 Normalised	 T-value4
t + 1 22 1.26 1.07 -0.19 -1.14 0:45
t + 2 19 1.25 1.14 -0.11 -0.62 0.47
Note 6 19 1.25 1.10 -0.15 -0.84 0.36
Notes as in Table 9.14.
Table 9.18
CHANGES IN MEAN NORMALISED PROFITABILITY OF AOQUIRERS:
'FAILING GROUP' 
Year
Pre-merger2
	Post-merger	 D3	 P5
N1 Normalised	 Normalised
	 T-value4
Profitability
	 Profitability
t + 1 13 0.63 1.02 0.39 1.53 0.69
t + 2 11 0.77 1.25 0.48 1.54 0.45
Note 6 11 0.77 1.14 0.37 1.33 0 45
Notes as in Table 9.14.
The clear impression given by the results presented in Tables
9.17 and 9.13 is that on average, there was an increase in
industry-relative profitability following acquisition by the SF
group. In contrast, the results of SNF group, showed a decline
over the 2-year post-acquisition period. Whilst the observations
are not statistically significant, they nevertheless seem to be
persistent.
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However, the relative pre-merger profitability of
each of the groups, (see Column 3 of Tables 9.17 and 9.18)
shows that the SF group was performing below expectation
before the merger. This result is not too surprising,
given that the companies acquired were potentially failing
companies. (The pre-merger profitability in the Tables is
a combination of the weighted average profitability of the
two firms involved in the merger).
In the first year after acquisition, the proportion
of mergers for which the normalised post-merger
profitability was greater than the pre-merger value was
0.69 for the SF group and 0.45 for the SNF group. Using a
binomial test, the difference was found not to be
statistically significant. In the second year, the values
were 0.45 for the SF group and 0.47 for the SNF (the
extra-ordinary result for the SF group in the second year
is accounted by 'outliers'). Although, the differences
were not statistically significant, they were persistent.
Table 9.19 shows the difference between the changes
incurred by the two groups of acquiring companies as a
result of their acquisitions. The results indicate
significant differences between the nature of changes
incurred by the groups.
0.39 -0.19 0.58 1.90 0.03**
0.48 -0.11 0.59 1.64 0.06
0.37 -0.15 0.52 1.57 0.07
t + 1
t + 2
Note 1
Notes: 1. average of two years post-merger profitability.
** statistically different from 0 at 5% level.
Table 9.20 and 9.21 show the outcome of each of the individual
group of mergers after those acquisitions where the relative size of the
acquired company was small (less than 10%) have been excluded. This
approach further reduced the sample size.
Table 9.20
CHANGES IN MEAN NORMALISED PROFITABILITY FOR ACQUISITIONS OVER 
10%: 'NON-FAILING GROUP'
Pre-merger2
	
Post-merger	 D3	 P5
Ni Normalised	 Normalised	 T-value4
Profitability	 Profitability
Year
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Table 9.19
DIFFERENCES IN MEAN NORMALISED PROFITABILITY BE1WEEN THE 700 GROUPS OF 
ACQUIRERS: 
Year
	 SF	 SNF	 Difference
	
T-value	 Sig
Level
t + 1 17 1.31 1.03 -0.28 -1.37 0.47
t + 2 14 1.31 1.07 -0.24 -1.31 0.42
Note 6 14 1.317 1.05 -0.26 -1.28 0 35
Notes as in Table 9.14.
7. The apparent coincidence of the pre-merger normalised
profitability is noted.
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Table 9.21
CHANGTS IN MEAN NORMALISED PROFITABILITY FOR ACQUISITIONS ABOVE
10%: 'FAILING GROUP'
Pre-merger	 Post-merger
Year	 N1 Normalised
	 Normalised
Profitability
	 Profitability
T-value4
t + 1 10 0.53 1.11 0.58 1.88 0.80
t + 2 08 0.70 1.26 0.56 1.36 0.63
Note 6 08 0.70 1.21 0.51 1.38 063
Notes as in Table 9.14.
Table 9.22 presents the difference between the changes incurred by
each of the two groups using two-sample t test.
Table 9.22
DIFFERENCES IN MEAN NORMALIShp PROFITABILITY BtAWEEN THE TWO GROUPS 
OF ACQUIRERS: 
Year
	 SF	 SNF	 Difference	 T-value	 Sig
Level
t + 1 0.58 -0.28 0.86 2.32 0.01*
t+ 2 0.56 -0.24 0.80 1.77 0.06
t + 33 0.51
-0.26 0.77 1.83 0.05**
Notes as in Table 9.19
* statistically different from 0 at 1% level
** statistically different from 0 at 5% level.
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The evidence presented in Tables 9.20-9.22 is
consistent with the conclusion reached when all
acquisitions were considered that the group which acquired
failing companies 'performed' better than the other
group. When only material acquisitions were considered
the differential performance is of greater magnitude and
of greater statistical significance.
It is to be recalled that in Section 9.8, it was
observed that the group acquiring failing companies
suffered a lesser decline in profitability than the other
group. In this section, however, it was observed that the
group acquiring failing cothpanies showed an improvement in
their post-merger profitability. The implication of the
findings of the two sections, is that the group acquiring
failing companies exhibited a 'superior' performance over
the other group.
While this outcome is interesting, it is also
important to examine whether the type of merger has any
influence on the results. This enquiry is necessary
because a considerable majority of the acquisitions of
failing companies were horizontal in contrast to the
acquisitions of non-failing companies (see Table 9.23).
This might suggest that horizontal mergers seem to be more
successful than others.
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In order to test the impact of type of merger on the
performance of the acquirers, each type of acquisition was
grouped irrespective of the financial characteristics of
the acquired company. By such a process, 20 companies
were readily classified as horizontal and 15 as
non-horizontall.
Tables 9.24 and 9.25 present the individual results
of each of the groups. In Table 9.24, for example, the
horizontal mergers achieved a 12 percent increase over
their pre-merger normalised profitability level.
Conversely, Table 9.25 shows that the non-horizontal
mergers sustained a 10% decline in their profitability in
the first year after the acquisition.
Table 9.23
CLASSIFICATION OF ACQUISITIONS BY TYPE OF MERGER 
Predicted
	
Type of Acquisition	 Total
Group
Horizontal	 Non-Horizontal
Failing	 11	 2	 13
Non-Failing	 9	 13	 22
Total	 20	 15	 35
1. The difficulties in classifying companies
accurately according to the type of merger should be
noted. However, the procedure adopted here follows
Cosh et al (1980) - mergers are classified as either
horizontal or non-horizontal.
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Table 9.24
ANALYSIS OF MEAN NORMALISED PROFITABILITY
BY TYPE OF MERGER: HORIZONTAL MERGERS 
Year N1
Pre-merger2
	 Post-merger	 D3
Normalised	 Normalised
Profitability	 Profitability
T-value4
P5
t + 1 20 0.99	 1.11	 0.12 0.56 0.50
t + 2 16 0.95	 1.07
	
0.12 0.59 0.50
Notes as in Table 9.14.
Table 9.25
ANALYSIS OF MEAN NORMALISED PROFITABILITY
BY TYPE OF MERGER:	 NON-HORIZONTAL MERGERS
Pre -merger2
	Post-merger P5
Year N1 Normalised	 Normalised T-value4
Profitability	 Profitability
t + 1 15 1.23	 1.13	 -0.10 -0.47 0.40
t + 2 14 1.21	 1.30
	
0.09 0.35 0.57
Notes as in Table 9.14.
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However, a different picture emerged in the second
year after the mergers. While the horizontal group seemed
to have maintained the increase of the post-merger
profitability, the non-horizontal turned the decline
incurred in the first year to a 9% increase in the second
year.
The result of the first year after merger is in the
direction that theory would suggest, that is the relative
ease with which the operations of the two firms could be
integrated. This may be as a result of a common
managerial experience, in both the inputs and outputs
markets. In the second year, it might be argued that the
management of non-horizontal mergers tend to have overcome
the initial adjustments in integrating the combined
operations of the two groups.
The implication of the above is that the group
acquiring failing companies did not necessarily perform
better than the other group because of the financial
characteristics of the company acquired. Part of the
relatively good performance of the SF group might easily
be ascribed to the preponderence of horizontal mergers in
this group.
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The foregoing findings also have empirical support.
For example, Kitching (1967) suggested that success in
' mergers depended on four key factors l . The first is the
existence of 'managers of change', being managers who
could handle the immediate and transitional consequences
of the merger. Secondly, the post-merger organization of
the company, with a senior executive to manage the newly
acquired company, and, in particular to ensure that the
management information and control systems of the two
companies are compatible and that good lines of
communication exist. These two factors are more likely to
be achieved quickly with horizontal than with
non-horizontal mergers, hence the 'superior' performance
of the former in the first year after the acquisition.
However, in order to examine the extent in which the
horizontal acquisitions might have influenced the
performance of the SF group, all horizontal acquirers were
split into SNF and SF groups (see Table 9.23), and a
comparison of their performances are presented in Tables
9.26 and 9.27.
1. The third factor is that merger must be part of an
overall strategic plan rather than the consequence of
an opportunist reaction and fourthly, there must be a
careful analysis of the future needs of the merged
company, especially regarding financial resources.
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Table 9.26
ANALYSIS OF MEAN NORMALISED PROFITABILITY
HORIZONTAL ACQUIRERS: FA=ING GROUP (SF) 
Year N1
Pre-merger2	Post-merger	 D3
Normalised	 Normalised
Profitability	 Profitability
T-value4
P5
t + 1 11 0.59	 0.91	 0.32 1.12 0.64
t + 2 9 0.76	 1.05	 0.29 1.11 0.56
Notes as in Table 9.14.
Table 9.27
ANALYSIS OF MEAN NORMALISED PROFITABILITY
HORIZONTAL ACQUIRERS: NON-FAILING GROUP
Pre-merger2	Post-merger	 123 P5
Year N1 Normalised	 Normalised T-value4
Profitability	 Profitability
t + 1 9 1.21	 1.08	 -0.13 -0.39 0.33
t + 2 7 1.19	 1.09
	 -0.10 -0.33 0.43
Notes as in Table 9.14.
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The results in Tables 9.26 and 9.27 show that the SF
horizontal acquirers performed better than their SNF
counterpart. In both years, the SF group experienced an
increase in their pre-merger normalised profitability,
while the SNF group incurred a decline in both years.
Although the change incurred by each of the groups is not
statistically significant (perhaps due to small sample),
there is strong evidence to support the superior
performance of the acquirers of failing companies
generally.
However, before further inference could be made on
the outcome of the normalised profitability measures, the
factors likely to distort the results should be
discussed. These factors are discussed below.
9.11 BIAS AND DISTORTIONS WHICH AFFECT PROFITABILITY 
MEASURES WHEN USED AS INDICATORS OF AVERAGE 
POST-MERGER EFFICIENCY:
9.11.1 Introduction: 
Meeks and Meeks (1981) discussed three elements of
distortion which can affect the normalised profitability
measure used in the present study. They are (a) change in
bargaining power (b) accounting in year of merger and (c)
goodwill arising on merger. The first two elements lead
to upward bias in the post-merger profitability, while the
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third leads to an underestimate of the profitability.
These elements are discussed below.
9.11.2 Change in Bargaining Power: 
It has been argued (Meeks (1980), Hannah and Kay
(1977) and Singh (1971)) that merger, on average, enhances
the bargaining power of the participants and consequently
an increase in post-merger profitability may not be
synonymous with an increase' in efficiency. Therefore,
because of the problem of disentangling the effect on
profit of efficiency changes from that of changes in
bargaining power, the post-merger profitability is viewed
as possessing an upward bias element.
However, Meeks and Meeks (1981) suggested that in
order to mitigate the effect of changes in bargaining
power, one could attempt to adjust for changes in input
and output prices associated with the merger. However,
they conceded that even where such data can be obtained,
"it is a very costly exercise normally feasible only for
small samples and in any case subject to various
qualifications". In view of the problems associated with
disentangling the 'bargaining power element', no attempt
was made in the present study for the suggested
adjustment. Therefore, the post-merger normalised
profitability figures presented in the present study
should be interpreted with the upwards bias element in
mind.
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9.11.3 Accounting in the Year of Merger: 
A second possible upward bias in the post-merger
profitability arises in accounting for the year of merger
as a result of the accounting convention adopted.
According to Meeks's (1977) equation, if the two companies
involved in the merger drew up independent accounts for
the year of merger and then pool them, the following
expression for their weighted average rate of return would
be obtained:
rm*y = P +	 Pgy	 vy
1/2(Aq( /71) 4.
 Av(y1) + Am,. + Avy ) 	  (1)
	Where A:	 Net Assets
	
m:	 amalgamation
	
P:	 Profit
	
q:	 Acquirer
	
t:	 proportion of the merger year
for which the victim has
contributed to the amalgamation's
profit
	
v:	 Victim
	
Y :	year of merger.
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i.e. twelve months' profit flow for each of the firms
divided by the average net assets for the two firms
together. The approach implies that the same term for
both the acquired and acquirer is included in the actual
profitability formula for the amalgamation. However,
since the acquired company was not part of the
amalgamation at the beginning of the year, its opening net
assets do not appear in the denominator whilst in the
numerator there appears on the acquired's side, the profit
for the number of months', the victim has belonged to the
group.
Meeks and Meeks argue that if t is the proportion of
the year for which the acquired has contributed to the
amalgamation's profit, then the profitability measure
derived from the acquirer's accounts could be stated thus:
+clY
	
tP vy
1/2(Aq
	 (Agy	 Avy )) ...(2)
rmy
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The issue is whether rmy (equation 2) can represent
rm*y (equation 1). There is however, no reason to believe
that rmy is unbiased in view of the imposition of t, which
may take on any value from 0 to 1. The significance of t
can be noticed, if for example, the merger took place at
the beginning of the holding company's financial year -(in
_this case, t	 m.171), then rmy would exceed r * (the
numerator for the two measures being the same, but the
denominator of rmy being smaller by 1/2 Av(y-1)•
Meeks and Meeks (1981) also pointed out that in the
opposite direction where the merger occurs at the very end
of the acquirer's financial year (t 	 0), rmy will
similarly fall short of rm*y. They further argued that
even where mergers are distributed over a series of years
so that average t 	 0.50, the equality of rmy and rm*y may
not be achieved. They stated thus:
.. whenever t is less than 1, the outcome will
depend not only on t but also on the specific
values of profit and net asset figures and no
general conclusion can be drawn" p.340
It therefore appears that the inclusion of the year
of merger in the analysis will not only present an upward
bias in the post-merger profitability but also an
ambiguous result.
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Meeks and Meeks (1981) suggested that the bias
element of the year of merger can be avoided by adjusting
each amalgamation's profitability for the merger year,
using information from the accounts on the timing of
merger to remove any distortion. However, they
acknowledged that the clerical effort would be very high
for a sizeable sample, and suggested that it can perhaps
be bypassed by isolating the figures for the year of
merger itself and concentrating on the subsequent record
(with years of any further merger excluded). In order to
avoid any ambiguities in the interpretation of the results
of the present study, the year of merger was excluded in
all the analyses.
9.11.4 Goodwill Arising on Merger: 
Goodwill arising on merger can lead to a downward bias
in post-merger profitability relative to a pre-merger
level. The bias arises because in an inflationary
environment, the book value of companies' assets, based on
historic cost accounting, usually understates their
realisation value. In most cases, when a company is
acquired, the acquiring company pays more than its book
value. It may then enter the acquired company in its
books at a value exceeding that in the acquired's books
before the merger (since it must include them at their
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'fair value', according to SSAP 14, when adopting the
acquisition accounting method of consolidation). The
excess is in most cases recorded in the acquirer's balance
sheet as 'goodwill' 1 , the acquired firm's assets are then
added to the other elements of the balance sheet at
historic cost.
The effect of the revaluation is that the
profitability of the amalgamated group will be lower than
the weighted average profitability for the separate
companies would have been in the absence of merger. This
is so because a larger denominator (incorporating
goodwill) is used in calculating profitability.
1. There are many factors which may explain why
goodwill arises. Examples are a skilled management
team, good labour relations and a strategic
location. These factors are intangible and it is
difficult to place a money value on them. For this
reason, it is not usual to show goodwill as an asset
in the balance sheet; any amount at which it was
valued would be arbitrary and subject to fluctuations.
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In practice, some companies write-off 'goodwill'
immediately against reserves (i.e. against retained
reserves brought forward, not as a charge in the current
years profit and loss account). Equally , some companies
capitalise goodwill and amortise over its estimated useful
life, hence profit would be reduced as well as assets
increased (much lower return on assets values). These two
methods are recommended by SSAP 22 'Accounting for
Goodwill'. The first method has been the common practice
prior to the imposition of SSAP and majority of the
companies during the period of the present stidy adopted
the approach.
However, Meeks (1977) developed a procedure for
estimating the goodwill arising on consolidation. His
calculations showed it to be on average around a third of
the book value of the acquired firms for mergers during
1964-71. It was found to be generally stable across the
years, so that any bias which it produces in profitability
measures is unlikely to vary greatly between mergers
undertaken in different years. By subtracting goodwill
from the assets of the amalgamation, Meeks obtained the
effect on profitability of the goodwill increment. Based
on his estimates, in the year of acquisition, adjusted
profitability (with goodwill removed from the denominator)
was on average between 1% and 3.5% higher than unadjusted
profitability. In the subsequent year, however, it was
higher by between 1.3% and 5.5%.
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Although, the majority of the companies in the
present study wrote-off goodwill immediately against
retained reserves brought forward, it does seem that the
observed increase in profitability may have been
understated because of the treatment of goodwill.
9.12 IS CHANGE IN PROFITABILITY TANTAMOUNT TO CHANGE IN 
EFFICIENCY? 
As stated earlier, the normalised profitability is
used in the present section as a proxy for internal
efficiency. The question is whether profitability is an
adequate surrogate for efficiency. Profitability has been
used in the free-market economy as a performance index for
particular companies. As Meeks (1977) puts it, "an
improvement in the efficiency of a firm (defined, say, as
a reduction in the resources actually used to produce a
given output) will be sufficient for an improvement in
profitability".
However, it can be argued that in an environment of
imperfect competition (that which is obtained in real
life), improvement in profitability, for example, is not a
necessary condition for an improvement in efficiency. The
improvement in profitability may arise from improved
market power, so that an increase in efficiency cannot be
inferred from an increase in profitability alone (Hughes,
1978).
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Meeks (1977) suggested, however, that in some cases,
it may be possible to infer changes in efficiency from
changes in profitability. For example, if the bargaining
power is unchanged as a result of merger, then the other
influences on profitability change, change in efficiency
will determine whether profitability rises, falls or
remains unchanged. With constant bargaining power, a
decline in profitability would imply a decline in a firm's
efficiency.
However, the assumption of constant bargaining power
in a competitive environment is unrealistic. A more
plausible assumption that has been made (Hannay and Kay
(1977) and Singh (1971)) is that bargaining power is
enhanced as a result of merger. Therefore, in such a
setting, a decline in efficiency may be inferred not just
from reduced but also from constant profitability, whilst
even an increase in profitability would present an
ambiguous implication for efficiency.
Several sources of gains arising from increased
bargaining power could be identified. Gains may occur in
the capital market and in the market for inputs as well as
in product markets. As discussed in Chapter 3, a merger
may lead to easier, and cheaper availablility of funds,
and similarly, the supply of material inputs may be more
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certain and may be obtained at a discount. The foregoing
sources of gains suggest that the power of the firm in the
various markets in which it operates may indeed be
enhanced by merger, and consequently if profitability
remains constant after merger or even increases, it could
still be compatiable with a decline in efficiency.
	 As
Meeks and Meeks (1981) further explained:
n ...if, however, merging firms record a fall in
profitabilit, or even simply no change, one
could conclude that, with bargaining power on
average enhanced, efficiency had declined.
'Even in this case, of course, an estimate based
on profitability of the size of the decline
will be biased upwards" p 335.
In view of the foregoing discussion, one is placed in
a quandary as to what level of profitability improvement
could be interpreted as an improvement in efficiency,
since an increase in profitability may well be compatible
with a decline in efficiency.
In the absence of any guidelines, it is reasonable to
argue that for an improvement in profitability to be
interpreted as an improvement in efficiency, the size of
the improvement must be very substantial. Based on this
premise, it is concluded that the slight increment in the
normalised profitability shown by acquiring companies in
the present study indicates no improvement in efficiency.
This is because the size of the reported increment is
small and not statistically significant.
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9.13 Summary and Conclusion:
In the preceding sections, profitability or
profit-related variables have been employed to assess the
post-acquisition performance of the acquiring companies.
It has to be emphasised that although in both sections, a
similar profitability variable was used, the emphasis of
the variable is not the same. The non-normalised
profitability measures used in Section 9.8 seek to
determine the impact of acquisition on the return to the
shareholders. While, the normalised measures in Section
9.9 seek to measure the internal efficiency of the firm in
combining the individual operations of the to merged
firms. Because both measures are not measuring the same
thing, they may present different answers. However,
results of the two sections are reconciliable.
The variables used in the previous sections, though
useful, may not be the only measures of merger success.
As has been pointed out, there are a number of
motivational factors which would influence the outcome of
post-acquisition profitability. Therefore, profitability
as a single measurement unit may be unable to capture
other aspects of success or otherwise of acquisition. In
the next section, a methodology which may capture several
dimensions of a company's viability is employed to test
the hypothesis of no apparent difference.
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9.14 THE PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS SCORE (PAS) PARADIGM: 
9.14.1 Introduction: 
As was pointed out in Chapter 6, the performance
analysis score (PAS) seeks to measure the relative
strength by ranking company 'Z-scores'. The Z-score
measures several important dimensions of a company and has
been shown to possess a bankruptcy predictive ability.
Unlike the profitability variables, a bankruptcy
prediction model takes into consideration several aspects
of a company's viability, notably, profitability,
liquidity, gearing and activity. It can therefore be
argued that the higher a company is on the PAS scale, the
farther away is the company from the risk of bankruptcy.
For example, a company with a PAS-score of 60 has a lower
risk of bankruptcy than a company with a score of 40.
One of the reasons often advocated for merger is
diversification. It could be argued that, through
diversification, a company reduces 'risk', (including
bankruptcy risk). It is therefore hypothesized in the
present study that a measurement of risk reduction is the
enhancement of relative PAS-score. The PAS-score is
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therefore used to test this aspect of the post-acquisition
performance of the acquiring companies.
9.14.2 Formal Hypothesis: 
(a) Ho:	 There is no significant difference
between the post-acquisition and
pre-acquisition performance of the
acquiring companies when performance is
measured by the PAS-score.
H1:	 There is significant difference between
the post-acquisition and pre-acquisition
performance of the acquiring companies
when performance is measured by the
PAS-score
Again, the need to control for industry and other
environmental factors requires comparison with the control
group of matched non-acquiring companies. This leads to a
second null hypothesis:
(b) Ho:	 There is no significant difference
between the performance of acquiring and
non-acquiring companies when performance
is measured by the PAS-score:
H1:	 There is significant difference between
the performance of acquiring and
non-acquiring companies when performance
is measured by the PAS-score.
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9.14.3 Discussion of Results: 
The results in Table 9.28 indicate that the PAS-score
for the acquiring companies declined on acquisition. The
decline is consistent for the first and second years after
acquisition and is statistically significant. This result
is in conformity with that obtained when
profitability-related variables were employed in the
previous sections. A more meaningful interpretation can
be given when the results are compared with those of the
non-acquiring group. The results of the non-acquiring
group indicate a slight increase in their relative
PAS-score in both years. There was no significant
difference in the pre-merger PAS-score of acquiring and
non-acquiring companies, indicating that neither of the
two groups was a 'superior' performer. However, the
difference between the post-merger PAS-score of the two
groups is statistically significant.
This lends weight to the argument that acquiring
companies are generally no weaker/stronger than
non-acquiring companies which tends to negate the merger
as an alternative to bankruptcy' hypothesis as far as ,
acquirers are concerned since a lower pre-acquisition PAS
score for acquirers would be expected.
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Table 9.28
PRE-MERGER AND POST-MERGLR PAS-SCORE 
FOR ACQUIRING AND NON-ACQUIRING COMPANIES 
1-YEAR	 1-YEAR	 2-YEAR
PAS-SCORE
	
PAS-SCORE	 PAS-SCORE
PRE-ivERGat	 POST-1ERGER	 POST-I.,=GER
Acquiring 
Companies: 
Mean PAS-Score 57.72 49.09 49.50
Std. deviation 21.34 24.23 23.39
No. of Companies 45 45 45
t-statisticl -3.06* -2.89*
Non-Acquiring
Companies:
Mean PAS-Score 60.43 61.81 61.09
Std. deviation 26.23 22.85 24.13
No of Companies 45 45 45
t-statisticl 0.73 0.25
t-statistic2 -0.55 -2.60** -2.35**
* statistically different from 0 at 1% level
**statistically different from 0 at 5% level.
Notes: 1. The t-statistic on the difference between pre-merger
PAS-score and the one and two-year post-merger
PAS-scores.
2. A two-sample-t test on the difference between the
changes in the PAS-score of acquiring and non-acquiring
group.
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In addition, if diversification may be defined in
terms of reduction of risk and may be measured by PAS, the
acquiring companies failed to achieve it. On average,
acquiring companies have significantly lower PAS scores
post-acquisition, and seem to have an increased risk of
bankruptcy. Although, the non-acquiring companies did not
increase their PAS-scores significantly, neither, did they
suffer decline.
Following the outcome of the PAS-score test, there is
compelling evidence to reject the null hypothesis that
there is no significant difference between the pre- and
post-merger performance of the acquiring companies, and
similarly between acquiring and non-acquiring companies.
In the next section, the hypothesis of no apparent
difference between the two groups of acquiring companies
is tested.
9.15 PAS-SCORES - COMPARISON BETWEEN ACQUIRERS: 
'NON-FAILING GROUP' 
(SNF) AND 'FAILING-GROUP' (SF): 
9.15.1 Introduction: 
In the previous sections, using profit and normalised
profitability measures, it was observed that the group
acquiring others with failing characteristics performed
better than the group acquiring others with non-failing
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characteristics.	 It was also observed that generally,
acquiring companies suffered decline in their PAS-scores,
implying an increase in bankruptcy risk. However, it is
unknown whether the deterioration in the PAS-scores is as
a result of acquiring potentially failing companies with
apparently weak PAS-scores. The purpose of this section
is to examine how the decline in the PAS-scores of the
acquiring companies was distributed. In other words,
whether or not by acquiring a potentially weak company, a
company increases its own bankruptcy risk.
9.15.2 Formal Hypothesis: 
Ho:	 There is no significant difference
between the performance of the group
acquiring others with 'non-failing'
characteristics and those with 'failing'
characteristics, when performance is
measured by PAS-score:
H1:	 There is significant difference between
the performance of the group acquiring
others with 'non-failing' characteristics
and those with 'failing' characteristics,
when performance is measured by PAS-score.
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9.15.3 Discussion of Results: 
Table 9.29 show the results for the two groups. Both groups
experienced decline in their PAS-score as has already been noted in
Section 9.14. Of more importance is how the level of decline is
apportioned between the two groups of acquiring companies.
Table 9.29
PRE-MERGER AND POST-MERGER PAS-SCORES FOR 
ACQUIRERS:
I-YEAR PAS-SCORE
PPE -MERGER
1-YEAR PAS-SCORE
POST-MERGER
2-YEAR PAS-SCORE
POST-DIERC.4ER
Non-Failing
Group:
Lean PAS-Score 55.96 52.36 52.84
Std Deviation 22.84 22.61 22.09
No of Companies 24 24 24
t-statistic l -1.03 -0.87
Failing Group
Mean PAS-score 59.81 45.19 45.52
Std Deviation 19.77 26.04 24.79
No of Companies 21 21 21
t-statisticl
	-3.40*
	 -3.37*
Notes as in Table 9.28
*statistically different from 0 at 1% level.
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Table 9.30 shows that the SF companies experienced
greater decline in PAS score than the SNF group, and the
difference is statistically significant. This result
might, at first, appear to be inconsistent with the
conclusion that SF group performed better than SNF, which
was reached in Sections 9.8 and 9.10, where profitability
and similar measures were employed. However, the apparent
discrepancy is not too surprising. Certainly, SF appeared
to suffer a smaller decline in profitability
post-acquisition than SNF but a significant rise in
gearing was also noted for SF. The PAS-score measure,
based on Z-scores, includes elements of profitability,
gearing and other financial facets of a company. It is
not unreasonable to argue that a "less poor" profitability
performance coupled with increased gearing might well lead
to a greater risk of bankruptcy and consequently a lower
PAS-score.
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Table 9.30.
CHANGES IN PAS-SCORES 
FOR ACQUIRERS: (NON-FAILING AND FAILING GRO(JP) 
One Year Post-
Merger changes in
PAS-Scores
NO of
companies
Two-year post-
merger changes in
PAS-Scores
Acquiring Companies:
Non-Failing Group -3 6 24 -3.1
Failing Group -14.6 21 -14.3
t-statisticl 1.99** 2.01**
**statistically different from 0 at 5% level.
1. Notes as in Table 9.28.
The foregoing evidence indicates that a higher proportion of the
decline in the PAS-score of the acquiring companies can be attributed
to the SF group than the SNF group. However, even the SNF group
suffered a decline in PAS-score post-acquisition. We can therefore
conclude that acquisition, whether the target-company was ootentiallv
failing or not, reduces the PAS-score of the acquirer, at least in the
short period after the acquisition. This conclusion to some extent
reinforces the belief held by the 'managerial' theories of merger that
acquisition leads to no 'obvious' benefit to the acquiring companies.
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9.16 Summary and Conclusion: 
The purpose of this chapter was to examine the
post-acquisition performance of the acquiring companies.
Three different performance measures were used; (a) simple
profitability and ratio measures; (b) normalised
profitability measures and (c) performance analysis scores
(PAS-scores). The profitability measures indicated that
on average acquiring companies suffered a decline in their
profitability-related variables subsequent to
acquisition. This result is in conformity with previous
studies which have indicated that acquisitions do not
improve profitability. However, the normalised
profitability measure which seeks to measure the internal
efficiency of the combined firm showed a slight increase
over the pre-merger level. In view of the inherent
upwards bais as a result of changes in the bargaining
power of the merged firms, this slight increase in the
profitability should not necessarily be interpreted as an
improvement in the efficiency of the acquiring companies.
An alternative methodology (PAS-score) was employed
to measure the relative strength of the acquiring
companies. The PAS-score paradigm takes into
consideration the general environmental influences and it
was considered an adequate surrogate to measure the risk
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reduction of the acquiring companies. Unlike the
profitability measures, it takes account of other
dimensions of a company. The PAS-score tests showed that
the performance of the acquiring companies declined. The
decline was also evidenced by a comparison of the
performance of non-acquiring companies. The result does
indicate that if risk reduction as measured by the
PAS-score, was the major objective of the acquirers, it
was not achieved.
The approach adopted in chapter eight, was to split
the acquiring companies into two groups based on the
financial characteristics of the acquired companies. In
the present chapter, the financial performance of the two
sets of acquiring companies was compared using the three
methodologies already stated. The results obtained by the
profitability measures indicated that although, in
general, acquiring firms suffered decline in profitability
subsequent to acquisition, the set acquiring non-failing
companies suffered a greater degree of decline. Even
where the 'normalised' profitability method showed that
acquiring companies, as a whole, experienced a slight
increase in their profitability, the group acquiring
non-failing companies was shown to have exhibited a
decline in its profitability. 	 One can therefore conclude
that the group acquiring failing companies seemed to
"performed" better than the group acquiring non-failing
companies.
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The PAS-score paradigm on the other hand, showed a
general decline in the PAS-score of acquiring companies,
as a whole.	 On the issue of which of the two groups
performed better, the results indicated that the group
acquiring failing companies suffered a greater decline in
its PAS-scores. It is, however, to be noted that the
group acquiring failing companies increased its gearing
significantly, which probably has affected its post-merger
PAS-score. This outcome is however to be expected. As
has been pointed out, the PAS-score measures the
'bankruptcy risk' of a company. It is fair to assume that
the acquired companies with failing characteristics
possess 'low' PAS-scores. Therefore any company acquiring
them might be expected to dilute its pre-acquisition
PAS-score, especially in the short-run (as was the case in
this study). Whether the PAS-scores improve in the
long-run would require further research using much larger
samples.
On the general issue of which of the acquiring sets
of companies renders a 'social' service to the community,
evidence from this study suggests that the set acquiring
failing companies does that. This is because by acquiring
potentially failing com panies, they have avoided both the
indirect and direct costs of bankruptcy. As was discussed
in chapter 4, although both the direct and indirect costs
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of bankruptcy are difficult to quantify, it can be assumed
that the impact of corporate bankruptcy on society is
significant. Therefore, any group, individual or
organization that prevents corporate failure, even
possible at the expense of a decline in profitability does
a great service to the society in general. Evidence from
this study suggests that the group acquiring failing
companies (SF) avoids the bankruptcy and at the same time
improves the pre-merger profitability position of the
separate companies operating individually.
The overall conclusion of the current study and
consideration of the possible avenues for future research
is presented in the next, and final, chapter.
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CHAPTER TEN
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
10.1 Introduction: 
The major implications of this study concern the
failure company doctrine for companies involved in mergers
and the post-acquistion performance of the acquiring
companies. This chapter briefly summarizes the study,
examines the implications, discusses its limitations and
suggests areas for future research.
10.2 Model Development:
Financial ratio analysis formed the basis of the
present study. To further the understanding of the
state-of-the-art of financial ratio analysis, the
literature that represents the history of progress in this
field was reviewed. In order to share with readers some
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perceptions that resulted from careful study of materials
previously published on the subject, the reviewed
literature was evaluated.
The financial data analyzed in the study were those
of medium to large companies quoted on the London Stock
Exchange between 1978 and 1984. The study analyzed
financial statements of over 550 companies engaged in
manufacturing, wholesaling and retailing.
•
10.3 Multivariate Discriminant Analysis (MDA):
MDA forms a major analytic technique in deriving a
bankruptcy prediction model. Results of the analysis
indicate that MDA can be applied to financial ratios to
determine their association with business outcome and
these associations provided a basis for classifying
companies as failed or non-failed. When the MDA model
developed was tested on the companies from which it was
derived, it achieved an accuracy rate of 96.7%. This
accuracy rate is favourably biased, and strongly so, by
the intensive search inherent in the analysis. However,
the unbiased result achieved in classifying members of the
holdout sample indicated that the analytical method was
effective. The 89.9% success rate was substantially
higher than the rate expected by chance and was similar to
that achieved in other studies.
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10.4 Financial Ratios: 
The success rate achieved by the analysis attests to
the effectiveness of the analytical model and is a
favourable factor in the argument for the usefulness of
financial ratios as predictors of business failure.	 Once
results are interpreted to be successful, it follows not
only that an effective means of analyzing data has been
used but also that the data analyzed contain information
that is worthy of analysis. The present study therefore
strongly suggests, as have other studies of this nature,
that financial ratios possess predictive ability of
business outcome.
10.5 Failing Company Hypothesis: The Acquired Companies: 
One of the objectives of the present study was to
determine whether the "failing company hypothesis"
rationale for mergers has any validity. The bankruptcy
prediction model was applied to a group of acquired and
non-acquired companies. The results indicated that a
higher proportion of acquired companies possessed
financial characteristics similar to previous failed
companies than the sample of non-acquired. The null
hypothesis that there was no significant difference
between the proportion of firms possessing 'failing'
characteristics in the set of acquired and non-acquired
companies was strongly rejected.
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The findings support previous empirical studies that
have sought to test the failing company hypothesis for
acquired firms (e.g. Shrieves and Stevens, 1979; Taffler
and Soper, 1983)). These empirical findings support the
theoretical arguments that have been put forward that some
acquisitions are 'merely a civilized alternative to
bankruptcy....' (Dawey 1961), and Marris (1964))
The findings of the present study and previous
studies raise a further policy issue. If some
acquisitions are an alternative to bankruptcy, why do
management of the acquiring companies want to acquire
failing companies at high premiums? Two reasons have
been offered in this direction. Firstly, Marris (1964)
suggested that acquisition is a spring-board for growth
maximizing by a firm and by growth a firm 'insulates'
itself from a takeover threat% Secondly, Weston and
Mansinghka (1971) (and to a lesser extent, Lynch (1971)
and Rush and Melicher (1974)) provided evidence that some
acquiring companies adopt a 'defensive' acquisition
strategy in order to avoid their own impending bankruptcy,
(a "failing-company hypothesis" for the acquiring
companies). This second version of the failing company
hypothesis formed a second objective of the present study.
10.6 The Failing Company Hypothesis: The Acquiring 
Company: 
The bankruptcy prediction model generated was applied
to the group of acquiring companies to determine if the
proportion possessing failing characteristics was higher
than in the group of non-acquiring companies. The
evidence obtained indicated that there was no difference
in the two groups of companies.	 There is therefore no
evidence in the present study to support the Weston and
Mansinghka conclusion.
The outcome of this study is not surprising given the
nature of modern corporate takeover 'battles'. Because
modern takeover battles are often protracted and
acrimonious, it is perhaps less likely that a potential
acquirer in a weak financial position can make a
successful acquisition. The target's 'Defence Document'
has been an avenue to launch an attack on the bidder's
management as well as on their performance record.
1. Recently, Levine and Aaronovitch (1981)
have argued that size is a strategic element in
both making acquisitions and in avoiding being
acquired. "...within this framework mergers
are primarily strategic decisions"..p.151.
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10.7 Post Acquisition Performance of Acquiring Companies:
In chapter 3, two predominant merger motives were
discussed. The neoclassical theory states that firms will
engage in takeovers if this venture leads to an increase
in wealth for the shareholders of the acquiring company.
The managerial theory upholds the view that management
will seek to maximize its own utility whether or not this
is consistent with the maximization of shareholder
wealth. Following from these merger motives, it is
expected that any attempt to measure pre- and post-merger
performance of the acquiring companies could give an
indication to which of the merger motives tends to be
predominant. The measurement of post-acquisition
performance of the acquiring companies formed the third
objective of the present study.
Three different measurement criteria were employed:
simple financial ratios, normalised profitability measures
and performance analysis scores. 	 The simple ratio
criteria indicated that on average the profitability
variables of acquiring companies in general declined one
and two years after the acquisition. The results were
compared with those obtained for a control group of
non-acquiring companies and showed that the difference
between the performance of acquiring and non-acquiring
companies was statistically significant; lower
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profitability was observed for the acquiring companies as
well as an increase in gearing level. This result was in
conformity with previous studies (e.g. Singh (1971) and
Utton (1974)) that acquisition does not improve
profitability. The outcome tends to support the
managerial theory of merger motivation.
The second measurement criterion employed was the
normalized profitability index which takes into account
industry and economic bias (Meeks (1977)). The result
obtained showed that, on average, acquiring companies
increased their post-acquisition profitability record
(although the level of improvement was, perhaps due to the
small sample sizes, not statistically significant). These
results were not consistent with those obtained when
simple profitability measures were employed. However, it
was shown that certain factors may have been responsible
for the upward bias in the post-merger profitability.
Taking into consideration the inherent upward bias in the
methodology and the small size of the increment in
normalised profitability, it was concluded that the
acquiring companies did not improve their efficiency.
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The third criterion used adopted the Performance
Analysis Scores measurement. The methodology may be
regarded as a way of testing the risk reduction of the
acquiring companies. The evidence obtained indicated that
the PAS-scores of the acquiring companies declined
compared with a very small observed increase experienced
by non-acquiring companies. If the change in PAS-score
can be considered a reasonable surrogate measure of risk
reduction, then it would appear that acquisition leads to
increased risk.
The aggregate evidence from the current study, albeit
'fairly weak, is that acquisition does not improve
profitability neither does it lead to risk reduction. An
important question to be asked is why should the
management of the acquiring companies embark on such an
expensive venture%
Levinson (1970) pointed out that there may be valid
economic and other reasons for merging (already discussed
in Chapter 4) but that
"—between the lines of these rational reasons
for acquisitions, often there are two more
subtle reasons which are rarely discussed in
these terms: fear and obsolescence. These
unrecognized feelings constitute psychological
traps because they lead to impulsive actions
which compound the very problems that a merger
is intended to resolve" p.65
1. For example, it was reported that it cost
the Argyll Group up to t 5Om in their
unsuccessful bid for Distillers (in 1986).
364
Fear, Levinson stated, derives from the feeling that
unless the company grows, larger companies will destroy
(acquire) it. Therefore, destruction will be avoided only
by becoming more powerful. The fastest way of so doing is
to acquire other companies. The notable factor is that
the managers feel threatened, and the pre-merger size of
the company appears to be quite irrelevant. With regard
to obsolescence, Levinson argued that organisations
become more stereotyped and rigid as they age, and less
able to cope with changes in their environment. They
become obsolescent, and so do their senior managers, who
are to be found controlling enterprising organisations and
very often it will be necessary to buy the companies to
buy the managers. Behind fear and obsolescence lie
unconscious attitudes which are the actual destructive
forces which can make mergers unsuccessful, as the results
of the present study have indicated.
Managers, for these various reasons (fear,
obsolescence, etc), begin to examine merger
possibilities. Whether or not a merger actually occurs
depends on the degree of 'corporate hesitancy'. Newbould
(1970) described corporate hesitancy as a mixture of
indigestion and reluctance. Indigestion, in the corporate
sense, is where the company cannot undertake another
merger because it does not have the managerial capacity to
deal with it, so that managers become reluctant to expose
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themselves to the various problems which mergers usually
create. If hesitancy is overcome, potential merger
activity becomes actual merger activity. Whether or not
it succeeds in bringing about the reduction in uncertainty
depends upon the success with which the merger proposal is
evaluated, executed and subsequently managed. If
Newbould's analysis is correct, managers of the acquiring
companies do not, except by coincidence, act to maximize
shareholder wealth, but react to perceived changes in
uncertainty in the corporate environment.
It is therefore not surprising that the abundant
evidence on the post-acquisition performance of the
acquiring companies shows decline in the profitability of
the acquirers. The reported decline has not been an
exclusive domain of one research methodology: both
'market-based' and 'accounting-based' models seem to
provide consistent evidence. The implication of these
studies is that acquisition does not generate
shareholders' wealth, or if it does, the research tools
have been unable to capture the latent 'benefits'.
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10.8 COMPARISON OF POST-ACQUISITION PERFORMANCE OF 
ACQUIRING FIRMS ACCORDING TO THE FINANCIAL PROFILE OF 
THE ACQUIRED COMPANIES: 
Until now, no empirical study has sought to compare
the performance of acquiring companies according to the
financial profile of the acquired companies. Previous
studies have concentrated on the post-performance of the
acquiring companies in general. The results show that, on
average, the acquiring companies suffer decline on their
profitali)ility records. Evidence on how the decline (or
otherwise) in profitability is shared amongst the two
groups of acquiring companies is lacking. In this study,
a comparison of the post-acquisition performance of the
two groups of acquiring companies was made.
As stated earlier, three types of measurement
criteria were employed to compare the post-acquisition
performance of the two groups of companies. The results
obtained using the simple profitability variables indicate
that although, on average, the acquiring companies
suffered decline in profitability, the magnitude incurred
by the group acquiring non-failing companies was greater;
the increase in gearing was also greater for this group.
With the normalized profitability method, a higher
increase in profitability was observed for the group
acquiring failing companies. Stated in a different way,
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the group acquiring others with failing characteristics
(SF) performed better than the acquirers of non-failing
companies (SNF).
However, when the PAS-scores was used, the group
acquiring non-failing companies showed a lesser decline in
their relative PAS-scores. This result is not surprising,
given that potentially failing companies possess 'low'
PAS-scores prior to acquisition, and their scores could
'dilute' the post-merger PAS-scores of the acquiring
companies.
The outcome of the study is interesting, in that one
might have expected the group acquiring non-failing
targets to have performed the better of the two groups.
One possible explanation is that the acquisition of target
companies in strong financial positions is often
expensive, in the way of premium and other incidental
expenses. This means that in those years after the
acquisitions, most of these expenses were written off
through the profit and loss accounts, hence the decline in
the profitability records of the acquiring companies.
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A decline in the average industrial profitability of
the acquired and acquiring companies is unlikely to have
caused the observations since, when the performance
measures used allowed for the performance of the
respective industries, the group acquiring failing
companies still performed better than the other group.
The implication is that the group acquiring failing
companies not only 'rescued' the failing companies, they
also bettered the pre-merger performance level of the
separate companies. By so doing, the group eliminated the
hazardous cost of bankruptcy to society in general and at
the same time enhanced the wealth of the acquiring
companies' shareholders.
As the performance of the group acquiring non-failing
companies was not better than the pre-merger level of the
individual companies in their respective industries, the
motives for such acquisitions become questionable. The
companies they acquired were apparently not failing, and
one cannot therefore argue that they prevented the effect
of bankruptcy on society. On that count, they did not
render a 'social' service. Given this, an alternative
motive for acquisition would have required management of
the acquirer to seek to maximise shareholders' wealth, for
example by improving profitability: this objective does
not appear to have been achieved. Management either must
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have been poor (at negotiation of the price or in
unrealistic profit expectations) or must have had motives
other than wealth/profit maximisation.
One may conclude that the motive of management in
acquiring non-failing companies at a very high cost seems
to support the managerial theory of acquisition.
Conversely, it could be concluded, that management
acquiring potentially failing companies at a 'nominal'
cost and improving their post-acquisition performance
typifies the neo-classical motive of acquisition.
10.9 Policy Towards Mergers: 
The findings of the present study call for a review
of general public policy towards mergers - should mergers
be actively encouraged or discouraged, or should policy be
neutral.
In the United Kingdom, there have been institutional
mechanisms to encourage competition. The Monopolies
Commission was created in 1948, since then there have been
the Restrictive Trade Practices Act of 1956, the Resale
Prices Act, 1964, the Restrictive Trade Practices Act,
1968, the Fair Trading Act, 1973 and the 1976
consolidating Acts. Most of this legislation has been
about the prevention of collusion among separate and
independent suppliers in the setting of prices and other
terms of sale.
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Alongside these Acts, there has been the growth of
statutory monopolies in the form of nationalized
industries, and some attempt to control the concentration
of industrial and commercial power in the hands of
companies.
However, despite attempts to control mergers through
investigation by the Monopolies and Mergers Commissionl,
merger has continued to flourish at the expense of
'competition which the initial Acts tried to encourage2.
Concentration often involves barriers to entry inti.o a
market, price collusion and a tendency to monopoly power.
These factors are potentially harmful to the general
public. To prevent the harmful effects of concentration
(as a result of mergers), and encourage competition,
mergers should be encouraged only if they are in the
public interest'. Public interest might, for the purpose
of the present study be defined as preventing impending
bankruptcies by the acquisition of failing companies.
1. Mergers which may be referred are those where the
gross value of assets transferred exceeds P5m, or
where it would create or enhance a 'monopoly share'
of the relevant U.K. market. A 'monopoly share' is
defined as 25%, or more, of a market (Green Paper,
1978, p.24).
2. O'Brien (1978) described policy towards mergers
in the U.K. as 'benign', despite their role in
increasing concentration.
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Generally, there seem to be reasonable grounds for arguing
that acquisition of non-failing (profitable) companies
should be discouraged, as evidence from the present study
(and several others) has shown that such acquisitions only
lead to maximisation of managerial utility function.
10.10 LIMITATIONS:
The results of this study should be considered with
knowledge of its limitations. The first limitation is the
use of single-period financial ratios in deriving the
discriminant model. In real life decision making, both
multi-period financial data and an abundance of
qualitative information are available for analysis.
However, the information set used in the present study was
chosen because of the apparent theoretical and empirical
support concerning the relationship between single period
financial ratios and business outcome.
Another limitation relating to the model derivation
is the use of factor analysis as a primary descriptive
and/or data reduction technique. This technique
inevitably 'omits' certain financial dimension of the
companies unless these dimensions are included to the
extent that they are not discarded.
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Like the use of a single-period financial variables
in deriving the discriminant model, the use of the model
to classify acquired companies may be defective. This is
because firms are 'judged' on the basis of a single year's
financial information.
On the impact of each acquisition on the performance
of the acquiring company, an acquisition free-period was
arbitrarily set and the value of the acquisition was
required to be above C2m. Notwithstanding these
requirements, it is possible that an acquisition may not
have a significant impact on the post-acquisition
performance of the acquiring company because of what has
often been referred to as 'size-mismatch' (Kitching
(1967)) or 'small-company' effect. For example, a 116111
acquisition by companies like GEC plc or BTR, may not have
a significant effect on their post-acquisition performance.
Related to the above, is the matching procedure
adopted to control the 'impact' of acquisition by
considering the performance of non-acquiring companies.
In theory, the matching procedure used seems efficient in
isolating the impact of acquisitions. However, in
practice, the 'matched-pair' technique may have a drawback
since in view of the widespread nature of acquisition
activity, it is not always possible to obtain appropriate
'matched' firms.
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Similarly, although, the ICC industrial data (the
industrial averages used in the present study) classifies
companies into industries according to certain criteria,
it is difficult, if not impossible to classify some
companies, especially those with varied activities, into
one specific industry. The classification in some cases
may be subjective.
Another limitation to the present study is its
time-span. If the study had been extended to several
years, the number of companies involved in the
post-acquisition measurement part of the present study
could have been greater. However, the choice of a
short-time in this study was made because of the stability
of the variables over a short period.
Finally, the sample of companies in the present study
by design, excluded mergers in which at least one of the
companies had a great deal of merger activity (for
example, BTR., Hanson Trust). This eliminates the larger
and more profitable acquirers, thus causing a downward
bias in the results. However, Utton's (1974) study
concentrated on such 'multiple' acquirers, and also found
a decline in profitability.
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In general, the assessment of post-performance of
acquiring companies is one-sided. It cannot accurately
determine what would have happened if the merged companies
had gone their separate ways, or if they had merged with
other companies. This problem is an example of
opportunity cost measurement. Once, the decision to merge
is taken, the alternative (not to merge) disappears, and
with it, the cost. Similarly, efforts to compare the
outcome of a merger with what had been forecast before the
merger are fraught with problems. This ra±ses fundamental
issues: if the forecast performance is not achieved, is
this because of some subsequent managerial failure, or was
the forecast unreasonable in the first instance? In the
uncertain (sometimes, tense) atmosphere of a merger, it
appears unlikely that careful, rational and
non-exaggerated forecasts will be made. In most cases,
the stated objectives of an acquisition (against which
performance might later be measured) are usually expressed
in vague qualitative terms, such as "to make our presence
noticeable in the other side of the Atlantic"; "to
increase our size for defensive and competitive reasons".
Increased size does usually follow from acquisitions, but
may not always be justified in terms of efficiency.
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10.11 AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH: 
The bankruptcy prediction model adopted in the
present study has opened areas for future studies. One
area is the application of the model to contested and
non-contested bids. (Although, one of the reasons for -
contesting a bid is for an improve offer). The purpose of
the approach is to determine if there is a failure
likelihood for non-contested target companies, hence the
decision of their management not to contest the bid.
Recently, the use of 'management buyout' has provided
an alternative to 'hostile' bids, the application of the
bankruptcy prediction model will indicate whether
companies bought-out by their management were in no danger
of failure than other companies.
In the present study, the post-acquisition
performance of the two sets of acquiring companies (those
acquiring potentially failing companies and others whose
targets were not so failing) was made using
'accounting-based' model. In the past, 'market-based'
model have been used to measure the post-performance of
acquirers. In view of the approach adopted in the present
study, it is recommended that a market-based model be used
in comparing the performance of the two groups of
acquiring companies.	 The outcome will confirm or refute
the findings of the present study.
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As pointed out, no U.K. study has modelled the direct
cost of bankruptcy. This avenue appears fruitful in order
to determine the magnitude of the direct costs of
bankruptcy.
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APPENDIX G
LIST OF NON-ACQUIRED COMPANIES
Name of Company
	
Accounting Year End
1	 Adwest	 30/6/82
2	 Allied Colloid	 31/3/79
3	 Alpine Soft Drinks	 31/3/79
4	 Amstrad Electronics 	 30/6/82
5	 Associated Diaries 	 30/4/83
6	 Austin (F)	 31/12/80**
7	 Austin Reed
	 31/1/81
8	 Baker Perkins	 31/3/79
9	 Barrat Developments 	 30/6/80
10 Beecham Group
	 31/3/82
11	 Bestdbell	 31/12/81
12 Black (P)	 30/4/82
13 Bladkwood Hodge 	 31/12/78**
14 Blagdon & Noakes	 31/3/79
15 Bowater Corporation	 31/12/81
16 Brent Chemicals
	 31/12/81
17 British Home Stores	 31/3/82
18 British Printing & Comm. Corpn. 	 31/12/82
19 British Steam Specialists Group 	 31/3/81
20 Brodkhouse plc 	 30/9/82**
21 Brown & Jackson	 31/12/80**
22 Bullough	 31/10/82
23 Bulmer (H.P.)
	
24/4/80**
24 Canning (W)	 31/12/81
25 Carpets International 	 31/12/80**
26 Chadburn Porter	 31/1/81**
27 Christie Tyler	 31/12/78
28 Chubb & Sons	 31/3/80**
29 Crest Nicholson
	 31/10/81
30	 Croda	 31/12/81
31/12/8131	 Crouch (D)
32 De la Rue	 31/3/80
33 Dubilier	 30/9/82
34 Dunlop Holdings	 31/12/81**
35 Edbro Holdings	 31/3/83
36 Electro Components	 31/12/82
37 Empire Stores	 31/1/79
38 English China Clays	 30/9/79
39 Farnell Electronics	 31/1/82
40 Foster Bros
	
31/3/79
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Appendix G (Contd).
Name of Company	 Accounting Year End
41	 Freemans	 31/1/80
42 Friedland Doggart	 31/3/83
43 Forward Technology 	 31/12/79
44 Galliford Bros.	 30/6/80
45 Gill & Duffs Group 	 31/12/79
46 Grattan plc	 31/8/81
47 Greenall Whitley	 30/9/80
48 Greene, King & Sons 	 30/4/81
49 Haden Carrier	 31/12/79**
50 Halma plc	 31/3/82
51 Hazlewood Foods	 31/3/82
52 Henderson Group	 26/2/83
53 Hepworth Ceramics	 31/12/78
54 Hewden-Stuart	 31/1/79
55 Highland Distillers	 30/8/81
56 Hillards	 28/4/79
57 Home Charm	 31/12/83
58 Hunting Associated 	 31/12/82
59 Invergordon Dist.	 31 /1 2/79
60 Johnson & Firth Brown 	 30/6/78
61 Johnston Group	 31/12/80
62 Jones & Shipman	 31/12/80
63 Kalamazoo	 31/7/79
64 Lennons	 31/3/79
65 London & Midland 	 31/3/82
66 M.K. Electric	 29/3/80
67 Marley plc	 31/10/80
68 Martonair	 31/7/82
69 Matthews (Bernard) 	 1/1/83
70 McKechnie Brothers 	 31/7/81
71 Metalrax Group	 31/12/80
72 Moben Group	 31/8/82
73 Mbrgan Crucible 	 31/12/79
74 Mbss Engineering	 31/12/80**
75 Mbwlem (J)	 31/12/80
76 Multitone Electronics 	 31/3/81
77 Neil (James)	 31/12/79
78 Oceonics Group plc
	 31/3/83
79 Polly Peck	 28/8/83
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Appendix G (Contd).
Name of Company	 Accounting Year End
80 Prestige Group 	 30/12/80
81 RHP Group	 30/9/33**
82 RMC Group	 31/12/82**
83 Ransom William	 31/3/80
84 Raybedk	 26/6/83**
85 Ricardo Con. Eng. 	 30/6/82
86 Robinson (T)	 31/12/80**
87 Rodkware Group 	 31/12/80
88 Rotork	 31/12/80
89 Ruberoid	 31/12/81
90 Sainsbury (J)	 28/2/82
91	 Smith & Nephew	 30/12/82
. 92 Spirax-Sarco Eng.	 31/12/82
93 Stewart Plastics	 30/4/81
94 Tate & Lyle	 30/9/81
95 Trafalgar House	 30/9/82
96 Ultramar	 31/12/83
97 Unilever	 31/12/30
98 Unitech	 31/5/83
99 United Wire Group	 29/9/79
100 Wm Low	 1/9/78
101 Ward & Goldstone 	 31/3/81
102 Whitecroft	 31/3/80
103 Young Breweries	 31/3/80
104 Yorkshire Chemicals	 31/12/79**
** classified as 'failing'
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APPENDIX I
LIST OF NON-ACQUIRING CCMPANIES
Name of Company	 Accounting Year End
1. APV Ltd	 31/12/80
2. Aquascutum & Associated Constr.
	
31/1/79
3. Associated Fisheries plc 	 30/9/82
4. Avon Rubber Co.	 30/9/79**
5. Bespak plc	 30/4/82
6. Billam (J) Ltd 	 31/12/79
7. Birmid Qaulcast Ltd 	 30/10/79
8. Birmingham Mint (The)	 31/3/79
9. Blundell-Permoglaze Hldgs. 	 30/10/80
10 Blue Bird Confectionery Hldgs.
	 30/6/80
11 Bogod-Pelepah Ltd 	 31/3/79
12 Bolton Textile Mill & Co.	 30/4/80**
13 Bridon plc	 31/12/81
14 Brown (John)	 31/3/83**
15 Burco Dean Ltd 	 30/9/78
16 Buckley's Brewery Ltd 	 31/3/80
17 Carlton Communications plc 	 30/9/82
18 Casket (S) Holdings	 30/6/82
19 Cray Electronics Hidgs. 	 30/4/83
20	 Dart (M.Y.)	 30/6/79
21 Dee Corporation	 30/3/81**
22 Dickinson Robinson Gr. 	 31/12/77
23 Dowding & Mills Ltd 	 30/6/80
24 Donald Macpherson Group	 26/11/80
25 Duport	 31/1/83**
26 Dwek Group Ltd	 31/12/79**
27 Eleco Holdings	 30/6/82
28 Elson & Robbins	 30/9/82**
29 Evered Holdings	 31/12/82
30 EVode Group	 30/12/80
31	 Folkes (J. H.)
	
31/09/79**
32 Fothergill & Harvey plc 	 31/12/81
33 French Kier	 31/12/82
34 Gent (S.R.) plc	 30/6/83
35 HTV Group plc
	 31/7/84
36 Hickson International 	 30/9/83
37 Hickson & Welch	 30/9/78
38 Higgs & Hill plc	 31/12/82
39 Hopkinsons Holdings	 28/1/83
40 Jackson Bourne 	 31/3/82
41 James Walkers Goldsmith	 30/4/81**
42 John Carr (Doncaster)
	
30/9/82
43 John Waddington	 31/3/83**
44 Johnson Group Cleaners
	 26/12/80
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Appendix I (Contd)
Name of Company	 Accounting Year End
45 LRC International	 31/3/82
46 Liberty plc	 28/1/84
47 Low & Bonar plc	 30/11/82
48 Management Agency & Music	 31/7/79
49 Martin the Newsagent	 3/10/80
50 McCorquodale & CO	 30/9/78
51 Mitchell Cotts Group	 30/6/79
52 Monk (A)	 28/2/81
53 Mtirhead plc	 30/9/83
54 NSS Newsagents 	 30/3/80
55 Neepsend Ltd	 31/3/78
56 Norton Opax plc	 31/3/83
57 Northern Bricks plc 	 30/9/81
58 Owen Owen plc	 29/1/83
59 Pauls plc	 31/3/83
60 Peter Stores	 30/6/80
61 Petrocon Group Ltd 	 31/12/80
62 Plysu plc	 31/3/82
63 Prestige Group plc	 31/12/82
64 Readicut Int.	 31/3/79
65 Rugby Portland Cement	 31/12/80
66 Selincourt plc	 31/1/83**
67 Scapa Group	 31/3/84
68 Scott & Robertson 	 31/3/83
69 Sharpe (W.N.) Holdings	 31/12/79
70 Standard Telephones & Cables 	 31/12/82
71 Staveley Industries	 31/3/81
72 Ttnstall Telecom. Group	 30/9/82
73 United Carries Ltd 	 26/1/80
74 Vaux Breweries	 30/9/79
75 Vibroplant Holdings Ltd	 30/4/82
76 Volex Group	 31/3/83**
** classified as 'failing'
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APPMDIXJ
LIST OF ACQUIRING AND NON-ACQUIRING COMPANIES
(Post-merger Performance) 
Acquiring Companies Industry Class. Non-Acquiring Companies
1. Alcan Aluminium** Bldg mat. Hepworth Ceramics
2. Avana Industries Food Man. Tate & Lyle
3. Berisford S &II Food Man. Northern Foods
4. Booker McConnell Misc. De la Rue
5 British Vita Chemicals Brent Chemicals
6 Brooke Bond Food Man. Rank Hovis
7 Bunzl Pack. & Pap. Metal Box
8 Coats Patons Textiles Tootal Group
9 Cburtaulds Textiles Baird (W) Holdings
10 Crystalate Electrical Eurotherm Int.
11 Dobson Park Eng. Mech. Pegler-Hattersely
12 Extel Misc Portals Group
13 Ferguson Indus. Misc L.C.P. (Holdings)
14 Fine Art Development Stores Empire Stores
15 Fitch Lovell Food Ret. Morrison (W) Super.
16 Foseco Minsep Indl. Mat. Cookson Group
17 G.E.C. Electronics Ferranti
18 .G.E.I. Eng. Mech. Ricardo & CO Eng.
19 G.K.N. Metals IMI plc
20 Garnar Booth Stores Stead and Simpson
21 H.A.T. Group Cnt. & Chst. Bryant Holdings
22 Habitat Mdthercare Stores British Home Stores
23 Harris Queensway Stores House of Fraser
24 Hestair Misc. Associate Heat Services**
25 Imperial Cont. Gas**. Oil Burmah Oil**
26 Lilly (FJC) Cnt. & Cast. Wilson (C) Holdings
27 M.F.I. Stores Burton Group
28 Menzies (John) Stores Freemans (London)
29 Mining Supplies Eng. Mech. Ranscmes, Sims & Jeffe.
30 Northern Engineers Eng. Mech. Davy Corporation
31 Pentos Misc Grampian Holdings
32 Racal Electronic Plessey
33 Redland Industries Bldg. Mat. BPB Industries
34 Reed International Pack & Pap. Bowater Corporation
35 Ruberiod Bldg. mat. Marshalls Halifax
36 Sears Holdings Stores Boots (The) Co.
37 Senior Engineering Eng. Mech. Rotork
38 Scot. & Newcastle Br. Brewers Whitbread
39 Siebe Gorman Hldgs. Misc. London & Northern
40 Simon Engineering Eng. Mech. TI Group
41 Tesco Stores Kwik-Save Discounts
42 Thorn Leisure Electronic Rentals
43 Unigate Food Man. Rowntree & Mackintosh
44 Vantona Textiles Dewhurst (I .J.) Hidgs
45 Waring & Gillow Stores Stanley (A.G.)
46 Wolseley-Hughes Bldg. mat. Marley plc
47 Woolworth Stores Dixons
48 Yule Catto Misc. Hargreaves
** Unavailability of PAS-scores.
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